The politics of economic reform in the Philippines: The case of banking sector reform between 1986-1995. by Mikamo, Shingo
The Politics of Economic Reform in the Philippines 
The Case of Banking Sector Reform 
between 1986 and 1995
A thesis submitted for the degree of PhD 
School of Oriental and African Studies 
(SOAS)
University of London 
2005 
Shingo MIKAMO
ProQuest Number: 10673052
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10673052
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
2Abstract
This thesis is about the political economy of the Philippines in the process of recovery 
from the ruin of economic crisis in the early 1980s. It examines the dynamics of 
Philippine politics by focussing on banking sector reform between 1986 and 1995. 
After the economic turmoil of the early 1980s, the economy recovered between 1986 
and 1996 under the Aquino and Ramos governments, although the country is still 
facing numerous economic challenges. After the "Asian currency crisis" of 1997, the 
economy inevitably decelerated again. However, the Philippines was seen as one of the 
economies least adversely affected by the rapid depreciation of its currency.
The existing literature tends to stress the roles played by international financial 
structures, the policy preferences of the IMF, the World Bank and the US government 
and the interests of the dominant social force as decisive factors underlying economic 
and banking reform policy-making in the Philippines. However, the excessive focus on 
these factors limits our ability to examine economic reform policy-making since they 
depict Philippine politics as a process in which policy outcomes are determined by 
relatively immediate expressions of either foreign-rooted or socially-rooted demands.
This thesis will offer an alternative view, by seeking to show the merits of an approach 
which locates "policy elites and institutions" at the centre of the analysis of banking 
reform policy-making. It will be argued that the decisions of policy elites, including the 
President, legislators and state officials (Central Bank officials), and the interactions 
among them, which are affected by changing political institutions, are vital to 
explanations of the success or failure of banking reform. Political institutions 
strengthen or weaken the interests and capacities of presidents, the centre of Philippine 
government, in promoting reforms in the banking sector.
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Chapter 1.
Introduction:
The Recovery and Reform of the Philippine Banking Sector 
Introduction
This thesis examines banking sector reform in the Philippines between 1986 and 1995, 
the period of economic recovery after the economic and banking crisis of the early 
1980s. By the late 1990s, the Philippines was seen as the "sick man of Asia", left 
behind by countries such as Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia. The failure of the Philippine economy in comparison with other Asian 
countries has been discussed by many observers.1 However, there are still very few 
studies devoted to the recovery of the mid-1990s and the relative stability of the 
economy after the currency crisis.2
After the serious economic turmoil of the early 1980s, the economy recovered between 
1986 and 1996 under the Aquino and Ramos governments, although the country is still 
facing numerous economic challenges. "Crony Capitalism", the word originally created 
to describe presidential cronyism under the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines, is 
more often used as a general word to refer to Asian (or developing) countries in the late 
1990s (see Kang, 2002). In the Philippines, various market-oriented reforms have been 
implemented and the state regulatory framework has been improved since the economic 
and banking crisis of the early 1980s. The Philippines is seen as a country which 
vigorously implemented liberalisation reforms in the 1990s.3
After the "Asian currency crisis" of 1997, the economy inevitably decelerated again.
However, the Philippines was seen as one of the economies least adversely affected by
1 For example, see Hutchcroft (1998), Haggard (1998), Bowie and Unger (1997), Jayasuriya (1995), 
Lindsey (1995), Rivera (1994), Yoshihara (1994), Broad (1988), and Hawes (1987).
2 For example, see MacIntyre (2001), Haggard (2000), Noland (2000) and Kang (2002).
3 According to a new index by A.T. Kearney, a consulting firm, the Philippines had the most rapidly 
"globalising" economy in 1993-1997 (cited in The Economist April 8th 2000:144). This is measured 
by variables such as openness to trade and investment, credit-worthiness and the importance of tourism 
and transfers from foreign workers.
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the rapid depreciation of its currency.4 In terms of economic growth, the Philippines has 
never recorded a high growth rate continuously. Poverty and unemployment are still a 
serious cause for concern. There are still many examples of favouritism, corruption and 
ineffectual state regulation in the banking sector.5 In early 2001, President Estrada was 
forced to leave the palace after misconduct was revealed.6 Yet, in spite of the dramatic 
political events fuelled by the financial scandal, the Central Bank was able to maintain 
relative monetary and banking stability although the political turmoil damaged a big 
commercial bank which had close links with the scandal. In this context, this thesis 
examines the politics of banking reform in the process of economic recovery after the 
economic crisis of the early 1980s.
In the last two decades, the existing literature on the Philippine political economy has 
been obsessed with one question: why was the Philippine economy left behind by other 
Asian countries including Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia? In order to understand the continuing failure of the economy and related 
policy reform in the Philippines, the existing literature tends to stress the roles played 
by international financial structures, the policy preferences of the IMF, the World Bank 
and the US government7 and the interests of the dominant social force as decisive 
factors underlying policy-making in the Philippines. With regard to the Philippine state, 
most studies have focused on the "weakness" of the state and the "strength" of the 
dominant social force (or oligarchy).8 International influences and the effects of social 
forces are important variables when explaining economic policy reform. However, the 
excessive focus on these factors limits our ability to examine economic reform policy­
making since they depict Philippine politics as a process in which policy outcomes are 
determined by relatively immediate expressions of either foreign-rooted or socially-
4 See, for example, Sicat (1999), Intal (1998) and Lim (1998).
5 For the Estrada cronyism, see, for example, Coronel (ed.) (2000).
6 For a report on the impeachment, see, for example, Hutchinson and Tordesillas (2001).
7 See Payer (1974), Bello, Kinley and Elinson (1982) and Broad (1988).
8 See, for example, May (1998), Hutchcroft (1998), Haggard (1998), Bowie and Unger (1997), 
Jayasuriya (1995), Lindsey (1995), Rivera (1994), Yoshihara (1994), Broad (1988), and Hawes (1987). 
Doronila (1992), which draws more attention to the state in the process of industrialisation, is a 
notable exception, although it recognises the "weakness" of the state.
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rooted demands.9
This thesis will offer an alternative view, by seeking to show the merits of an approach 
which locates "policy elites and institutions" at the centre of the analysis of banking 
reform policy-making. It will be argued that the decisions of policy elites, including the 
President, legislators and state officials (Central Bank officials), and the interactions 
among them, which are affected by changing political institutions, are vital to 
explanations of the success or failure of banking reform. Political institutions 
strengthen or weaken the interests and capacities of presidents, the centre of Philippine 
government, in promoting reforms in the banking sector. Both foreign-rooted and 
socially-rooted demands are influential in banking reform policy-making, but these are 
mediated by political institutions and influence the decision of policy elites.
The main focus of this study is the commercial banking sector, the largest segment of 
the banking sector and the financial sector as a whole in the Philippines. The restoration 
of relative stability in the banking sector alone cannot lead to high economic growth 
rates. Economic development is obviously a more complicated process than banking 
sector development. Banking sector reform is only one example of economic reform. 
Each area of economic reform whether it be agrarian, budget, tax, trade or infrastructure 
reform, is closely associated with its own unique set of economic and political factors. 
However, in the Philippines banking sector reform especially is critical to any attempt to 
understand economic reform and politics. The stability and performance of the banking 
sector is closely connected with the macro-economy (see Bautista, Ybanez and Agulto, 
Jr.,1995:16-22). Banks have close connections with all businesses and their lending 
decisions have a strong impact on businesses (see Gochoco-Bautista and Reside,
9 Studies which depart from this dominant trend in an attempt to understand the dynamic changes in 
state and society and the complexity of their interaction in the policy-making process, have just started 
to emerge. See, for example, Magadia (1999), Eaton (2002) and Montojo (1998). For studies which 
focus more on the process of policy-making, see Ateneo Centre for Social Policy & Public Affairs 
(1997) and Third World Studies Centre (1994). de Guzman (ed.) (1963) is a pioneering work on the 
decision-making of policy choice in the Philippines. Interesting studies which are more concerned 
about societal actors are also emerging. For example, the important role of NGOs in Philippine 
politics is examined by Clarke (1998) and a critical social movement in elections is analysed by 
Hedman (1998). For a recent study of political leadership in local politics, see Kawanaka (2002).
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2000). As creditors, banks play an important role in corporate governance. Importantly, 
during the period in question banking reforms were guided by two key principles of 
economic reform: liberalisation and the strengthening of the state regulatory 
framework.
In its analysis of banking reform policy-making, this thesis distinguishes between two 
types of reform: structural and regulatory reform. The working definition of structural 
reform is reform which entails changes in the existing laws through the legislative 
process. In particular, amendments of two key laws, namely the Central Bank Act (R.A. 
265) and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337) which had provided the legislation 
necessary for the monetary and banking sector regulation from 1949, can be seen as 
critical structural reforms. Regulatory reform is defined as reform which can be 
implemented by the Central Bank within the existing legal framework.
The following section of this introductory chapter will examine the developments and 
reforms of the banking sector after the economic and banking crisis of the early 1980s. 
Although weaknesses remain, the banking sector has successfully undergone various 
changes facilitated by reforms. After reviewing the existing literature on economic and 
banking reform policy-making, issues relating to "policy elites and institutions" will be 
explored. The final section will provide an overview of changing political institutions 
and banking reform in the Philippines.
Developments and Reforms in the Banking Sector since the Early 1980s
The Philippine banking sector has long been seen as a symbol of the country's failed 
economy. Banking frauds, including behest loans and DOSRI (directors, officers, 
stockholders and related interests) loans, and the cartel-like behaviour of the big banks 
have been identified as the main obstacles to effective financial intermediation in the 
Philippines. For example, in his influential study, Hutchcroft (1998) stresses the 
continuing role of "rampant favouritism" and "ineffectual state regulation" in the 
Philippine banking sector as typical of the failed economy. As many studies suggest, 
however, despite the remaining weakness, the Philippine banking sector was showing
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visible improvements by the mid-1990s. Although banking frauds remained a potential 
threat to financial stability, as in other developing and developed economies, the level of 
fraudulent loans and financial distortion which had reached a peak in the late Marcos 
dictatorship, fell in the 1990s. After the economic and banking crisis of the early 1980s, 
the banking sector underwent radical changes facilitated by various policy reforms, 
although the relatively successful implementation of reforms in the 1990s has not 
guaranteed the development of a stable and effective banking sector in the following 
decades.
Although the level of financial development in the Philippines was not impressive in 
comparison with Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, the financial sector showed 
strong growth in the mid-1990s. Various monetary and financial indicators improved. 
The ratio of M3 to GNP increased from 0.25 in 1986 to 0.41 in 1998 (Gochoco- 
Bautista,1999:39-40,Table 3). The share of deposits to GNP rose rapidly between 1986 
and 1995, from 27.95 per cent to 52.46 per cent (Intal and Llant,1998:Table 3). It is 
true that Gross Domestic Saving (GDP minus consumption by both private and public 
sectors) is still low in comparison with other ASEAN countries such as Singapore, 
Malaysia and Thailand. However, as Ravalo (1998) points out, the relatively low Gross 
Domestic Saving, which is closely connected with the level of the GDP, cannot be seen 
as a simple indicator of the inefficiency of the banking sector. The relatively low level 
of GDP growth cannot be explained by the inefficiency of the banking sector alone.
All the assets, domestic credits and deposits of the financial system steadily increased 
between 1987 and 1997 (see Table 1-2). As the economy recovered, the size of the 
banking sector expanded. The total assets of the commercial banks increased from 
264,635 million pesos in 1986 to 1,347,362 million pesos in 1995 (see Table 1-3). The 
number of branches also expanded. In 1986, 33 commercial banks had 1,589 branches 
and in 1995, 48 commercial banks had 3,152 branches (see Table 1-4). Increases in 
bank profits can be seen as a sign of recovery from the brink of collapse. Between 
1983 and 1986, huge losses and non-performing assets were registered in the banking 
sector, mainly due to the problems of the state-owned Philippine National Bank (PNB) 
and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), which occupied a large share of the
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banking sector. In 1986, the commercial banks recorded 2,607 million pesos in total 
losses. By contrast, in 1995 the total profits of the commercial banks amounted to 
25,906 million pesos (see Table 1-5). The asset quality of the banking sector had also 
improved by 1997. The proportion of non-performing loans (NPLs) decreased to 2.8 
per cent in 1996 from 22.6 per cent in 1985 (see Table 1-6), although asset quality 
declined after the currency crisis. In commercial banks, NPLs had risen to 12.3 per cent 
by 1999 and to 15.1 per cent by the end of 2000 due to slower economic growth and 
market instability, although some part of the deterioration reflected tighter reporting 
standards.10 Private commercial banks have become less reliant on credit from the state. 
Recent studies on the banking sector reveal a significant shift in the liability structure of 
the commercial banking system towards much greater reliance on deposits and less 
dependence on borrowings.11
The banking sector was seen as typical of a Philippine business sector dominated by a 
small number of elite families (oligarchy) who made large profits at low risk due to 
close familial ties with power holders in the state and other businesses (see 
Hutchcroft,1998). However, by the 1990s the banking business was no longer an easy 
business in a highly-protected environment. The structure of the banking sector 
changed rapidly as a consequence of policy reforms. Under the Aquino government, 
the role of state banks, which had been predominant under the Marcos dictatorship, 
became much smaller, although they are still large players in the banking sector. In the 
early 1990s, the Central Bank started to facilitate competition among banks by easing 
the tight regulation on the opening of new domestic banks and branches of banks, while 
it maintained the conservative prudential regulations. Under the Ramos government, 
competition among banks was further encouraged by the entry of new foreign banks, a 
development which would have been unthinkable in previous decades.
In the 1990s, the banking sector was forced into a more competitive environment by 
changes in regulation, although excessive competition became a potential threat to the 
stability of the financial system. Under the more liberalised environment, increasing
10 For the analysis of the banking sector, see World Bank (document) (2002:34-37).
11 See Bautista, Ybahez and Agulto, Jr., (1995:26) and Intal and Llant (1998:16-17).
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competition among banks, in particular among big commercial banks, was observed.12 
Although the entry of new foreign banks was allowed under the terms of the restrictive 
guidelines, the effect of this was to facilitate competition among the top domestic banks, 
which were supposed to be dominated by the "oligarchy". Big commercial banks were 
forced to extend their business to middle markets and to consumer markets such as car 
and home loans. Smaller banks also tried hard to acquire more savings and to expand 
their business. Philippine banks faced fierce competition to gain larger market shares in 
diverse business activities and to acquire deposits (cheap funds).
In the 1990s, the structure of the banking sector differed significantly from that of the 
first half of the 1980s (see Table 1-7). The large profits of the top private commercial 
banks during the economic recession of the early 1980s clearly showed the distortion 
of the banking sector. By the late 1990s, in a more competitive business environment, 
further mergers among big commercial banks such as Philippine Commercial and 
International Bank (PCIBank) and Equitable Bank, and Bank of the Philippine Islands 
(BPI) and Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBT) showed that a new era had 
dawned in the banking industry. Today, there is no single expanded commercial bank 
which serves entirely the needs of a particular business group, although business 
connections through large shareholders play an important role in the banking business. 
The banking business is still profitable for well managed banks, but there is no 
indicator which shows the continuation of the structure which secured "enormous 
profits" for banks in the 1990s. After the currency crisis of the late 1990s, the ROE 
(Return on Equity) of banks rapidly decreased in response to the low economic growth. 
The ROE of the Philippine banking system declined from 12.42 per cent in 1997 to 
5.81 per cent in 1998 (see Gochoco-Bautista, 1999:44, Table 5).
The question of the high intermediation costs is a contentious issue among economists.
However, there is little evidence to show that the high level of intermediation costs in the
1990s can simply be seen as a "powerful testimonial to oligopolistic power"
(Hutchcroft,1998:230). The slow process of reducing intermediation costs should be
understood in conjunction with other regulatory policies such as relatively high reserve
requirements and tax policy, and macro economic policy, especially foreign exchange 
12 See Hapitan (2001), Unite and Sullivan (2001) and Manzano and Neri (2001).
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policy (see Manzano and Neri, 2001). Expanding client base in retail banking 
potentially increased lending rates since new borrowers of car and home loans 
inevitably brought higher risks in comparison with the traditional borrowers of big 
commercial banks such as big coiporations and very rich individuals.
With regard to the development of the banking sector, it should also be noted that the 
banking sector now has a more reliable regulator, namely the Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas (BSP). In 1993, the huge debts of the old Central Bank were finally liquidated 
by the establishment of this new monetary authority. The new Central Bank has greater 
regulatory powers and independence as a monetary authority through the new 
legislation, although coordination between fiscal and monetary policy is still a 
contentious area. In addition to reducing its role in development finance by changing 
the composition of the Monetary Board, its core decision-making body, the new BSP 
has more successfully distanced itself from political affairs than its predecessor. Better 
protection of bank officials from legal action has also been provided. In terms of 
handling insolvent banks, the heavy burden of the Central Bank has been reduced as the 
role of the Philippine Deposit and Insurance Corporation (PDIC) has been enhanced. 
The Central Bank was streamlined by the organisational reforms, and the salaries of 
Bank officials were increased. The reform of the Central Bank can be seen as a critical 
factor in maintaining macro-economic stability after the currency crisis.
The BSP has maintained a good reputation as a regulator among the business 
community both inside and outside the Philippines. According to the surveys of the 
Makati Business Club (MBC) and the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(PCCI), the BSP was the best performing government institution in 1996. A business 
magazine, Asiamoney, chose BSP governor Gabriel C. Singson as the "Central Bank 
Governor of the Year 1996". The BSP maintained its good reputation after the currency 
crisis. In the Philippines, it is often said that corruption is widespread, but in terms of 
the monetary authority, there have been few specific charges of (or rumours about) 
corruption in the late 1990s. Although the notion of "reputation" is changing in nature, 
particularly in the Philippines, the restoration of the Central Bank’s reputation as a 
monetary authority in the mid-1990s was a critical step towards monetary and banking
20
stability.
After the currency crisis , as is broadly recognised, the Philippines had a more stable 
banking sector than Korea, Thailand, Malaysia or Indonesia. Although the public was 
burdened with the huge costs of the failure of the banking sector under the Marcos 
dictatorship, the Philippines was one of the countries in the region which was able to 
avoid the use of large public funds to restore financial stability after the currency crisis. 
Since the economic crisis of the early 1980s, the Central Bank has adopted a more 
assertive attitude towards regulating the banking sector. The minimum capital 
requirement for banks has been steadily increased to improve the stability of the 
banking sector. Every commercial bank must also maintain a high capital adequacy 
ratio, defined by the Central Bank as the ratio of net worth (capital account) to risk 
assets. In 1992-1997, the capital adequacy ratio stayed within the range of 16.9 per cent 
to 20.2 per cent (Intal and Llant,1998:18, Table 5). This is twice as high as the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) requirement of 8 per cent. After the foreign exchange 
liberalisation, the risks which the public sector might shoulder have largely been 
reduced. Foreign exchange losses were one of the main causes of the enormous cost of 
maintaining the financial system. Learning from past experience, the new Central Bank 
has cautiously maintained the foreign currency accounts in surplus.
Another critical development was that of the 1998 Presidential election which was the 
first not to seriously damage monetary stability in the Philippines, although there had 
been some positive signs in the previous election. Although election-related murders 
and fraud are still serious threats to Philippine democracy, maintaining macro-economic 
stability in an election year had been a long-term "dream" for the monetary authority 
after repeated experiences throughout post-war history of macroeconomic instability 
caused by excessive spending during presidential elections. In this context, this thesis 
seeks to solve one of the puzzles of the Philippine political economy: why were the 
Aquino and, more importantly, Ramos governments able to implement important 
banking reforms which contributed to the restoration of monetary and banking 
stability?
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Explaining Economic and Banking Reform Policy-Making
Banking policy reforms have been mainly examined by economists.13 These studies 
provide valuable insights into the developments, reforms and problems of the banking 
sector. Obviously, this thesis has also drawn a great deal on these insights. There are 
still problems in the banking sector and in the macro economy, most notably the 
relatively high banking spreads (intermediation costs) and the low level of Gross 
Domestic Saving (GDS). The Central Bank continues to face difficult challenges in its 
efforts to develop a stable and effective banking sector in the context of unstable 
international financial markets. However, the recovery of the banking sector after the 
economic crisis, the important shift toward liberalisation and the significant 
improvement of regulatory policy have been largely recognised and discussed by 
economists. In particular, after the currency crisis, the various banking reforms of the 
second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s have been seen as an important factor 
contributing to the relative stability of the banking sector despite the economic shocks.14
However, the main concern of economic literature is banking policy review, and the 
effects of various liberalisation measures and regulatory reforms.15 In these analyses, 
banking reform policy-making is largely seen as a matter of technical choice, although 
there is a recognition of the importance of political factors in monetary and banking 
stability.
With respect to the liberalisation of the banking sector, the main concern of economists 
is the effect of liberalisation measures on the domestic banking sector. The causes of 
liberal reform and the process of forming and implementing reform have been rarely
13 See, especially, Intal and Llanto (1998), Lamberte and Llanto (1995), Paderanga (1996) and 
Bautista, Ybanez and Agulto (1995). For the growing literature on the Philippine banking sector after 
the currency crisis, see Gochoco-Bautista (1999), Gochoco-Bautista and Reside (2000), Canlas (2000), 
Intal, et al. (1998), Urn (1998), Noland (2000) and Sicat (1999).
14 For example, see Gochoco-Bautista (1999:32), Canlas (2000:37), Intal, et al. (1998:154), Sicat 
(1999:44) and Intal and Llanto (1998:2).
15 For debates on the effects of the entry of new foreign banks, see Hapitan (2001), Unite and 
Sullivan (2001) and Manzano and Neri (2001). For recent studies on banking regulation, see Lamberte 
(2002), Milo (2001) and Milo (2002).
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discussed by economists.16 Since the early 1980s, the importance of liberal reform has 
been recognised by local economists and encouraged by the IMF, the World Bank and 
the US government, but the implementation of liberal reforms has never been smooth. 
To understand the successes or failures of liberal reforms, changing political factors 
need to be placed at the centre of the analysis.
With regard to regulatory reform, for example, Lamberte (2002) has examined 
extensively the significant changes in the role of the Central Bank, in particular after the 
establishment of the new Central Bank, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). However, 
with respect to the causes of the Central Bank reform, the study simply points out the 
important contribution of the Legislature under the Ramos government in establishing 
the new Central Bank, without examining the policy-making process (see 
Lamberte,2002:8). The urgency of the Central Bank reform had been recognised since 
the mid-1980s. Yet, the implementation of the Central Bank reform was a turbulent 
process. As Lamberte notes, the leadership and commitments of legislators, particularly 
senators, were crucial in the successful implementation of the Central Bank reform, but 
these should be understood in the broader context of changing political institutions. 
The commitment of legislators to the reform of the banking sector in cooperation with 
the President was strengthened by changing electoral rules under the 1987 
Constitution.
Despite the significant contribution they make to our understanding of banking policy, 
the studies published by economists leave one important question unanswered: how 
and why was critical banking reform implemented under the Aquino and, more 
seriously, the Ramos government? Unlike the economic literature, this thesis aims 
essentially to examine the politics of economic and banking reform policy-making.
In his influential study, Hutchcroft (1998) examines the politics of the banking sector
and uses evidence drawn from the commercial banking sector to show how the major
obstacles to economic development in the Philippines lie in the political sphere.
Essentially, he sees the Philippine banking sector as a typical case of rampant
favouritism and ineffectual state regulation, and stresses the historical continuity of 
16 For notable exceptions, see de Dios (2000) and Alburo (1993).
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these factors. He argues that the "rampant favouritism" and "ineffectual state 
regulation", which impede economic growth, can be understood in the context of the 
structure of Philippine society and the state, viewed as "a predatory oligarchy and a 
patrimonial state" (see Hutchcroft,1998:l~12).17 He also claims that "[T]he favour or 
disfavour of those oligarchs currently holding state office is a major determinant of the 
relative success or failure of particular banks" (Hutchcroft,1998:8). This perspective is 
consistent with a broad trend in debates on Philippine politics: the stress on 
interpersonal relationships and their strong continuity through history (see Kerkvliet, 
1995:401). Hutchcroft rightly addresses the importance of political factors in economic 
development but his approach leads to a limited understanding of the development, 
reforms and problems of the Philippine banking sector in the process of economic 
recovery.
First of all, the limitations of his analysis stem from a reliance on too broad a typology 
to explain the politics of the banking sector in the Philippines. The primary goal of his 
study is to "explain the Philippines' longstanding 'developmental bog'" 
(Hutchcroft, 1998:1). Hutchcroft attempts to explain the continuing economic problems 
of the Philippines by employing a broad categorisation of capitalist systems. He notes 
that:
"Economies are commonly expected to fall somewhere along a continuum 
between laissez-faire and statist models. The Philippines highlights the basic 
inadequacy of this popular typology, precisely because its economy does 
not exhibit key characteristics of either laissez-faire or statist capitalism" 
(Hutchcroft, 1998:19).
In order to find an adequate place for the Philippines and other developing countries, he 
adds one more category ("rent capitalism"). He insists that:
"The laissez-faire versus statist continuum generally highlights only one 
vital dimension of intra-capitalist variation: the relative strengths of state 
apparatuses and business interests. A second dimension, however, is just as 
vital: variation among state apparatuses, many of which exhibit strong
patrimonial features" (Hutchcroft,1998:19).
17 The "patrimonial framework" originated in Weber's work (1978, Vol.2, Chapter 12). For an 
analysis of the Philippines in the context of this framework, see also Hutchcroft (1991).
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He names this second dimension "rent capitalism", which is identical with "patrimonial 
polity". There are two types of "patrimonial polity (rent capitalism)": "the patrimonial 
administrative state (bureaucratic capitalism)" and "the patrimonial oligarchic state 
(booty capitalism)". The Philippines is categorised as "a patrimonial oligarchic state 
(booty capitalism)" while Thailand and Indonesia are classified as "patrimonial 
administrative states (bureaucratic capitalism)".
When he comes to consider the differences between the two types, Hutchcroft notes 
that: "[I]n the patrimonial administrative state, the dominant social force is a 
bureaucratic elite - based within the state apparatus". "In the patrimonial oligarchic state, 
on the other hand, the dominant social force - an oligarchy - has an economic base quite 
independent of the state apparatus, but access to the state is nonetheless the major 
avenue to private accumulation". He asserts that "over the long term, obstacles to 
change will tend to be far more problematic in the patrimonial oligarchic state" (booty 
capitalism) "than in the patrimonial administrative state, or bureaucratic polity" 
(bureaucratic capitalism) (Hutchcroft,1998:234).
These categories of the patrimonial oligarchic state (booty capitalism) and patrimonial 
administrative state (bureaucratic capitalism) are offered in order to explain the failure 
of the Philippine banking sector in comparison with other Asian countries such as 
Thailand and Indonesia. However, an analysis based on this broad categorisation limits 
our ability to understand banking reform policy-making in the process of economic 
recovery in the Philippines. Despite the remaining weaknesses of the banking sector, 
the "patrimonial oligarchic state (booty capitalism)" was able to restore banking 
stability in the 1990s. The "patrimonial administrative states" of Thailand and Indonesia 
(Hutchcroft,1998:5), on the other hand, showed serious weakness in banking regulation 
in the 1990s.
Secondly, in addition to the weakness inherent in an analysis relying on such a broad 
typology, Hutchcroft's assertion that the Philippine elite is the most influential force in 
state decision-making is problematic. Essentially, Hutchcroft sees the Philippine elite as 
a unified social force which shares the same interests and policy preferences. He notes
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that "the Philippine elite has displayed a remarkable degree of consensus on major 
issues of national policy, even as it fights with passion (and often violence) over the 
division of spoils" (Hutchcroft,1998:250). However, as he notes, throughout its history 
there have always been fierce conflicts among Philippine elites both in and out of the 
state over key policy issues. These conflicts have been an important factor facilitating 
(or decelerating) banking reform. In the 1950s, a fierce conflict among Philippine elites 
emerged over monetary policy ("the monetary policy debate") in which the most 
powerful faction in the country's history, namely the "sugar bloc", failed to enforce 
monetary policy to serve its business interests. In the 1960s, the controversy over 
decontrol policy witnessed a continuing struggle among Philippine elites pursuing its 
own business interests. As Marcos gained political power, he was at the centre of 
conflicts among Philippine elites in the 1960s and 1970s. Under Marcos's authoritarian 
rule, as the tight control of the dictatorship started to loosen in the late 1970s, fierce 
conflicts among Philippine elites were again revealed. As the economy decelerated, 
there were fierce battles among Philippine elites over fiscal, monetary and banking 
policy. Anti-Marcos movements among business and religious elites clearly showed the 
fragmentation of Philippine elites. Under the Aquino government, conflicts among 
Philippine elites continued. There were intense debates over key policy including 
foreign debt, social reform and the US bases issues. There was strong opposition to 
liberal reforms under the Aquino and Ramos governments.
The assumption that the Philippine elite is a powerful and uniform entity becomes 
problematic in the analysis of liberalisation. Since economic liberalisation potentially 
leads to more competition among businesses, it is very unlikely to occur if the economy 
is dominated by a powerful and uniform oligarchy. Thus, in Hutchcroft's study (1998), 
although the promotion of liberal reform as a broad policy trend under the Ramos 
government is acknowledged, the implementation of liberalisation in the banking sector, 
such as the entry of new foreign banks, is treated as a very limited measure in spite of 
its obvious significance. In Hutchcroft's view, the promotion of liberal reform was 
largely prevented by the strong interests of the oligarchy, despite the trend towards 
economic liberalisation in the 1990s. Yet, as noted earlier, since the mid-1980s, changes 
in the structure of the banking sector due to liberalisation were evident even liberal
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reforms are not always helpful in developing an effective and stable banking sector.
Thirdly, Hutchcroft's excessive stress on the continuing "weakness" of the Philippine 
state apparatus is also problematic in terms of the analysis of the banking sector during 
the period of economic recovery. The establishment of the new Central Bank and the 
financial restructuring of the bank are simply seen as cases in which the financial mess 
at the Central Bank led to huge costs for the public. With regard to regulatory power 
and the role of the Central Bank, Hutchcroft observes "little change in the overall 
character of the monetary authority" (Hutchcroft,1998:211). Thus, the successful 
passage of the new Central Bank Act is seen as having little impact on the banking 
sector in Hutchcroft's study.
However, it must be noted that his assessment of the reforms stands in sharp contrast to 
those of other leading economists.18 There is no economic literature which stresses the 
importance of the strong continuity in the banking sector and the Central Bank under 
the Marcos, Aquino and Ramos governments, although all observers agree that there are 
weaknesses remaining in the banking sector.19 Contrary to Hutchcroft's observation, as 
a regulatory authority, the Central Bank has experienced radical changes in terms of its 
role and regulatory power since the early 1980s. The process of economic and banking 
recovery has been associated with the improvements of the regulatory authority under 
changing political institutions. In the early 1980s, under the Marcos dictatorship, the 
Central Bank had been very vulnerable to the direct intervention of the President. The 
Central Bank, which played a critical role in development finance, allocation of foreign 
exchange and rescue of ailing banks, was unable to maintain its autonomy from the 
President and political affairs. During the economic crisis, the President intervened 
directly in the decisions of the Central Bank to rescue ailing banks. Election-related 
spending reemerged as a serious threat to monetary stability. Under the Marcos 
government, the Central Bank was unable to restore public confidence in the banking 
sector. After President Aquino took power, banking reform was initiated in order to
18 See, particularly Lamberte (2002).
19 See, for example, Intal and Llanto (1998), Lamberte and Llanto (1995), Paderanga (1996),
Bautista, Ybanez and Agulto (1995), Gochoco-Bautista (1999), Gochoco-Bautista and Reside (2000), 
Canlas (2000), Intal, et al. (1998), Lim (1998), Noland (2000) and Sicat (1999).
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redirect policy and to eradicate the effects of Marcos's influence. Redirecting state 
intervention, the Central Bank facilitated the reduction of its own role in development 
finance. The Central Bank was able to regulate banks more independently under the 
new President. President Aquino, unlike her predecessor, did not intervene directly in 
the Central Bank's decisions. With support from the President, the Central Bank 
implemented liberalisation measures through regulatory reforms in the early 1990s. 
Under the Ramos government, the Central Bank further improved its regulatory powers 
through the enactment of the New Central Bank Act. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 
(BSP) is still facing numerous challenges under changing economic conditions, but it 
has secured more distance from political affairs than before due to the reduction of its 
role in development finance and the Monetary Board reform.
Hutchcroft (1998:208) stresses the importance of the Ramos administration's skill in 
allocating discretionary funds to legislators and the financial support of the World 
Bank in the enactment of the New Central Bank Act. However, the Central Bank reform 
cannot be fully understood in terms of the "old tactics" (use of discretionary funds) and 
the financial support of the World Bank alone. As a means to reforming the banking 
sector, the "old tactics" had not worked at all under the "old" Legislature between 1949 
and 1972 under the 1935 Constitution. The Central Bank was established in 1949, but 
there was no key structural reform in the banking sector through the legislative process 
until the Legislature was closed in 1972, although the urgency of banking reform was 
evident by the late 1960s. As noted, despite generous support from the World Bank, the 
Aquino government failed to implement the Central Bank reform. In order to 
understand why the "old tactics" were effective under the Ramos government and why 
the government adopted the policy recommended by the World Bank, the decisions of 
the policy elites and the interaction among them need to be examined in the light of the 
changes occurring in the political institutions as a result of the 1987 Constitution, which 
strengthened the interests and capacities of the President in promoting banking reform.
As economists point out, there are still many weaknesses in the Philippine economy
and in the banking sector.20 Improving regulatory policy is a continuing process. In a
more globalised and liberalised policy environment, maintaining banking stability 
20 See, for example, Gochoco-Bautista (1999:55-73).
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becomes more difficult. The Central Bank has always been on a tightrope in terms of 
regulating the banking sector. The relatively successful restoration of banking stability 
after the financial crisis will not secure continuing stability and the further development 
of the banking sector. However, the key events associated with the Philippine banking 
sector in the process of economic recovery, including the overall restoration of relative 
banking stability, changes to the banking sector structure, significant changes in the role 
of the Central Bank, the facilitation of competition among banks through liberalisation 
measures and the enhancement of the Central Bank's regulatory power, can hardly be 
understood simply as the effects of personal favours bestowed by a dominant 
oligarchy.
While in Hutchcroft's study (1998), liberalisation in the banking sector is treated as a 
very limited measure, other observers view liberalisation as the underlying cause of the 
problems in the economy and the banking sector.21 According to the studies of Bello, 
Kinley and Elinson (1982) and Broad (1988), the promotion of liberalisation in the 
1980s has been linked to the strong influence of the IMF, the World Bank and the US 
government and to the close ties between these entities and technocrats in the Philippine 
state. In the 1990s, the strong influence of international factors on Central Bank reform 
was also observed by Maxfield (1997). After the end of the "Cold War" and the 
departure of the US military, there was a change in US security interests which was 
seen as an important factor mitigating the pressures from the IMF and World Bank for 
liberal reform during the early years of the Aquino government. Along with the global 
trend towards liberalisation, some observers stress this change in US security concern 
as a decisive factor in the promotion of liberal reform in the Philippines in the 1990s 
(see Hutchcroft,1998:245).
As the Philippine experience shows, foreign support has been an important factor in 
activating the interests of policy elites in promoting economic and banking reform. 
Nevertheless, the promotion of liberal policy reform in the banking sector and other 
sectors in the Philippines can hardly be seen simply as a response to policies enforced
by foreign governments and financial institutions. The successes and failures of
21 See, for example, Bello (2000). For the negative impact of liberalising the banking sector on 
employment, see IBON Facts & Figures, 15 & 31 December 2000, "Philippine Financial System".
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banking reform in the Philippines cannot be wholly explained by reference to foreign 
pressures centred on US interests. It is important to recognise that the policy elite, 
including the President, legislators and state officials, have not simply served foreign 
interests. Despite a strong trend towards financial liberalisation in the 1990s, banking 
regulation, foreign exchange policy, the structure of the banking sector and the level of 
financial stability varied across Asian economies, as many studies of the Asian 
economic crisis show.22
During the economic crisis of the early 1980s, in spite of strong pressure from the IMF 
and the World Bank, the Marcos government repeatedly delayed the implementation of 
stabilisation measures based on economic orthodoxy due to an internal political factor, 
namely the 1984 legislative elections. The government did not implement liberal 
reforms in the coconut and sugar industries during the Marcos Presidency despite 
enormous pressure from the IMF and the World Bank because the President was 
determined to protect the interests of his close allies. The US seemed to be supportive 
of the Marcos government, but the IMF and the World Bank largely maintained their 
stance in temis of policy conditionality. Lack of foreign funds due to the strict position 
of the IMF and the World Bank further weakened the US-backed President Marcos. 
The restructuring of state banks was eventually to become the first step towards liberal 
reform in the banking sector. However, the Marcos government blocked such reform, 
ignoring the advice of the governor of the Central Bank, the Minister of Finance, the 
IMF and World Bank.
The Aquino government, on the other hand, selectively implemented the economic
reforms recommended by the IMF and the World Bank. With foreign support, the
Aquino government implemented some economic and banking reforms but not others.
The success and failures of banking reform can only be fully understood by examining
internal political factors. The monopolies in the coconut and sugar industries were
terminated and the state banks were finally rehabilitated. But these measures were not
simply the result of increasing pressure from foreign actors. The absolute power of the
President during the transitional period and the urgent necessity to reform economic
policy and eradicate Marcos's influence immediately after Aquino took power were also 
22 See, for example, Asian Development Bank (1999) and Haggard (2000).
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critical factors.
After the Aquino government failed to convince the Senate to postpone the termination 
of the US bases agreement and the immediate Communist threat had greatly faded, 
further reduction of US support was expected in the last years of the Aquino 
government. Some liberal reforms were implemented in the early 1990s, but the Aquino 
government was less successful in promoting economic reform during this period. In 
spite of generous offers of urgently needed funds from the World Bank, the Aquino 
government failed to reform the Central Bank due to internal political factors, namely 
the deadlock between the Executive and Legislature on reform. As a result, the Aquino 
government lost an opportunity to receive generous financial support from the World 
Bank.
After the closure of the US bases, there was no change in the World Bank's 
commitment to the Central Bank reform. The Ramos government was able to 
implement reform by overcoming the obstacles which had thwarted the Aquino 
government. The promotion of liberal reform and regulatory reform under the Ramos 
government cannot be explained by reference to strengthening foreign pressures alone, 
as previous economic and banking reform experiences showed. For example, the 
Ramos government lifted the tight restrictions on the entry of foreign banks without 
strong financial incentives (or pressure) from the World Bank through conditional 
lending or from other lenders. The successful promotion of banking reform under the 
Ramos government should be examined in the context of the changing political 
institutions which strengthened the interests and capacities of the President in 
promoting economic and banking reform.
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The Policy Elites-Institutions Centred Approach
As Haggard and Kaufman (1995:5) argue, economic policy-making is ultimately 
determined by the choices of key actors as constrained by economic circumstances and 
existing institutions. The demands of social and foreign actors are important variables 
when explaining the outcomes of economic policy reform. However, an excessive focus 
on these factors often constrains our ability to examine economic reform policy-making 
since this approach depicts Philippine politics as a process by which policy outcomes 
are determined by relatively immediate expressions of either foreign-rooted or socially- 
rooted demands. For many years, scholars have explored the critical issue of how 
institutions affect political behaviour and policy outcomes.23
This thesis will argue that in the Philippine context "policy elites and institutions" must 
be at the centre of the analysis of banking reform policy-making. This approach, which 
draws attention to the decisions of policy elites and the interactions among them which 
are affected by changing political institutions, provides a systematic explanation for the 
successes and failures of economic and banking reform. Social and foreign factors are 
important in economic and banking reform but these are mediated by the political 
institutions which influence the decisions of policy elites. As defined by Grindle and 
Thomas (1991), the term policy elites refers to "those who have official positions in 
government and whose responsibilities include making or participating in making and 
implementing authoritative decisions for society" (Ibid:59). In terms of banking reform 
policy-making in the Philippines, the policy elites include Presidents, legislators, and 
non-elected state officials (Central Bank officials, Monetary Board members of the 
Central Bank and cabinet members).
The basic idea underlying this approach is fittingly expressed by Geddes (1994:6) in 
terms of policy choice and the "autonomy of the state". "Since state decisions are made
33 The literature concerned with interactions between institutions and policy outcomes in developing 
countries has grown considerably in recent years. See, for example, Haggard and Kaufman (1995:5) 
Harris, Hunter and Lewis (eds.) (1995), Haggard and McCubbins (eds.) (2001), and World Bank 
(2001). For the case of the Philippines in a comparative perspective, see, particularly, MacIntyre 
(2003) and Eaton (2002).
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by these human beings, the content of their decisions -including decisions that 
contribute to reforming the state itself- will reflect their interests. Political leaders' 
interests centre on their careers".24 As Geddes (1994:8) argues, this approach leads to 
an explanation of autonomous state actions vis-a-vis powerful societal and foreign 
actors grounded in the behaviour of individual political actors: Presidents, legislators 
and state officials will only serve the interests of dominant social forces (oligarchy) and 
foreign actors in so far as it serves their own interests, which are centred on their 
careers.
Changing political institutions crucially affect the ways in which policy elites pursue 
their own interests and facilitate (or decelerate) cooperation among policy elites to form 
and implement policy reform. As North (1995:23) observes, "[I]institutions are the 
rules of the game of a society".25 Institutions are composed of both formal and informal 
rules. Formal rules are composed of statute law and regulations. Informal rules (or 
constraints) include customs, social norms and self-imposed codes of conduct. These 
are often closely related to the cultural and historical context of a society. Lessons from 
past experience and historical events are influential in constraining individual behaviour 
and encouraging conformity to a code of conduct.
The Constitution, which defines the power of the State, Executive, Legislature and the 
electoral rules of the President and legislators (members of the House and the Senate), 
can be seen as being at the centre of formal political institutions in the Philippines. 
With respect to legislative politics, the political party system is also a set of important 
political institutions and organisations, but it is still underdeveloped in the Philippines. 
The lack of a responsible political party system or of any effective party rule which can
24 Geddes cites Schumpeter (1975:285) who views politics as a career in modem democracy.
25 North stresses that it is essential to distinguish clearly between institutions and organisations. 
"Organisations are the players: groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve 
objectives. They include political bodies (political parties, the senate, a city council, a regulatory 
agency); economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives); social bodies (churches, 
clubs, athletic associations); and educational bodies (schools, colleges, vocational training centres)1' 
(North, 1995:23). According to North (1995:23), institutions are composed of both "formal mles 
(statute law, common law, regulations)" and "informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour 
and self-imposed codes of conduct)".
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discipline individual legislators' behaviour is an important feature of the political 
institutions of the Philippines.
The attempt to examine the interactions between political institutions and policy reform 
in the Philippines context has only just begun. The writings of Eaton (2002) and 
MacIntyre (2003) are pioneering studies. Eaton (2002) examines a piece of failed tax 
legislation (EVAT) under the Ramos government which he compares with the success 
of tax legislation in a Latin American Presidential system (Argentine). He points out the 
importance of electoral rules and revenue distribution rules as explanatory factors 
underlying the failure of the Philippines and the success of Argentina in terms of tax 
reform. In MacIntyre's (2003) comparative study of four ASEAN countries (Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) the Philippine polity is treated as relatively 
successful in terms of policy reform (responses to the 1997-98 financial crisis). Both 
studies make important contributions to our understanding of the complicated 
interactions between political institutions and policy reform in the Philippines. On the 
other hand, the limitations in the approaches of Eaton and MacIntyre are due to their 
lack of attention to policy reforms and the changing institutions of the Philippines in 
their historical context. These are ambitious comparative studies but their breadth leads 
to weaknesses in the understanding of the interactions between political institutions and 
policy reform in the Philippines.
Eaton's study (2002) is an important contribution to the study of political institutions 
and policy reform in the Philippines since it focuses on political institutions as an 
explanatory factor underlying economic policy-making, unlike the existing literature 
which tends to stress social or foreign actors. In fact, tax reform is a controversial issue 
that shows how domestic political factors played an important role in policy-making in 
the 1990s. Eaton (2002) shows how the electoral rules of the House and revenue 
redistribution rules served as obstacles to cooperation between the President and the 
members of the House on the tax reform measure (EVAT). However, this ambitious 
comparative study is too narrowly focused on the failed VAT reform under the Ramos 
government. Although the Ramos government failed to implement VAT reform, it later 
successfully enacted another critical tax reform measure, namely the Comprehensive
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Tax Reform Package (CTRP). This implementation of tax reform cannot be explained 
by the "institutional factors" which Eaton (2002) effectively views as the cause of the 
failed VAT reforms under the Ramos government. It is also arguable that the Ramos 
economic reform was less successful than that implemented by the Argentine 
government, which faced a very serious economic crisis. To understand economic 
reform in the Philippines, it would be more helpful if economic reform was examined in 
its historical context with more detailed reference to the changing political institutions.
MacIntyre (2003) attempts to resolve "the power concentration paradox" using a 
comparative analysis based on the number of veto players. In brief, the fragmented 
political institutions of Thailand, with six veto players, caused policy volatility, while the 
concentrated political institutions of Malaysia and Indonesia, with one veto player, led 
to policy rigidity. Both policy volatility and rigidity highlight distinctive problematic 
governance syndromes which prevented these countries from responding effectively to 
the 1997-1998 financial crisis. In comparison with these countries, the Philippines, with 
three veto players, was able to avoid such problematic governance syndromes (neither 
policy volatility nor rigidity) in the financial crisis.
For the purpose of comparative study, the classification of political institutions by a 
simple number of veto players is highly convenient. Yet, as MacIntyre recognises, this 
approach limits the examination of complicated interactions between political 
institutions and policy reforms. The varying economic policy reform experiences of the 
Philippines suggest the limitations of an analysis based on the simple number of veto 
players. In MacIntyre's analysis, Philippine political institutions under the Ramos 
government, which did not suffer from serious defects of governance, had three veto 
players (the President, the House and the Senate) due to a presidential system of 
government with a bicameral legislature without a stable majority of disciplined parties. 
Although these basic features of Philippine political institutions were the same in the 
pre-Marcos dictatorship era (1946-1972), which supposedly had three veto players, the 
Philippine government of the pre-dictatorship era, particularly the second Marcos 
government (1969-1972) experienced serious problems of governance leading to policy 
rigidity. In the face of macro-economic instability in the early 1970s, economic reform
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was urgently needed but economic reform measures were seldom implemented due to 
the deadlock between the President and the Legislature. After martial law was declared 
and the Legislature was closed, the authoritarian government, with one veto player, 
implemented economic policy measures relatively smoothly avoided policy rigidity 
during the first half of the 1970s. However, faced with the economic crisis of the early 
1980s, the authoritarian government with its one veto player experienced serious 
problems of governance similar to policy rigidity syndrome. These experiences of 
policy reform and responses to economic crisis under various forms of government 
show the necessity of further detailed analysis of the political institutions.
Any attempt to construct a general theory by which to understand the systematic effects 
of institutions on policy-making, will be limited in a single-country study. Yet, there are 
advantages to studying the complicated interactions between institutions and policy 
reform outcomes in a given country. Institutions and institutional changes are 
essentially incremental and path dependent (North,1995:23). Thus, the interactions 
between institutions and policy reform can only be understood in the unique historical 
setting of each country and policy area. As Haggard and McCubbins (2001:4) argue, 
explaining political outcomes often requires a more detailed focus on specific 
institutions. In particular, this observation is applicable to developing countries, which 
often experience radical changes in formal political institutions. A single-country case 
study also has the merit of leading to a better understanding of how informal political 
institutions are connected to a particular society and its historical context.
Between 1986 and 1995 banking reforms have been guided by two key principles: 
facilitating competition among banks through liberalisation measures and strengthening 
the state regulatory framework. As noted earlier, in order to analyse banking reform 
policy-making, this thesis distinguishes between two types of reform: structural and 
regulatory reform. The working definition of structural reform is reform which entails 
changes in the existing laws through the legislative process. In particular, amendments 
of two key laws, namely the Central Bank Act (R.A. 265) and the General Banking Act 
(R.A. 337), which provided laws for monetary and banking sector regulation from 
1949, can be seen as critical structural reforms. Policy coordination between policy
36
elites including Presidents, legislators and state officials, are crucial to the design and 
implementation of structural reform. Political institutions essentially facilitate or impede 
policy coordination by offering incentives to individual actors.
Regulatory reform is defined as the reform which can be implemented by the Central 
Bank within the existing legal framework. The Central Bank officials engage daily in 
improving regulation under a given authority. However, the Central Bank is not entirely 
autonomous vis-a-vis other actors.26 The autonomy of the Central Bank vis-a-vis 
politicians, especially Presidents, and regulated banks is influenced by political 
institutions. Political institutions constrain the interactions among policy elites and the 
autonomy of the Central Bank officials vis-a-vis Presidents and others. The failures and 
successes of banking reform under the Marcos, Aquino and Ramos governments are 
closely connected with the facilitation and deceleration of policy coordination among 
policy elites and the level of the Central Bank's autonomy, which are factors constrained 
by changing political institutions.
Political institutions have crucially strengthened or weakened the interests and 
capacities of presidents, the centre of Philippine government, in reforming the economy 
and banking sector. In brief, this thesis argues that the successful enactment and 
implementation of banking reform in the Philippines during the process of economic 
recovery after the economic crisis of the early 1980s was contingent on a new 
constellation of political institutions emerging as a consequence of the establishment of 
the 1987 Constitution. This new constellation strengthened the interests and capacities 
of Philippine Presidents in advancing economic and banking reform and weakened the 
proclivity and potential for resistance among legislators and a faction of social actors 
who had benefitted from the existing system. The following section will provide an 
overview of the decisions of policy elites, the interactions among them, and the 
outcomes of banking reform by examining how their interests are affected by changing 
political institutions.
26 The definition and measurement of Central Bank autonomy (or independence) is still a contentious 
issue. For the controversy, see Maxfield (1997); Fry, Goodhart and Almedia (1996); and Cukierman 
(1992).
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The Interests of Policy Elites, Changing Political Institutions and Banking 
Reform
Economic and banking reform is a continuous process and always a controversial issue 
in developing economies. Presidents have potentially a motive to reform the economy 
and banking sector to generate broad support. Improving the economy and banking 
sector advantages presidents who seek to stay in power. All Presidents have stressed 
the importance of economic reform. Yet, Presidents have often faced conflicting choices 
between the amount of support they can expect to generate by implementing reform and 
that which is likely to result from protecting vested interests within the existing system. 
The careers of legislators depend on reelection. Their ability to influence how people 
will vote in the next elections is always a crucial factor in their policy decisions. 
Legislators thus share the same motives and face the same dilemmas as Presidents. In 
addition, legislative leaders seeking to be elected to the next Presidential seat face a 
particularly difficult choice in that they have to decide whether it will be more beneficial 
for their career to support or oppose the reform agenda of the President since the 
reforming the economy and banking sector potentially benefits the incumbent President 
who is often the main rival to legislative leaders. State officials (or Central Bank 
officials) also have a motive to reform the banking sector since developing a stable and 
effective banking sector secures them in office and thus advances their careers. 
Nevertheless, their policy decisions are often constrained by their relationships with 
politicians, in particular with the President who is at the centre of government. It should 
also be noted that they might become involved in misconduct which will maximise their 
material benefits in the short term.
With respect to formal political institutions, the Philippines has had three forms of 
government (see Table 1-8): a Presidential system with bicameral Legislature under the 
1935 Constitution (1946-1972); a Presidential dictatorship (Marcos authoritarian 
regime) under the 1973 Constitution; and a Presidential system with bicameral 
Legislature under the 1987 Constitution (1987 - present).
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The Presidential dictatorship is subdivided into two periods: the first half (1972-77) 
and the second half (1978-1986). While the first half was a period of consolidated 
dictatorship, the second half witnessed changes in the character of the State. In 1978, 
elections to the Interim Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) were first held under 
the dictatorship. In 1981, martial law was lifted, although the dictatorship under 
President Marcos maintained absolute power over law-making.
It should be noted that the Aquino period (1986-1992) is also seen as the transitional 
period of the 1987 Constitution. After President Aquino took power by extra-ordinary 
means (the "EDSA revolution") she held absolute power over law-making until the new 
Legislature was opened in July 1987. Moreover, after the May 1987 legislative 
elections, there were no legislative elections held between 1987 and 1992 due to the 
transitional provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Under the 1987 Constitution, the 
Philippines restored the Presidential system with a bicameral Legislature. However, the 
1987 Constitution set different electoral rules for the President and legislators from the 
previous 1935 Constitution. Importantly, it prohibited the reelection of the President by 
limiting Presidential terms to one term (6 year) only.
The interests and capacities of Presidents in implementing banking reform measures 
have been constrained by these changing political institutions. The key events of 
banking reform in the Philippines, including the monetary instability and the failure of 
banking reform in the early 1970s, the first implementation of structural reform under 
the Marcos dictatorship, the rise of Presidential cronyism in the banking sector, the 
disastrous failure of banking reform in the early 1980s, the mixed results of banking 
reform under the Aquino government, the newly restored democracy, and the relatively 
successful banking reform under the Ramos government, can be understood by 
examining how the decisions of policy elites and the interactions among them are 
linked to career interests which are affected by changing political institutions.
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The Presidential System-uncler the l935 Constitution: Monetary Instability and Failed 
Banking Reform in the early 1970s
After independence, the Philippines adopted a democratic form of government under 
the 1935 Constitution, which was a Presidential system with a bicameral legislature 
until 1972. The Central Bank Act and General Banking Act, which were enacted in 
1948 and became effective in the following year, provided the banking sector with a 
regulatory structure. The Philippine banking sector started to play an important role in 
economic recovery from the devastation of the Japanese occupation, although the roots 
of the banking sector are to be found in pre-War history. The Central Bank was 
expected to play a critical role in developing the monetary and banking system of the 
country.
In a changing economy, the Philippine banking sector developed and regulatory policy 
was altered. During the 1950s, foreign exchange control had been the main concern of 
the monetary authority in order to stabilise the economy and to allocate financial 
resources. In the 1960s, the focus of monetary policy shifted from foreign exchange 
control as decontrol was instituted. In the 1960s, the Central Bank began to promote 
economic development intensively by active use of the rediscount window.27
However, between 1949 and 1972 under the 1935 Constitution, no key structural 
reform in the banking sector was enacted through the legislative process. This period 
was also characterised by frequent monetary instability. Under the 1935 Constitution, 
the frequent legislative elections, in particular the Presidential elections, which allowed 
reelection of the incumbent President, inevitably facilitated election related spending and 
discouraged the Central Bank from tightening monetary policy. Furthermore, the fierce 
rivalry between the President and legislative leaders, particularly the senators who were 
standing for the next Presidential election, was a serious obstacle to the implementation 
of banking sector reform through the legislative process.
27 See Lamberte (1988:211) and Laya (1982:131). For changes in monetary policy, see Tan (1971).
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It should also be noted that the Central Bank had not held decisive power as a monetary 
authority. On the first Monetary Board before the 1972 reform, the decision-making 
body of the Central Bank was chaired by the Minister of Finance, and the Central Bank 
governor was one of the seven members along with representatives from two state 
banks, namely the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the 
Philippines (DBP).28
In the late 1960s, faced with banking instability, the Central Bank started to advocate 
structural reform in the banking sector to strengthen the Bank's powers of supervision 
and examination.29 Under the second Marcos government, as the amount of credit 
allocated by the state banks expanded, favouritism in credit allocation became a public 
concern. The media was active in reporting on the problem of a "favoured" few who 
benefltted from public funds allocation.30
After the elections of 1969 led to monetary instability due to massive election related 
spending, the urgency of banking reform became clearer. The reelected President 
showed his willingness to respond to public demands and to improve the banking 
sector. The President keenly backed the banking reform advocated by the Central Bank. 
Yet, the government was unable to enact important legislation because of its failure to 
cooperate with the House and Senate. Importantly, there were few formal or informal 
institutions which facilitated cooperation between the President and the Legislature on 
policy reform priority. The lack of a strong political party system to discipline the 
legislative behaviour of legislators and the fierce rivalry between the President and the 
legislative leaders, particularly senators, was a distinctive feature of Philippine political 
institutions and this often became a serious obstacle to economic reform.
28 The DBP was established by reorganising the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) in 1958.
29 Key reform measures include making the governor of the Central Bank the Chairman of the 
Monetary Board, the upgrading of the position of Superintendent of Banks to Deputy Governor, an 
increase in the basic pay of bank examiners and more rigid training in bank examination (see 
BSP, 1998:56-57).
30 For example, the case of the Iligan Integrated Steel Mills was enthusiastically investigated by the 
Philippine Free Press. See 6 March 1971; 13 March 1971; 18 March 1971; 27 March 1971; 3 April 
1971; 17 April 1971; 24 April 1971; 22 May 1971; 5 June 1971; 19 June 1971; 10 July 1971; 24 
July 1971; 31 July 1971 and 5 August 1971.
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In addition to the absence of a responsible party system, the powerful Senate added to 
the difficulties of the Philippine president in pursuing his legislative agenda (see 
Grossholtz,1970:100). Each senator was elected by the national constituency in the 
same way as the President himself and, as sometimes happened, possibly with a larger 
number of votes. Senators had longer electoral terms (six years) than the President 
(four years). The conflicts between presidents and senators were often fuelled by 
tactical considerations for the next presidential elections because leading senators were 
serious challengers to an incumbent President seeking reelect for another term. 
President Marcos was also a former senator. In particular, during his second term (only 
President Marcos was reelected), it was very difficult for the President to push through 
his legislative agenda because of a refusal to cooperate on the part of the Legislature. 
The legislative infighting became fiercer during the second and supposedly the last term 
of President Marcos. In June 1971, the Constitutional Convention, which started to 
discuss amendments to the 1935 constitution, including the legislative system and 
presidential term, fuelled the controversy.31 Legislative leaders who harboured 
presidential ambitions had little incentive to cooperate with their main rival, the 
incumbent President, who it was supposed would attempt to stay in power by amending 
the Constitution and enacting economic reform measures. The banking sector, like 
industry and agriculture, was central to national development, but was not reformed 
through the legislative process provided under the 1935 Constitution.32
In 1972, President Marcos declared martial law and closed the Legislature. Under the 
Presidential Dictatorship, the President dominated the law-making process and was
31 See, for example, FEER, 5 June, 1971:18; PEER, 12 June 1971:14 and FEER Supplement, 12 
June 1971, "Philippines 1971". For the debate on changes to the legislative system, see, for example, 
"On the Unicameral System" by Napoleon G. Rama, in Philippines Free Press, 27 November 1971.
32 For the ineffectiveness of the Congress, see Stauffer (1975:26), Pattoco (1972:185), M.A. Caoili 
(1989:1-35) and Olivia Caoili (1994:13). Fora study which emphasises the important role of 
Congress, see Emmert (1983). For the passage of some important pieces of legislation, see de 
Guzman (1963).
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located at the centre of political institutions. This transformation of the political 
institutions strengthened the interests and capacities of the President with respect to 
economic and banking reform. However, the concentration of power provided fertile 
ground for Presidential cronyism as the dictatorship consolidated itself by promoting 
active state intervention in the economy. The banking sector experienced unprecedented 
levels of presidential cronyism and favouritism under Marcos' authoritarian rule, which 
severely eroded the stability of the banking sector.
The concentration of power overcame the problem of policy coordination in the early 
years of the dictatorship. The martial law regime allowed the implementation of the first 
structural reform, which included amendments to existing key laws in the Philippine 
financial system. The banking reform was one of a set of key economic reforms which 
the government claimed as evidence of the positive impact on the economy of the 
martial law regime. Soon after the declaration of martial law, in order to improve the 
regulatory framework of the banking sector, President Marcos issued two important 
Presidential Decrees: P.D. No. 71, which amended the General Banking Act,33 and P.D. 
No.72, which amended the Central Bank Act34.
During the 1970s the Philippines achieved a relatively high economic growth rate 
averaging 6.4 per cent between 1971 and 1980 (Lamberte,1989:36). The banking sector 
steadily grew during the 1970s under favourable economic conditions and an 
expansionary monetary policy. However, under Marcos's authoritarian regime, the
33 The revisions in the General Banking Act included: (1) "putting non-banks engaged in quasi­
banking (borrowing from the general public) under the Central Bank’s regulation and supervision"; (2) 
authorising the Monetary Board to judge the qualification of bank directors and officers; (3) "reducing 
the required capital-to-risk assets ratio from 15 per cent to 10 per cent to enable banks to expand their 
lending and investing capacity"; and (4) "authorising banks to invest in allied undertaking"
(BSP, 1998:69-70).
34 The revisions included the following major changes in the Central Bank Act: (1) making the 
governor of the Central Bank the chairman of the Monetary Board, a post previously held by the 
Minister of Finance; (2) replacing the PNB and DBP representatives to the Monetary Board with those 
from the National Economic and Development Authority and Board of Investments; (3) subjecting 
deposit substitutes to reserve requirements; and (4) increasing the number of Central Bank deputy 
governors, paving the way for the conversion of the position of superintendent of banks to deputy 
governor (See BSP, 1998:69-70 and Suleik, 1989:36-37).
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vulnerability of the economy and the banking sector was soon revealed. Active state 
intervention in the economy under the martial law regime provided massive 
"opportunities" for Presidential cronies, the most "successful" plunderers of public 
resources. The bases of the economic and banking sector were eroded by Presidential 
cronyism under conditions of active state intervention in the economy. Presidential 
cronyism was not unusual in Philippine politics. Presidents consolidated their political 
power by using state resources. Presidential supporters (or cronies) could benefit 
through inexpensive credits, allocation of foreign exchange, various industrial incentives 
including tax exemption, public works contracts and government procurement. But 
Marcos's cronyism was clearly anomalous in the country's history. The banking sector 
became one of the main industries which experienced an unprecedented level of 
Presidential cronyism under the Marcos dictatorship. The state banks expanded rapidly, 
as did behest loans under this new pattern of state activism. The Central Bank provided 
the state banks with substantial credits through foreign loans, rediscount windows and 
government deposits. The growth of crony-owned banks proceeded at a rate 
unprecedented in the history of banking in the Philippines during the last half of the 
1970s.35
Importantly, under Marcos authoritarianism, the Central Bank played a critical role in 
promoting active state interventionism. Thus, the role of the monetary authority in 
maintaining monetary stability was severely undermined. In the early years of martial 
law, through the amendments to banking laws the Central Bank's legal position was 
strengthened enabling it to be more effective in regulating the financial system. The 
Central Bank's authority was also enhanced by making the governor the chairman of 
the monetary board, the policy-making body of the Central Bank. To strengthen 
coordination of development efforts by other state organisations, the Director General
35 The list of commercial banks for 1973 and 1980 indicates that some banks expanded their 
businesses at an unusual speed. Four of the top ten "private" banks achieved this status due to rapid 
growth in a very short period of time. Allied Bank which was owned by Lucio Tan, the biggest private 
bank of 1980, was the most remarkable example. Other banks included Republic Planters Bank (fourth 
largest) which was owned by Roberto Benedicto, United Coconut Planters Bank (sixth largest) which 
was owned by Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Traders Royal Bank (eighth largest) which was also owned 
by Roberto Benedicto. All the banks had unusual access to Central Bank credit or other sources of 
public funds. Their owners were seen as being the core of the President's cronies.
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of the NEDA and the Chairman of the Board of Investments became members of the 
Monetary Board, replacing the representatives of the PNB and the DBP. The entire 
financial and credit system was placed under the Central Bank's supervision. These 
were positive steps towards enhancing the regulatory authority of the Central Bank.
Nevertheless, under the Presidential Dictatorship, the autonomy of the Central Bank as 
a monetary authority was significantly weakened as it was subordinated to the 
developmental efforts of the State, which was dominated by the President. The Central 
Bank played a critical role in development finance which largely benefitted the 
President and his cronies. The role of monetary authority in maintaining monetary 
stability and regulating banks was severely undermined as Presidential cronyism 
increased.
After changes in international economic conditions, the Philippines had to face its most 
serious economic and banking crisis in the early 1980s. In the early 1980s, the highly 
indebted Philippine economy was very vulnerable to macro economic shocks including 
oil price increases, low commodity prices, rapid rises in interest rates and recession in 
developed countries. Faced with crisis, the Presidential dictatorship in decline showed 
its inability to reform the economy and banking sector.
The weakness of the financial sector was revealed after Dewey Dee, a Filipino-Chinese 
textile based manufacturer, fled the country leaving behind nearly $85 million in debt in 
January 1981. Faced with economic turmoil and political uncertainty, the banking 
sector had failed to regain its stability in spite of a massive rescue operation mounted 
by the Central Bank. In October 1983, the Philippines was forced to declare a 
moratorium on external debt payments. During 1984 and 1985, draconian economic 
stabilisation measures led to the worst economic recession in the country's history. For 
these two consecutive years, GDP declined more than 7 per cent. The rate of inflation 
soared more than 50 per cent in 1984. Many banks collapsed during the economic 
crisis in spite of massive rescue operations. The huge non-performing assets of the
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state banks were a clear indication of the failed economy. Despite the urgent need for 
banking reforms, no reforms were implemented by the Marcos government. The 
government failed to restore public confidence in the banking sector.
In its early years, the martial law regime was relatively effective with regard to the 
implementation of reforms. However, in the late 1970s, the authoritarian regime 
fragmented after favourable macro economic conditions changed for the worse. Serious 
problems of policy coordination among policy elites emerged as the dictatorship began 
to lose control. The creation of the Ministry of the Human Settlement by the first lady, 
Imelda Marcos, triggered the loss of the government's control over the economy (see 
Sicat,1985:59). In the early 1980s, under strict budget constraints, conflicts between 
policy elites (in particular, Gerardo Sicat and Cesar Virata), who were in favour of 
macro economic stabilisation measures, and Imelda Marcos and close Marcos cronies, 
who opposed austerity measures, were exacerbated. Marcos authoritarianism in decline 
was characterised by fragmenting policy elites within the state, activating opposition 
from business and social elites, and declining external support.36
The implementation of stabilisation measures and reforms in the monopolistic coconut 
and sugar industries was vital to the securing of external funds from the IMF and the 
World Bank. However, the implementation of stabilisation measures was repeatedly 
delayed due to the 1984 elections and reforms of the coconut and sugar industries were 
not implemented until the end of the Marcos era. These industries were dominated by 
close Marcos cronies, namely Eduardo Cojuangco (the coconut industry) and Roberto 
Benedicto (the sugar industry), who also owned big banks. They occupied important 
positions in the ruling Marcos party, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).
During this period, the weakness of the Central Bank as monetary authority and
banking regulator was clearly revealed. The Central Bank underestimated the volatility
of the money markets, which grew rapidly in the late 1970s and contributed to the
fragility of the banking sector. The Central Bank, which played a critical role in
36 Haggard ( 1990b) classifies the regime as a "weak authoritarian regime". He explains the failure of 
economic adjustment in the Philippines in terms of the characteristics of a "weak authoritarian 
regime".
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development finance, allocation of foreign exchange and the rescue of ailing companies, 
including banks, was unable to maintain its autonomy from the President or to resist 
political pressures. Due to the restoration of elections (legislative elections in 1978, 
local elections in 1980 and legislative elections in 1984), even if they were unfair, it 
became much harder for the Central Bank to maintain monetary stability. After repeated 
delay due to the 1984 elections, the new Central Bank governor, Jose Fernandez 
implemented radical stabilisation measures, but they caused further recession in the 
economy. The vulnerability of the Central Bank vis-a-vis the President's intervention 
was exposed by the crisis. The Central Bank initiatives, which aimed to strengthen the 
banking sector and to restore public confidence by implementing tough measures 
against insolvent banks, were undermined by the President. The close allies of the 
President, including Eduardo Cojuangco and Roberto Benedicto, who also headed big 
banks, were more influential over state decisions than the regulator of the banking 
sector, since the President was more supportive of his cronies than he was of the 
Central Bank governor.
The insolvent state banks, with their huge non-performing assets, exemplified the 
failure of economic and banking management under the authoritarian government. In 
spite of the deepening crisis, structural reform to rehabilitate the state banks was not 
implemented by the Marcos government. No consensus emerged on the controversial 
reform among policy elites. There were fierce conflicts among policy elites over fiscal, 
monetary and banking policy. Above all, the President was in favour of the opposition 
to the Finance Minister and the Central Bank governor, who supported implementation 
of macro-economic stabilisation measures, tight budgets and banking reform. Faced 
with growing opposition, the President was unable to implement the restructuring of the 
state banks, which would potentially have led to large lay-offs, further deterioration of 
public confidence in the banking sector and the termination of credit allocation to his 
close cronies under severe economic conditions. For Marcos, the need to consolidate 
the political support he received from his cronies, who controlled a large share of the 
economy, in the short run overwhelmed the need for adequate economic and banking 
reform.
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In 1986, when Aquino established a new government, it faced a serious economic 
recession with $28 billion of external debt. In the late 1980s, payments on this inherited 
debt absorbed some $3.5 billion per year, or about ten per cent of the country's GDP 
(Boyce,1993:245). The deep problems of the Philippine economy, including low 
economic growth rates, large inequity of wealth and an ineffectual state apparatus 
remained unresolved. In electoral politics, the importance of familial ties remained 
evident. However, the effect of the various policy reforms in the banking sector under 
the Aquino government, in particular the rehabilitation of the state banks, should not be 
underestimated. The establishment of the Aquino government triggered a change in 
banking policy.
In 1986, President Aquino terminated the dictatorship and called for the Constitutional 
Convention to write the new 1987 Constitution. In terms of the Constitution, the 
Aquino Presidency was seen as a transitional period. Until the Legislature was 
reopened after the May 1987 elections, the President held absolute law-making power. 
Due to these transitional provisions, legislative elections were not held between 1987 
and 1992.
After President Aquino took power, economic and banking reform became an urgent 
task for the new government. The insolvent state banks left by the former dictator were 
soon restructured before the Legislature was reopened. Due to their rehabilitation, the 
presence of state banks in the banking sector became much smaller than before.
The transition also triggered a change in the relationship between the Central Bank and 
the President, although the Central Bank governor Jose Fernandez retained his position. 
President Aquino added another cabinet member (Budget Secretary) to the Monetary 
Board to facilitate economic policy coordination. However, unlike the former dictator, 
President Aquino did not intervene directly in the Central Bank's decisions regarding 
banking policy. President Aquino backed the Central Bank's position on foreign debt
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policy, which was the most controversial issue in the early years of the Aquino 
government, despite severe criticism from other cabinet members and legislators. 
Despite continuing political uncertainty, the Central Bank, which was backed by the 
President, started to restore public confidence in the banking sector.
However, the Aquino government failed to implement further structural reform in the 
banking sector through the legislative process. Although some important legislation, 
including the Foreign Investment Act, was passed in the early 1990s, the Aquino 
government's performance in terms of pursuing its legislative agenda was not 
impressive. Despite strong support from the World Bank and businesses, including 
banks, the establishment of an independent Central Bank became one of the key 
reforms which were not implemented by the Aquino government.
The failure of the Central Bank reform bill exemplified Aquino's failure to implement 
key economic reform due to the slow legislative process and the lack of cooperation 
between the President and the Legislature. The newly restored Legislature suffered 
from many inefficiencies. Inexperienced legislators were keen to participate in policy 
debates, but the passage of legislation was often delayed. After serious delay, the House 
passed the Central Bank reform bill. However, since the Senate bill was not finalised, 
the bill was not enacted.
A responsible party system which facilitates policy-coordination between the President 
and the Legislature had not yet developed in the Philippines. There were no effective 
institutions and organisations to coordinate policy priority between the President and 
the Legislature. In addition, since there were no legislative elections between 1987 and 
1992, due to the transitional provisions of the new Constitution, legislators secured their 
seats for at least five years and were not keen to cooperate with the President since they 
did not need to ask her for support in elections in the early years of the new 
government. President Aquino was not keen to create a formal body to solve the 
problem since she was committed to a strict separation of powers between the Executive 
and the Legislature under the newly restored democracy. For a President who enjoyed 
popular support due to her anti-authoritarian stance, "intervention" in the legislative
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process by creating a policy coordination body was best avoided since it would 
potentially have damaged her popularity as a respected champion of "democracy".
In brief, immediately after Aquino came to power, the interests and capacities of the 
President in advancing reforms in the banking sector were enhanced by broad support 
from businesses and foreign lenders and her continuing domination of a policy-making 
power until the Legislature was restored. During this period, an important banking 
reform, the rehabilitation of state banks, was implemented. Under the Aquino 
government, with support from the President, the Central Bank implemented regulatory 
reforms in the banking sector more successfully than under the Marcos government in 
the early 1980s. However, after the Legislature was restored, the lack of policy 
coordination between the President and Legislature and the fierce conflicts between the 
President and the legislative leaders, particularly senators, on important policy issues, 
including foreign debt policy and the US bases issue, became a serious obstacle to the 
reform of the economy and the banking sector through the legislative process.
under the Ramos Government
Under the Ramos government, the Philippine economy recovered and recorded a 
relatively high growth rate. Between 1994 and 1997, the annual growth of the GDP was 
a continuous 4-5 per cent. Relatively high economic growth rates were supported by the 
expansion of exports. After the currency crisis of 1997, the economy decelerated, but 
the government was able to manage the macro economic shocks relatively well. In spite 
of the currency crisis, the banking sector remained relatively stable.
The Ramos government became the first administration to implement key structural 
reforms in the banking sector through the legislative process. The establishment of the 
New Central Bank, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the entry of new foreign banks 
can be seen as critical structural reforms which reflected the successful promotion of 
key principles of banking reform: the enhancement of the Central Bank's regulatory 
powers and the liberalisation of the banking sector.
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Although the Ramos government inherited its economic strategy from the Aquino 
government, the transition from Aquino to Ramos was associated with changes in 
political institutions which influenced the decisions and interests of policy elites and the 
interactions among them. Under a new constellation of political institutions emerging as 
a result of the 1987 Constitution, the interests and capacities of the President in 
promoting banking reforms were expanded. The establishment of a cooperative 
relationship between the President and the legislative leaders provided the basis for 
successful structural reforms in the banking sector under the Ramos government.
New political institutions under the 1987 Constitution provided legislative leaders with 
stronger incentives to cooperate with the President than under the 1935 Constitution. 
The 1987 Constitution replaced the basic framework of the previous 1935 Constitution, 
including the Presidential system and the bicameral Legislature. There were significant 
changes in terms of electoral rules. Importantly, the Presidential term was now to be 
limited to only one term of six years and reelection of the President was banned under 
the new Constitution. This term limit removed a serious obstacle to building 
cooperative relationships between Legislative leaders, in particular senators, and the 
President. Under the previous 1935 Constitution, the Senate posed a peculiar difficulty 
to the Philippine President. The conflicts between a President and senators were often 
fuelled by tactical considerations for the next Presidential election because leading 
senators were serious challengers to an incumbent President who sought reelection for 
a consecutive term as allowed by the 1935 Constitution. Senators who harboured 
ambitions for the Presidential seat had no incentive to cooperate with the current 
President. Under the 1987 Constitution, however, for legislative leaders who harboured 
ambitions for the next Presidential seat, the incumbent President was no longer a rival 
in the next Presidential elections.
It should also be noted that the 1992 elections, the first Presidential elections under the 
1987 Constitution provided an important lesson for legislative leaders that support from 
the President was an important asset in the next Presidential elections. In addition, the 
popularity of a particular candidate, Miriam Defensor-Santiago, who did not have a
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strong political machine but appealed to the public as a clean reformer, also made an 
impression on legislative leaders who harboured ambitions for the Presidency. Having 
popular appeal as a reformer was a significant advantage in Presidential elections. 
Legislative leaders, including the House Speaker, Jose de Venecia, the Senate President, 
Edgardo Angara, and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banks, Raul Roco, 
harboured presidential ambitions. Thus, they had an incentive to cooperate with the 
President's initiatives in economic and banking reform, especially in the period before 
President Ramos had decided which candidate he intended to endorse as the next 
President.
The Ramos government also took its own initiatives in building a cooperative 
relationship with legislative leaders. The government articulated the problem of close 
links between political instability and economic failure. The government stressed the 
importance of political stability and national unity for economic development. In the 
Philippine context, along with internal armed conflicts, the conflict between the 
Executive and the Legislature was seen as a key obstacle to national unity and political 
stability.
Amicable relations were encouraged by the newly-elected President's leadership. For 
instance, the formation of the Legislative and Executive Development Advisory Council 
(LEDAC) played a critical role in creating a consensus between the President and 
legislative leaders on priority bills. Under the Ramos government, the LEDAC meeting 
was held once a week for many years. Ramos also encouraged legislators to participate 
in forming economic development plans. In addition, in 1993, a People's Summit on 
Social Pact for Empowered Economic Development (SPEED) was organised through 
collaboration between the President and Legislative leaders to mobilise public support 
for the government’s economic and social agenda.
In the Philippines, the lack of a responsible party system has been viewed by many 
observers as an obstacle to economic reform because of the resulting poor policy 
coordination between the President and legislative leaders (see Lande, 1965:3), Overall, 
the Philippine experiences of banking reform add another example to studies of Latin
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American countries that show that a lack of party discipline weakens a President's 
capacity to reform state and economy.37 However, under the 1987 Constitution, with the 
President's own initiative to build cooperative relations with the Legislature, the Ramos 
government was able to pursue its legislative agenda more successfully than previous 
Presidents had and became the first government to implement key structural reforms in 
the banking sector through the legislative process.
Conclusion
Economic and banking reform has always been a controversial issue in the Philippines. 
The economy has repeatedly faced economic turmoil or crises which have fuelled 
demands for economic and banking reforms. The responses of governments have been 
varied and they have often failed to implement banking reform in a prompt way. As 
outlined above, to understand the successes or failures of banking reform, this thesis 
will show the advantages of an approach which draws serious attention to the decisions 
of policy elites and to the way in which the interactions among them are affected by 
changing political institutions. Demands from foreign and social actors are influential, 
but they are mediated by political institutions which shape the decision-making of 
policy elites. In brief, this thesis will argue that the successful enactment and 
implementation of banking reform in the Philippines between 1986 and 1995 was 
contingent on a new constellation of political institutions emerging after the end of the 
Marcos dictatorship as a consequence of the 1987 Constitution. This new constellation 
strengthened the interests and capacities of Philippine presidents in advancing banking 
reform and weakened the resistance of legislators.
In the following chapters, key events in banking reform will be further explored by
examining the decisions of policy elites and the interactions among them in the context
of changing political institutions. The focus of this thesis is the period of economic
recovery between 1986 and 1995. However, the analysis will begin with the last years
of the Marcos era, since changing political institutions and banking reforms are
essentially historical path dependent. The issues of banking reform and political
institutions were inherited from the previous period. The key events of banking reform 
37 See, in particular, Geddes (1994) and Eaton (2002).
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include the failures of banking reform during the economic and banking crisis in the 
early 1980s; the successes and failures of reforms under the Aquino government 
between 1986 and 1992; and the successful implementation of important structural 
reforms, namely the establishment of the new Central Bank and the entry of new 
foreign banks, under the Ramos government.
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Table 1-1. Key Macro Indicators of the Philippine Economy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real GDP Real GNP Growth Rate Unemployment Inflation F
(Billion Peso, (Billion Peso, of Real GDP Rate
1985 prices) 1985 prices) (per cent)
Year
1980 609.8 608.6 5.15 „ 14.2
1981 630.6 628.3 3.42 - 11.7
1982 653.5 646.2 3.62 9.4 8.7
1983 665.7 655.5 1.87 7.9 14.2
1984 617.0 598.3 -7.32 10.6 53.3
1985 571.9 556.1 -7.31 11.1 23.4
1986 591.4 579.2 3.42 11.1 -0.4
1987 619.7 608.7 4.78 9.1 3.0
1988 658.5 652.3 6.25 8.3 12.2
1989 698.4 689.7 6.06 8.4 11.5
1990 720.7 716.9 3.04 8.1 13.2
1991 716.5 720.2 -0.58 9.0 18.5
1992 718.9 731.4 0.34 8.6 8.6
1993 734.1 746.9 2.12 8.9 7.0
1994 766.4 786.1 4.39 8.4 8.3
1995 802.9 825.2 4.76 8.4 8.0
1996 849.1 884.2 5.85 7.4 9.1
1997 893.1 930.6 5.19 7.9 5.9
1998 888.0 934.4 “0.58 9.6 9.7
1999 918.1 969.3 3.40 9.6 6.7
2000 958.4 1016.1 4.38 10.1 4.4
2001 989.2 1051.1 3.22 9.8 6.1
Sources: NSCB, NSO
BSP(Selected Philippine Economic Indicators, Various years) 
Asian Development Bank (2003),
Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries
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Table 1-1. Key Macro Indicators of the Philippine Economy
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Foreign Debt Foreign Debt Gross Total Exchange
Stock Stock International Exports Rates
Year
(Million $) / GNP (%) Reserves 
(Million $)
(Million $) Pesos per 
US Dollar 
End of Period
1980 17252 49.5 3155.40 - 7.60
1981 20893 54.3 2574.00 5722 8.20
1982 24677 62.3 1711.40 5021 9.17
1983 24816 71.3 864.70 5005 14.00
1984 25418 76.8 886.10 5391 19.76
1985 26252 83.4 1061.10 4629 19.03
1986 28256 94.0 2459.98 4842 20.53
1987 28649 87.2 1958.69 5720 20.80
1988 27915 72.9 2058.88 7074 21.34
1989 27616 68.0 2324.16 7821 22.44
1990 28549 68.6 2048.35 8186 28.00
1991 29956 70.5 4525.94 8840 26.65
1992 30934 60.7 5337.87 9824 25.10
1993 34282 64.9 5922.03 11375 27.70
1994 37079 60.8 7121.78 13483 24.42
1995 37778 51.8 7762.17 17447 26.21
1996 41875 47.3 11745.08 20543 26.29
1997 45433 52.7 8767.67 25228 39.98
1998 47818 69.4 10806.25 29496 39.06
1999 52210 65.1 15107.32 35037 40.31
2000 52060 65.8 15024.20 38078 50.00
2001 52355 69.3 15658.39 32149 51.40
Sources: NSCB, NSO
BSP(Selected Philippine Economic Indicators, Various years) 
Asian Development Bank (2003),
Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries
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Table 1-2. Total Assets, Credits and Deposits of the Financial System
(in Million Pesos)
Total Assets Growth Domestic Growth Total Growth GNP
(excluding CB) Rate Credits* Rate Deposits** Rate Growth Rate
1981 289,802 _ 112,898 18.2% 176,587 _ 3.4%
1982 339,772 17.2% 130,310 15.4% 91,747 -48.0% 2.4%
1983 431,575 27.0% 171,482 31.6% 106,750 16.4% 1.7%
1984 487,906 13.1% 174,678 1.9% 112,481 5.4% -9.1%
1985 503,156 3.1% 161,351 -7.6% 131,515 16.9% -7.0%
1986 418,740 -16.8% 135,871 -15.8% 143,577 9.2% 3.6%
1987 452,336 8.0% 150,795 11.0% 153,855 7.2% 5.2%
1988 523,756 15.8% 185,096 22.7% 194,113 26.2% 7.2%
1989 638,713 21.9% 234,018 26.4% 240,202 23.7% 6.2%
1990 800,230 25.3% 291,024 24,4% 279,451 16.3% 4.8%
1991 926,668 15.8% 330,555 13.6% 336,688 20.5% 0.5%
1992 1,087,449 17.4% 396,428 19.9% 386,755 14.9% 1.6%
1993 1,359,407 25.0% 525,204 32.5% 489,237 26.5% 2.8%
1994 1,645,716 21.1% 684,526 30.3% 608,185 24.3% 4.6%
1995 2,049,375 24.5% 939,244 37.2% 767,893 26.3% 4.9%
1996 2,637,320 28.7% 1,384,976 47.5% 898,356 17.0% 7.2%
1997 3,389,280 28.5% 1,785,741 28.9% 1,068,425 18.9% 5.3%
1998 3,444,785 1.6% 1,747,009 -2.2% 1,145,172 7.2% 0.4%
1999 3,741,292 8.6% 1,772,586 1.5% 1,285,548 12.3% 3.7%
2000 4,065,520 8.7% 1,998,999 12.8% 1,387,253 7.9% 4.8%
2001 4,096,701 0.8% 2,085,483 4.3% 1,510,707 8.9% 3.4%
2002 4,312,300 5.3% 2,150,991 3.1% - 4.5%
* Gross Domestic Credits including Domestic Securities, Loans and Advances
** Peso Deposit Liabilities excluding Deposit Substitutes
Sources: Philippine Statistical Year Book 2002, BSP
BSP (www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics)
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Table 1-3. Total Assets of the Financial System
(in Million Pesos)
Financial Banking Commercial KBs Thrift Rural Specialised Non- NBs
System System Banks /FS Banks Banks Government
Banks*
Banks /FS
1981 289,802 226,057 171,705 59.2% 11,631 6,631 36,090 63,745 22.0%
1982 339,772 265,015 198,865 58.5% 12,586 8,136 45,428 74,757 22.0%
1983 431,575 338,903 256,459 59.4% 16,150 9,500 56,794 92,672 21.5%
1984 487,906 391,757 299,227 61.3% 14,967 9,023 68,540 96,149 19.7%
1985 503,156 395,141 296,564 58.9% 15,082 8,822 74,673 108,015 21.5%
1986 418,740 304,086 264,635 63.2% 17,653 9,351 12,447 114,654 27.4%
1987 452,336 330,305 287,465 63.6% 19,557 9,961 13,322 122,031 27.0%
1988 523,756 392,054 342,312 65.4% 24,993 11,018 13,791 131,702 25.1%
1989 638,713 479,011 420,410 65.8% 32,390 12,522 13,689 159,702 25.0%
1990 800,230 609,697 539,708 67.4% 37,623 13,862 18,504 190,533 23.8%
1991 926,668 691,099 599,122 64.7% 47,480 15,936 28,561 235,569 25.4%
1992 1,087,449 811,958 691,099 63.6% 60,234 18,641 41,984 275,491 25.3%
1993 1,359,407 1,019,065 864,350 63.6% 74,607 22,667 57,441 340,342 25.0%
1994 1,645,716 1,253,912 1,058,820 64.3% 106,646 28,191 60,255 391,804 23.8%
1995 2,049,375 1,595,483 1,347,362 65.7% 143,307 36,653 68,161 453,892 22.1%
1996 2,637,320 2,109,635 1,876,217 71.1% 185,138 48,039 241 527,685 20.0%
1997 3,389,280 2,779,006 2,512,975 74.1% 208,395 57,636 - 610,274 18.0%
1998 3,444,785 2,788,633 2,512,223 72.9% 216,441 59,969 - 656,152 19.0%
1999 3,741,292 3,007,728 2,722,288 72.8% 223,588 61,852 - 733,564 19.6%
2000 4,065,520 3,326,729 3,013,561 74.1% 245,807 67,361 - 738,791 18.2%
2001 4,096,701 3,403,067 3,070,474 74.9% 258,834 73,759 - 693,634 16.9%
2002 4,312,300 3,606,700 3,250,200 75.4% 273,000 83,500 - 705,600 16.4%
* Stalling February 1996, specialised government banks consist of AAIIBP only.
Starting 1997, specialised government banks were consolidated with commercial banks. 
Sources: BSP (www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics)
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Table 1-4. Number of Offices
Total Commercial Banks* Foreign Banks Thrift Banks Rural Banks
Total Head Branch Tolal Head Branch Total Head Branch Total Head Branch
1986 3,616 1,866 33 1,589 9 4 4 665 116 372 1,083 875 107
1987 3,547 1,831 32 1,617 9 4 4 658 112 369 1,058 850 109
1988 3,562 1,850 32 1,638 9 4 4 664 110 378 1,048 840 109
1989 3,588 1,870 32 1,660 9 4 4 675 106 403 1,043 824 118
1990 3,638 1,940 33 1,733 9 4 4 653 103 396 1,045 804 142
1991 3,791 2,065 34 1,889 9 4 4 663 101 433 1,063 784 182
1992 4,296 2,438 35 2,289 9 4 4 718 98 505 1,140 787 253
1993 4,657 2,682 35 2,553 9 4 4 780 97 573 1,195 780 319
1994 5,096 3,001 36 2,878 9 4 4 821 100 612 1,274 784 395
1995 5,569 3,298 48 3,152 20 14 5 925 99 718 1,346 790 462
1996 6,332 3,647 49 3,478 22 13 8 1,171 108 941 1,514 804 616
1997 7,182 4,078 54 3,880 23 13 9 1,389 117 1,171 1,715 832 788
1998 7,646 4,230 53 4,025 23 12 10 1,474 117 1,262 1,942 826 1,021
1999 7,689 4,326 52 4,118 22 11 10 1,478 118 1,277 1,885 806 989
* including Foreign Banks and Specialised Government Banks
Sources: BSP, The Philippine Financial System Fact Book 1999,1995
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Table 1-5. Total Commercial Banks, Statement of Income and Expense
(in Million Pesos)
Net Income Total Net Interest Total Extra Ordinary
/ (Loss) Operating Income Operating Credits
Year Before Tax Income Expenses
1986 (2,607) 7,892 1,487 11,101 602
1987 4,164 13,476 7,387 10,143 831
1988 7,072 17,438 9,862 11,792 1,426
1989 9,822 23,415 13,953 15,451 1,858
1990 15,021 34,681 17,964 21,747 2,087
1991 15,706 36,680 23,788 23,385 2,411
1992 15,240 38,800 21,784 25,967 2,407
1993 15,840 43,274 24,806 30,781 3,347
1994 19,654 51,145 33,948 35,709 4,218
1995 25,906 65,348 42,760 45,087 5,645
1996 40,728 96,924 70,845 67,493 11,297
1997 41,992 134,602 98,194 98,765 6,155
1998 23,534 140,553 106,411 125,656 8,637
1999 12,028 127,214 84,858 123,468 8,282
Sources: BSP, The Philippine Financial System Fact Book, 1995 and 1999
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Table 1-6. Non-Performing Loans of Commercial Banks
(in Million Pesos)
Total Loans NPL
Loan Loss 
Provisions
NPL/
Loans
Provisions 
/ Loans
1981 127,842 17,182 1,193 13.4% 0.9%
1982 152,793 23,457 1,940 15.4% 1.3%
1983 189,284 22,851 2,512 12.1% 1.3%
1984 198,929 41,801 5,046 21.0% 2.5%
1985 166,660 37,726 5,753 22.6% 3.5%
1986 183,476 37,506 40,783 20.4% 22.2%
1987 138,885 19,047 11,160 13.7% 8.0%
1988 162,684 17,565 9,705 10.8% 6.0%
1989 208,042 17,135 11,284 8.2% 5.4%
1990 270,760 19,426 12,679 7.2% 4.7%
1991 306,171 20,245 12,270 6.6% 4.0%
1992 366,809 22,494 12,453 6.1% 3.4%
1993 506,425 23,840 13,311 4.7% 2.6%
1994 637,179 25,050 11,995 3.9% 1.9%
1995 866,330 28,008 13,781 3.2% 1.6%
1996 1,221,763 34,206 15,149 2.8% 1.2%
1997 1,573,140 73,602 34,780 4.7% 2.2%
1998 1,542,487 160,001 61,333 10,4% 4.0%
1999 1,582,894 195,389 91,038 12.3% 5.8%
2000 1,628,214 245,813 107,206 15.1% 6.6%
2001 1,625,052 281,908 127,412 17.3% 7.8%
Sources: BSP Selected Philippine Economic Indicator, May 1998 
BSP Selected Philippine Economic Indicator, 2003 
(www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics)
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Table 1-7. Philippine Commercial Banks (1983-2002)
at the end of Period
(in Million Pesos)
2002
Total
Assets
Share
%
1996
Total
Assets
Share
%
1993
Total
Assets
Share
%
1983
Total
Assets
Share
%
Metropolitan Bank 1 473,812 14.2 1 200,089 11.1 3 78,719 9.2 3 11,505 4.6
Solidbank Corp. 15 38,886 2.2 13 18,173 2.1
Consolidated Bank 18 3,995 1.6
Global Bank
Asian Bank Corp. 22 20,246 1.1 20 10,305 1.2
Philippine Banking Corp. 26 14,212 0.8 25 7,040 0.8 25 2,931 1.2
Bank of the Philippines Island 2 386,583 11.6 3 138,437 7.7 4 65,444 7.7 5 10,642 4.3
Far East Bank & Trust Co. 5 120,877 6.7 6 51,067 6.0 8 7,149 2.9
Pacific Banking Corp. 17 4,083 1.6
City Trust Banking Group 15 16,142 1.9 21 3,355 1.4
DBS Bank
Bank of Southeast Asia (DBS) 32 8,084 0.4
:::::: DeYbfophjejil: Bhiik of :§ihgaporje 36 5,752 0.3
Equitable PCI Bank 3 268,151 8.0 11 59,854 3.3 11 26,158 3.1 23 3,099 1.2
PCI Bank 6 119,143 6.6 5 52,061 6.1 7 8,070 3.3
Insular Bank of Asia & America 19 3,699 1.5
Land Bank of the Philippines* 4 249,094 7.5 4 129,333 7.2 2 89,432 10.5
Citibhtlk M. A';.: : : : : : ; : ; : : : : 5 216,911 6.5 7 85,450 4.8 7 47,325 5.6 2 26,590 10.7
Rizal Commercial Banking Corp 6 206,010 6.2 8 78,466 4.4 8 39,869 4.7 13 5,445 2.2
Philippine National Bank 7 184,642 5,5 2 189,306 10.5 1 123,070 14.4 1 70,502 28.4
Republic Planters Bank 9 6,829 2.8
Development Bank of the Philippines* 8 151,004 4.5
Allied Banking Corp 9 129,020 3.9 10 60,609 3.4 10 29,519 3.5 10 6,857 2.8
Banco de Oro 10 120,042 3.6 16 35,544 2.0
::: 0at>: Hbhg B hiik -: *: -: ^ : -: *::: -: -: -: -: - 42 4,244 0.2
China Banking Corp 11 106,381 3.2 12 47,156 2.6 12 21,372 2.5 15 4,584 1.8
United Coconut Planters Bank 12 105,008 3.1 9 74,639 4.2 9 38,805 4.6 4 10,739 4.3
13 77,567 2.3 19 23,988 1.3 17 15,166 1.8 27 2,574 1.0
Union Bank of the Philippines 14 73,299 2.2 13 45,916 2.6 18 14,215 1.7 31 2,227 0.9
International Corporate Bank 22 8,330 1.0 24 3,004 1.2
Security Bank Corp 15 64,681 1.9 14 40,243 2.2 16 15,310 1.8 16 4,266 1.7
Prudential Bank 16 48,129 1.4 20 22,200 1.2 14 16,203 1.9 20 3,625 1.5
Pilipinas Bank 25 14,601 0.8 27 5,220 0.6 32 1,357 0.5
Philippine Bank of Communications 17 46,675 1.4 17 24,533 1.4 19 11,240 1.3 22 3,313 1.3
Stahdfeijd :Ghhi:t'Cf6d Bank::::::::::::::: 18 40,009 1.2 29 12,783 0.7 28 5,052 0.6 30 2,290 0.9
International Exchange Bank 19 39,259 1.2 27 13,966 0.8
Bank of Commerce 20 38,386 1.1 31 10,497 0.6 26 6,503 0.8
Panasia Bank
Traders Royal Bank 28 13,134 0.7 24 7,896 0.9 14 4,639 1.9
Commercial Bank of Manila 34 800 0.3
Philippine T rust Co. 21 33,439 1.0 24 15,669 0.9 21 9,332 1.1 33 1,285 0.5
Export and Industry Bank 22 26,742 0.8
Urban Bank 34 7,379 0.4 30 4,666 0.5
irtt'bCdmmfeffcifeit Bhnk *>f :Chifel::::::: 23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
22,540
22,138
20,194
16,250
15,367
15,082
14,985
14,653
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
30
35
43
23
21
41
10,858
6,487
3,979
17,093
22,042
4,684
0.6
0.4
0.2
1.0
1.2
0.3
0.0
32 2,476 0.3 29 2,379 1.0
fbteuts'chfe Bhiiki A G : F : : : :  | :
tit) if t?f iToj^(F:I l^t?u i^sinititd:
Ctiiiih Tfitst (PKUs\):
United Overseas Bank Philippines 
Westmont Bank 
Associated Bank
jNfji ifi'ank I-:;:-:::::-:-:-:-:-:-:-::-: 
East-West Banking Corp.
Asia United Bank
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Philippine Veterans Bank 
jyiizjihQ {^rpiqrate; J3fU)k:,: Iifd| 
; IF.iiji -Bithki iLtili: I::: ■::: I:;::: I
ida^b^nk::: •:::;:::::::::::; r j; j 
if. IP il '^ptguh: cjiiase: Bpik':
: : G hasd MafiMtiiiii ilBiinii::::::
ABN Amro Bank, Inc.
Australia; Hlp\v ^ aiairdiBaiikiiiig 
Burikj sif ISA!;
o^re^ nBx.bhaiigis jB4pk: j: 
BiahtoiSiaiiiief :Mitls.>:Ihp; 
^hh^k6k:i3aiik; tjuiiiiQ Cf);,: Utd 
Al-Amanah Islamic Bank
(Manila Bank Corp.)**
: i: jITA Batik; of lHe:PhiIip{3Hiesi:Inc | :;:
(PDCPBank)**..................................
First Philippine International Bank 
Producers Bank of the Philippines 
(BPI Family Bank)**
Family Bank & Trust
Total 3,342,807 100
31 13,987 0.4 33 7,753 0.4
32 12,368 0.4
44 3,281 0.2
33 11,280 0.3
34 10,869 0.3
45 1,128 0.1
35 10,408 0.3
36 10,018 0.3 40 5,001 0.3
37 8,418 0.3 18 24,041 1.3
38 6,296 0.2 38 5,320 0.3
39 6,201 0.2 39 5,233 0.3
40 4,274 0.1 37 5,328 0.3
41 96 0.0
1,798,472 100
29 4,675 0.5
23
31
7,971 0.9
3,871 0.5
852,625 100
28 2,555 1.0
9,004 3.6
11 6,486 2.6
26 2,630 1.1
12 5,655 2.3
248,165 100
Note:
Fdi&gh Bittiks:;:;:;:::;:;:;: I:;:;: I:;:;:;
* LBP is not classified as commercial banks in 1983.
DBP is not classified as commercial banks in 1996,1993 and 1983.
** (Thrift Banks)
Sources: Business Day, Business World, Fourth Quarter Banking Report, various issues
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Chapter 2.
The Economic Crisis and the Banking Sector 
between 1980 and 1986
Introduction
The period of the most serious economic turmoil in the Philippines was the worst era 
for the Philippine banking sector. After a relatively high growth period, the economic 
climate started to change in 1979 when the second oil shock in the 1970s led to a 
prolonged deceleration in economic growth. The 1980s began with structural reform of 
the banking sector which aimed to increase long-term finance in the economy. 
However, soon after the reform was initiated, the banking sector was shaken by a 
collapse of the money market triggered by a financial scandal. Between 1981 and 1983, 
the Central Bank had tried to prevent bank closures to avoid further deterioration of 
public confidence both in the banking system and the government. Massive rescue 
funds were provided through the Central Bank and state financial institutions to rescue 
ailing companies, including financial institutions.
However, in spite of the massive rescue operation, the government was unable to 
salvage the economy and banking sector. The Philippines faced its most serious 
economic and financial crisis between 1983 and 1985 and became the only Asian 
country to declare a moratorium on repayments of foreign debt in 1983. High inflation, 
negative economic growth rates and huge amounts of foreign debt were a reflection of 
the economic crisis. Massive public funds to rescue ailing banks and the huge non­
performing assets of the banking sector indicated clearly the depth of the financial 
crisis. The government acquired six banks through the rescue operation. Between 1981 
and 1987, the Central Bank closed 173 banks, although the majority were small rural 
banks. The state banks, namely PNB and DBP, which had occupied a large share of the 
banking sector, recorded huge losses between 1984 and 1986. Non-performing loans 
in the banking sector reached the highest level in banking history.
Despite some reform attempts, the government failed to improve the economy. After 
repeated delay, the Central Bank implemented stabilisation measures to curb high
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inflation, but these led to further economic recession. Under the Marcos dictatorship, 
public confidence in the banking sector was never restored.
International economic factors including high interest rates, a slump in commodity 
markets and the economic recession of the leading trading partners adversely affected 
the economy and the banking sector. Nevertheless, as Filipino economists argue, the 
economic and banking crisis cannot be explained by external economic factors alone 
since some countries managed to minimise the economic shocks.1
In terms of economic policy choice, some stress the influence of International Financial 
Institutions, namely the IMF and the World Bank. In fact, the availability of foreign 
credit was an influential factor in terminating the unlimited rescue operation for ailing 
companies including banks. However, the IMF and the World Bank pressures had not 
always been seen as a decisive and solitary factor in policy choice. Careful studies of 
the policy conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank revealed that their 
conditionality had not been burdensome for the country until 1983.2 During the severe 
balance of payments crisis, the Philippines repeatedly delayed the implementation of a 
stabilisation programme endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank due to an internal 
political factor, namely the 1984 elections. After the election, the Central Bank adopted 
a stabilisation programme, but its detailed policies and the timing of its implementation 
were decided by the Philippine government. It should be noted that even during the 
severe balance of payments crisis, in spite of massive pressure from the IMF and the 
World Bank, the Marcos government did not accept their recommended reforms in the 
coconut and sugar industries which directly affected Marcos's power base. The reform 
of the state banks, which was also endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank, was also 
not implemented. The loss of US support was a significant factor in ending Marcos's 
rule. However, in terms of economic policy choice, the influence of US policy 
preferences was not very clear. The President seemed to believe that US support for his 
regime was solid due to its security interests and that the US would not enforce 
economic reform.
1 See de Dios, et al. (1984) and Sicat (1985:25).
2 See Mosley (1991) and Thompson and Slayton(1985).
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This chapter examines the failure of banking reform during the economic crisis by 
focusing on the decisions of policy elites and the interactions among them in the 
context of changing political institutions. After martial law was declared in 1972, the 
problems of policy coordination between the Executive and Legislature, which was a 
serious obstacle to structural reform in the banking sector, was resolved due to the 
closure of the Legislature. The first key structural reforms in the banking sector were 
implemented by presidential decrees. During the early years of the Marcos dictatorship, 
the Central Bank, which was backed by the President, strengthened its regulatory 
power. The governor of the Central Bank became the chairman of the Monetary Board. 
In terms of monetary and banking policy, economic policy coordination was improved, 
since representatives from National Economic Development Authority and Board of 
Investments joined the Board. The Central Bank coped with the first oil price hike in 
1973 relatively well.
However, during the early 1980s, the various changes in political institutions centred 
upon the dictatorship were clearly revealed. Essentially, the Central Bank was losing 
support from the President. The tight control of the dictatorship began to change in the 
mid-1970s (Thompson,1995:102). Marcos resumed elections in 1978 and officially 
lifted martial law in January 1981. The President continued to have a decisive influence 
on policy-making, due to his unlimited power to issue decrees. Nevertheless, even if 
they were not fair, the resumption of elections led to a new era for the authoritarian 
regime. Having increased the importance of electoral contests for the regime's survival, 
the leaders of Marcos ruling party and close Presidential cronies, who also owned big 
banks, obtained more influence over economic policy-making. During the economic 
downturn, the dictatorship, which was at the centre of the political institutions, was 
declining as a result of fragmenting policy elites, giving rise to opposition movements 
from various groups, including business and Catholic churches and a loss of support 
from foreign creditors. Under an authoritarian regime in decline, the interests and 
capacities of the President in advancing economic and banking reforms were severely 
undermined.
Faced by this crisis, the policy elites found themselves divided over policy choices 
relating to economic reform. Monetary Board members, including Prime Minister (and
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Finance Minister) Cesar Virata, were supportive of economic stabilisation measures to 
secure foreign credit. However, the leaders of the Marcos ruling party and its close 
associates, including Imelda Marcos, Eduardo Cojuangco and Roberto Benedicto, were 
keen to avoid the structural reform which might cause further economic recession, lose 
support for the government and deprive them of their privileges. As international 
support from the IMF, the World Bank and then the US government had been fading 
and the government was not able to improve the economy, this prompted critical voices 
from business elites who opposed the Marcos cronies' domination of the economy. 
Various opposition movements to the regime, including religious leaders and left wing 
movements, were energised during the economic crisis. Importantly, electoral politics 
reemerged as a serious threat to monetary stability. The Central Bank, which played a 
critical role in helping the authoritarian regime through massive public spending, was 
very vulnerable to political interference and lost its control over monetary and banking 
policy.
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, the 1980 banking reform 
is analysed. The structural reform, which included amendments to existing laws by 
presidential decree, was potentially influential since it altered the structure of the 
banking sector. For example, the expanded commercial banks (universal banks), which 
could undertake investment house operations were introduced to facilitate investment 
activities. However, the effects of reform were not clear because the banking sector was 
shaken by the collapse of the money market soon after the reform initiatives. In the 
second section, the responses of the government to the instability of the banking sector 
and its consequences are reviewed. Until 1983, the Central Bank tried to rescue all 
banks. Nevertheless, the massive rescue operation did not improve the economy and the 
banking sector. The government had to face further deterioration of the economy. In the 
third section, the Central Bank's attempts to alter the previous policy are examined. 
During this period, the new Central Bank governor, Jose "Jobo" Fernandez, took 
drastic measures to stabilise the economy and to restructure the banking sector. 
However, the reform efforts were undermined by lack of support from the President. 
The most serious issue in the banking sector, the rehabilitation of the state banks, was 
left unsolved until the end of regime.
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The 1980 Structural Reform in the Banking Sector
In the late 1970s, the Central Bank was concerned about the effectiveness of the 
financial system. Since the middle of the 1970s, the Central Bank had tried to mobilise 
more savings for long-term finance through various measures. As a key policy 
measure, the Central Bank had started to liberalise interest rates in the middle of the 
1970s. Laya (1982:163) explains that
"While it was recognised that the economy was responsive to the 
mobilisation of savings in financial forms as a result of interest rates, tax 
and other fiscal and monetary reforms, the increase in deposits had not been 
translated into long-term financial assets. Much of the outstanding credits 
of the financial system, of which the banking system was the dominant 
sector, still remained short-term oriented".3
The initiatives for the 1980 reform stemmed from the concern of the Central Bank over 
ineffective financial resource mobilisation through the financial system. The main 
objectives of the reform were (1) to promote greater efficiency by increasing 
competitive conditions and (2) to increase the availability of, and access to, longer term 
funds.4 To achieve these goals, the government implemented the following reforms in 
1980 and 1981: (1) changing the financial structure; (2) floating interest rates; and (3) 
improving the Central Bank policy instruments.
The IMF and the World Bank played an important role as technical advisors in 
designing the reform of the financial structure. In March 1979, a joint IMF/World 
Bank Mission was invited to study the financial system in the Philippines. It must be 
noted that this mission had a specific issue to address. The IMF/World Bank clarified 
the objectives of the mission as follows:
"In particular, the mission looked at the present situation of the sector in 
light of the need to increase the flow of longer-term savings and make such
3 See, also Lamberte and Remolona (1986:103).
4 See World Bank/IMF (document) (1979), Laya (1982:164), Suleik (1991:37) and Lamberte and 
Remolona (1986:103).
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flows available for priority uses. There was concern about the shortage of 
medium and longer-term finance, especially for industry. The authorities 
requested that the mission pay special attention to the possibilities and 
consequences of changing the range of functions performed by financial 
institutions and the impact this might have upon the supply of finance" 
(World Bank/IMF, 1979:i).
The main recommendation of the study was that the commercial banks should be given 
"powers to invest in equities and engage in underwriting" (World Bank/IMF,1979:i), 
since the existing legislated specialisation of financial institutions prevented them from 
responding to the needs of their clientele and from operating on the basis of 
comparative advantage.
Following this recommendation, the reform programme included the following major 
changes in the banking structure: (1) the introduction of universal banks (or expanded 
commercial banks) ;s and (2) simplification of domestic bank categories by reducing 
differentiations among thrift banks, savings and mortgage banks, private development 
banks and stock savings and loan associations.
In short, expanded commercial banks can be defined as the combination of commercial 
banking (full domestic and international banking) with the functions of an investment 
house (underwriting, securities dealership, and equity investment) (see Laya,1982:166). 
Investment house operations can be pursued by an expanded commercial bank either 
(1) through the establishment of a separate department in the banks or (2) through a 
separate subsidiary. The introduction of the expanded commercial banks was expected 
to have the effect of making competition in the system, more vibrant and credit- 
orientation longer-term.
By simplifying the domestic bank category, thrift banks, including savings and
mortgage banks, private development banks and stock savings and loan associations,
were allowed to offer the full range of "domestic banking" services, including demand
5 The model for the universal bank was the German universal bank. For a detailed discussion of 
German universal banks, see Krummel (1980).
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deposit accounts and NOW accounts, and other additional services with prior Monetary 
Board approval. Thus, thrift banks came to be defined as commercial banks which did 
not engage in international banking. Through this reform, other banks were expected to 
be energised, since the removal of their legislated areas of specialisation and the 
capability to "move up" to the level of the higher ranking financial institutions were 
thought to be good incentives to enhance their operations. The Central Bank raised the 
minimum capital requirement: P500 million for expanded commercial banks, P300 
million for commercial banks, P20 million for thrift banks located in Metro Manila and 
P0.5 million for rural banks.
The second component of the reform in the early 1980s was the liberalisation of 
interest rates. Since the middle of the 1970s, interest rates had been gradually 
liberalised. In July 1981, except for short term loans, all interest rates on deposits, 
deposit substitutes and loans were freed from administrative ceilings. Then, in January 
1983, the ceiling on the short-term loan rate, the last remaining ceiling, was lifted. The 
institution of floating interest rates, in conjunction with the other financial reforms of 
1980, was expected to give financial institutions a greater flexibility with respect to the 
mobilisation of funds.
To strengthen the regulatory power of the Central Bank, a Presidential Decree granted 
the Monetary Board the power to authorise special examinations of affiliates of non­
bank financial intermediaries with quasi-banking functions and to inspect deposits 
during bank examination in order to detect bank fraud or serious irregularity (see 
Suleik,1991:37).6
Within the Monetary Board, there was a conflict over the introduction of expanded 
commercial banks. The reform of the financial structure was controversial, since the 
existing financial structure had been established less than a decade before as a result of 
recommendations made by the joint IMF-CBP (Central Bank of the Philippines)
6 The Central Bank's capital base was to be enhanced from P10 million to P10 billion through an 
additional revision to R.A. 265 by means of P.D. 1771 dated January 4, 1981. However, the additional 
capital was not provided by the government.
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commission.7 Some Central Bank officials, including Amulfo Aurellano (a special 
assistant to Governor Licaros), had serious doubts about the merits of the expanded 
commercial banks (see Broad,1988:144-145). Also, governor Licaros himself did not 
support the reform initially. They were afraid of the consequences of economic 
concentration and domination by the big banks of the banking sector. However, Virata, 
the Ministry of Finance and a member of the Monetary Board, was a key proponent of 
the reform.8 The proponents believed that expanded commercial banking could take 
advantage of scale economies. Bigger and more diversified banks are more stable, more 
capable and more efficient in pursuing various financial activities. The leaders of the 
banking sector and other financial institutions were also convinced by the proponents 
with regard to the merits of the banking reform.9 The BAP (Bankers Association of the 
Philippines) issued an official statement supporting the reform.
Despite Chairman Licaros's doubts about their merits, the Monetary Board approved 
amendments to laws aimed at reforming the financial structure, including the 
introduction of expanded commercial banks. It should be noted that the Monetary 
Board's decision was unusual since the Central Bank governor, the Chairman of the 
Monetary Board, had normally played a decisive role in decision-making. By the late 
1970s, in terms of decision-making in the Monetary Board, the decisive influence of 
Licaros, who had served as Central Bank governor since 1970, had started to fade as 
Virata had became a more prominent figure in the Marcos government. In early 1981, 
Licaros was replaced by Jaime Laya, deputy governor for supervision and examination 
and a close ally of Virata. There was strong evidence that Licaros’s involvement in 
irregularities forced him to resign,10 although they were not officially uncovered.11 The
direct involvement of the Governor in misconduct relating to foreign currency allocation
7 For the controversy, see Broad (1988:137-148).
8 See FEER,23 January 1981:38-39; Business Day, 26 September 1979; Asian Wall Street Journal, 
26 February 1980, cited Broad, 1988:148.
9 See Times Journal, 16 January 1980, p. 10.
10 Virata, who played a leading role in Licaros's resignation, admitted the "unfortunate" incident 
(Interview, Virata, 19 June 1998). See, also, Hutehcroft (1998:140) and Patrick and Moreno 
(1985:322).
11 It is reported that Governor Licaros asked to be retired after fifty years of service in the government, 
eleven of them as Central Bank Governor (Bulletin Today, 14 January 1981, p. 10 and Times Journal 
13 January 1981).
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may have been the most serious crime which the Central Bank had ever committed.
Under the authoritarian regime, the process of structural reform through amendments to 
laws had been very smooth. Following approval from the Monetary Board, the 
President enforced the decisions of the Monetary Board. Then, the "Batasang 
Pambansa", the legislative body which was established in 1978 under the martial law 
regime, immediately amended the existing banking law without any serious discussion 
in the legislative body.12 These reforms consisted of seven amendments which were 
passed into law in April 1980.
The essence of the 1980 reform was to liberalise the financial system to facilitate 
financial resource mobilisation, particularly with regard to long term funds. The 
introduction of the expanded commercial banks was expected to mobilise more long­
term funds and to activate capital markets. The flotation of interest rates was supposed 
to attract more deposits. In fact, Lamberte and Remolona's study (1986:101) suggests 
that the reform achieved some of these goals in the short run. The reform led to 
substantial increases in the growth rates of savings and time deposits.13 However, the 
effects of the reform on the banking system were not so clear,14 as an era of financial 
and economic crisis resulting from political upheaval followed immediately afterwards. 
It was impossible to mobilise longer term funds and to activate capital markets during 
the economic and political crisis. Despite the flotation of interest rates, the Central Bank 
opened various rediscounting windows to provide credits at lower interest rates.
In terms of banking policy-making, the 1980 reform suggests that the President still 
supported the decision of the Monetary Board at that time. Under the dictatorship, with 
Presidential support, banking reform was implemented smoothly. However, as the 
economic crisis deepened, conflicts over economic policy were revealed between the 
Monetary Board members and the leaders of Marcos’ ruling party, including influential
12 See Bulletin Today, 25 March 1980, p.l and 28 March 1980, p.l.
13 Lamberte and Remolona (1986:138) find that the reform caused higher interest rates on deposits and 
borrowed funds and low returns on loans and investments which squeeze bank profits. They claim that 
"This had made banks more vulnerable to the balance of payments crisis" in 1983.
14 See Business Day, 30 April 1984 (Supplement: "Unibanking: Adjustment period needed").
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Marcos cronies. During the economic and political crisis, the Central Bank lost the 
support of the President.
Saving for All Banks: The Rescue Operations and Their Failures between 1981 
and 1983
Since the economic climate started to change in 1979 and the Philippines entered an era 
of worldwide recession and high interest rates, the government attempted to maintain 
high growth through high investments (Lim,1996:11). In January 1981, the Dewey Dee 
scandal revealed the fragility of the financial system. Dewey Dee was a leading 
businessman who headed a business group centred on textile manufacturing. He left 
the country on 9 January 1981, leaving behind unpaid debts of about P635 million, 
mostly to 16 commercial banks, three offshore banking units and 11 investment houses 
(Lamberte,1989:48). This scandal led to the collapse of the money market and seriously 
hurt public confidence in the financial system. Laya, the governor of the Central Bank, 
notes that "in retrospect, Dewey Dee's flight had a far greater impact than might have 
been expected with the amount of money that he took with him" (Laya: 1982:46). Big 
businesses and financial institutions, including commercial banks, investment houses 
and finance companies, which depended heavily on the money market, were hit by the 
scandal.
Assuming that the economic downturn and the financial crisis was temporary, the 
government and the Central Bank became involved in rescue operations on a scale 
which the country had never experienced before. Governor Laya announced that the 
Central Bank was empowered to extend appropriate financial assistance to both banks 
and non-bank financial institutions.15 For the first time, the Central Bank made advances 
to quasi banks, reaching P I.5 billion (about US$187 million), the largest such advance 
in the history of the Central Bank (Laya,1982:29). Yet, this was only the first step in 
rescuing the financial system.
During previous economic recessions, increasing government spending to stimulate the
economy had been the conventional response. However, the policy choices of the
15 See Times Journal, 21 January 1981.
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government in response to the recession, including the massive rescue operation and the 
prolonged delay of adjustment efforts, should be understood in conjunction with the 
changing political institutions centred on the Marcos dictatorship in decline. President 
Marcos resumed elections in 1978 and officially lifted martial law in January 1981. The 
opening of the National Assembly, the interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP), did not cause 
a significant change in Presidential power with respect to policy-making, since the 
President held unlimited power to issue decrees.16 The President also maintained a tight 
control over the ruling party (KBL: Kilusang Bagong Lipunan), which dominated the 
Assembly. Nevertheless, the resumption of elections, no matter how unfair, opened a 
new era of the Marcos dictatorship. Surrounded by a constellation of political 
institutions, contingent on the resumption of elections, and with the legitimacy of the 
dictatorship in decline, the President was unable to implement economic and banking 
reform measures promptly enough to avoid an economic and banking crisis.
By the late 1970s, the legitimacy of the martial law regime had started to fade, due to the
economic downturn, presidential cronyism, bureaucratic inefficiency, internal conflicts
among state elites, including economic ministers and military leaders, opposition from
business and religious leaders and an increase in political unrest. In terms of economic
policy-making, the leaders of Marcos ruling party who were most concerned about
immediate electoral contests and their business interests became more influential.
Having restored the electoral contest and with its legitimacy declining, the government
did not stop providing massive funds through foreign borrowing to avoid the further
economic recession and to shore up support for the regime. The Central Bank had
played a critical role in helping the regime survive through this massive spending. Until
the foreign credit line was shut down and available funds were exhausted, the
government could not stop spending. Election-related spending reemerged as a serious
threat to monetary stability. A deep cleavage among policy elites over economic policy
was revealed during the economic crisis. Monetary Board members of the Central
Bank, including the Central Bank governor, Finance Minister and the Director General
of the NEDA, recognised the importance of economic adjustment, including tight
monetary and fiscal policy. However, the leaders of KBL (Marcos's political party),
including Imelda Marcos and close Marcos cronies, opposed the economic
16 See Olivia Caoili (1989); Canoy (1980:178-186); and Wurfel (1988:234).
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adjustments. Finally, President Marcos did not support the Monetary Board's policy 
and delayed economic adjustments.
In the wake of the 1981 liquidity crisis, financial companies which had been heavily 
involved in the money market were the first group of companies to fall. These included 
Filmanbank and Philfinance of the Silverio Group; Atrium, Apcor, Interbank and 
Combank of the Herdis Group; and Bancom Development Corporations of the 
Bancom Group, which was long owned by Rolando Gaput.17 Apart from their own 
affiliates, Atrium and Apcor were known to have lent large amounts to and to have 
underwritten several commercial papers of Dewey Dee's Continental Manufacturing 
Corporation (see Lamberte,1989:47). Many companies of the Silverio Group and the 
Herdis Group, which had close financial relationships with these financial companies 
were severely damaged. During the liquidity crisis, some small banks, which were 
poorly managed, also revealed their financial weakness. Philippine Veterans Bank 
(PVB), a state-owned commercial bank, was one of the weakest banks. The bank's 
financial position deteriorated due to uncollected loans incurred by some of its officers. 
In spite of its mounting losses, the bank was allowed to operate until 1985. Associated 
Bank was another bank which received generous financial assistance. After a rescue 
operation, the bank was acquired by the DBP.
To restore public confidence in the financial system, the government decided to rescue
financial institutions. Until 1983, the Central Bank did not allow the closure of a single
bank. The Central Bank arranged to merge and consolidate financial institutions within
the same conglomerate. Apart from the Central Bank credits, the government provided
ailing banks with financial assistance through state financial institutions, including the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social
Security System (SSS) and National Development Corporation (NDC). Generous
financial assistance through state financial institutions led to the government's takeover
of rescued banks. Due to the massive rescue operation, the presence of the state in the
financial sector was further expanded. The state banks, namely the PNB and the DBP,
17 Rolando Gaput, who was seen as Marcos's financial advisor, worked for the Bancom between 1965 
and 1980 and left the bank to head the Security Bank in July 1980.
occupied nearly half of the entire banking sector's assets in 1983.
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Filmanbank of the Silverio Group faced a continuing decline in its liquidity position 
due to the expansion of unsecured loans in the past. To rescue the bank, PNB infused 
more than P200 million worth of equity and then took control of the ownership and 
management of the bank. The bank was renamed Pilipinas Bank in 1980. Philfinance, a 
finance company of the Silverio Group, which also faced a severe liquidity problem, 
was closed after revealing serious violations against financial regulation.18
Financial companies and a bank of the Herdis Group were merged by the Central 
Bank's rescue packages. Atrium Capital Corporation (Atrium), the largest investment 
house in the country with PI.6 billion assets in 1980, and Asia Pacific Capital 
Corporation (APCOR) merged to form Interbank. Atrium obtained an emergency loan 
from the Central Bank to pay off their investors, although their placements were based 
on a without-recourse basis. When they merged, the DBP provided P420 million 
capital infusion. Furthermore, National Development Corporation, a state-owned 
holding company, acquired a 20 per cent ownership share of the Herdis Group. As a 
consequence, Interbank became a state-owned commercial bank. The DBP owned 70 
per cent of the capital stock of the bank and played a key role in managing the bank.19
Bancom Development Corporation, headed by Sixto Roxas, the fourth largest 
investment house in the country, was another of the biggest companies which suffered 
severely from the liquidity crisis. Accepting the Central Bank's rescue plan, it merged 
with three other financial institutions of the Bancom Group and then converted to a 
commercial bank, Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP).20 To meet the P300 million 
minimum capital requirement for a new commercial bank, LBP infused P140 million 
and SSS did P100 million.
18 Lamberte (1989:25) explains the typical fraud. The finance company engaged in "Kiting", which 
means borrowing from the money market using the same commercial papers of reputable firms three 
or four times for different sets of investors.
19 See Bulletin Today, 13 September 1981.
20 See Bulletin Today, 3 September 1981.
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Associated Bank was another bank which was rescued by government assistance, 
including the CB advances, capital infusion by the DBP and deposits from the DBP. 
Later, the DBP acquired the bank, since the bank was not able to pay back its debt.
These five state-acquired banks had combined assets of P I2 billion, about 8 per cent of 
the total domestic commercial banks' assets (see PEER, 13 September 1984:56). The 
various forms of financial assistance by state institutions to acquired banks amounted 
to more than P6 billion at the end of February 1984.21 Central Bank assistance to 
financial institutions also increased rapidly. The ratio of the assistance divided by the 
total of the reserve money jumped from 7.7 per cent in the first quarter of 1984 to 47.3 
per cent in the same period of 1986 (see Table 2-1).
Apart from assistance to financial institutions, the government set up a PI.5 billion 
Industrial Fund using the national budget and the proceeds of Central Bank Certificates 
of Indebtedness (CBCIs) in 1981 (see, Laya,1982:30-34). The Fund aimed to rescue 
commercial paper issuers and quasi-banks from the collapsed money markets. The 
resources of the Industrial Fund were to be channelled through lead banks to the 
commercial paper issuers. Thus they could pay back the troubled quasi-banks and 
these in turn could repay the Central Bank. The first recipients of assistance from the 
Industrial Fund were Continental Manufacturing Company, Alfa Integrated Textiles 
and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).22 
Continental Manufacturing Corporation was the company which Dewey Dee 
abandoned. This company and Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation, another 
Dewey Dee's company were taken over by the DBP.23 Alfa Integrated Textiles was 
damaged by the Dee scandal during the recession, since the company had close 
relations with Dee's company. CDCP, which was owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a Marcos 
crony, was the largest construction company with 13,878 employees (at year end 1980). 
The following year, the Industrial Fund was replaced by a new P2 billion rediscounting 
facility.
21 See Business Day, 4 May 1984, p.2.
22 It is reported that 10 more firms asked the government for assistance (Bulletin Today, 1 September 
1980, p.20).
23 See, for example, Bulletin Today, 31 January 1981, p.l 1.
78
To restore financial stability, the Central Bank also provided large amounts of credit 
through its rediscount windows, particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Between 
1980 and 1983, a lot of rediscount windows had been opened with preferential rates 
significantly below the market rates. In fact, the Central Bank's selective credit 
programme lost its selectiveness, since many economic activities could qualify for 
rediscounting.24 Massive rescue operations to ailing companies which were owned by 
close Marcos cronies fuelled criticism against the Marcos government. For example, 
Jaime Ongpin, a leading critic of the business community against the government, 
severely criticised the CDCP rescue by the government.25
The Central Bank was also keen to attract foreign credits to stimulate the economy 
during this period. Foreign swaps (Forward Exchange Cover) began in 1972 and 
became particularly important in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the early 1980s, the 
Central Bank encouraged private banks to acquire foreign credits through foreign 
swaps which generously transferred currency risks from the private banks to the 
Central Bank (Dohner and Intal, Jr.,1989:174). Between 1983 and 1984, total swaps 
increased both in absolute terms and as a proportion of total commercial bank assets 
and 1984 devaluations caused Central Bank losses.26 Huge losses from foreign swaps 
contributed to the financial collapse of the Central Bank.
Until 1983, the Philippines could manage to generate foreign loans, although investors 
became more cautious and the terms and conditions tended to be less favourable for the 
country. Despite the financial instability and serious economic problems, the World 
Bank and IMF did not encourage structural reforms in the banking sector until the 
economy and banking sector was faced with a deep crisis. They did not recognise 
properly the vulnerability of the economy and banking sector in the country. The 
World Bank had continued to provide loans to the country. The first $200 million 
Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) was approved in September 1980 and the second 
$200 million SAL was approved in April 1983. In addition, in May 1981 the World
24 For the lists of preferential rediscount rates, see Lamberte (1988, Table 7, 1949-1973 and Table 21, 
1981-1983); and World Bank (1988, Table 6.1, 1979-1986).
25 See, for example, Times Journal, 1 ,3  and 4 March 1983.
26 From 1985 the Central Bank stopped using foreign exchange swaps to facilitate foreign borrowing.
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Bank approved a $250 million APEX loan for relending to the private sector through 
Philippine Investments Systems Organisation (PISO), Private Development 
Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP), and the Development Bank of the Philippines 
(DBP), including a $100 million co-financing syndicated by Lloyds Bank International 
(see Laya,1982:61). In 1981 the Central Bank also borrowed $250 million for the 
private sector as part of the Consolidated Foreign Borrowing Programme (Jumbo 
Loan) (Laya, 1982:61). This consisted of $200 million syndicated by Manufacturers 
Hanover Trust in the US and $50 million syndicated in Bahrain by Allied Bank.
In 1980, the World Bank recognised that the balance of payments deficit of the country 
was already over 5 per cent of GNP. The economy had a very high ratio of investment, 
due to the extremely high capital-output ratio, but the return on public investment was 
low. In fact, the first SAL was granted to attack two basic problems: the uneven 
structure of protection and the low return on public investment (see Mosley, 1991:45). 
Nevertheless, the World Bank did not impose the strict conditions needed to achieve 
these two goals. As Mosley's study revealed, the conditions of the lending were not 
burdensome for the country (see Mosley,1991:50).
The World Bank was particularly concerned about the eleven major industrial projects
which had been announced in late 1979, just after the oil price shock, by the Ministry of
Trade and Industry, headed by Roberto Ongpin, who was also a member of the
Monetary Board.27 These very ambitious projects aimed to transform the basis of the
economy from light (labour intensive) to heavy (capital intensive) industry. Their
estimated cost was more than $3 billion. Of the eleven major industrial projects, the
World Bank succeeded in persuading the Philippine government to cancel four projects
including the steel mill, the aluminium smelter, the paper mill and the petrochemical 
27 For the projects, see Ministry of Industry (1980) "Philippine Industry in the 1980s". The eleven
major projects comprised: the Copper Smelter Project (an estimated cost of $350 million), the
Phosphatic Fertiliser Project (an estimated cost of $370 million), the Aluminium Smelter Project (an
estimated cost of $580 million), the Diesel Engine Manufacturing Project (an estimated cost of $100
million), the Cement Industry Rationalisation Programme, the Coconut Industry Rationalisation
Project, the Integrated Pulp and Paper Project, the Petrochemical Complex Project (an estimated cost
of $187 million), the Heavy Engineering Industries Project (an estimated cost of $100 million), the
Steel Mill Project (an estimated cost of $700 million), and the Alcogas Programme (an estimated cost
of $900 million).
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complex (see Mosley,1991:51). However, the Bank allowed the others to go ahead if 
they were justified by rigorous economic appraisal. The Ministry had kept the plan of 
the industrial projects until 1983. The government failed to improve the macro economy 
for two years after the first SAL. However it implemented some of the trade 
liberalisation measures and this was enough to satisfy the World Bank. The second 
SAL was approved in April 1983.
The IMF's assessment of the economy was also not very critical until late 1983, 
although the year 1982 was only the second year since 1962 when there was no Stand­
by Credit Arrangement between the Philippines and the IMF. The IMF rejected the 
government's request to secure an IMF credit for 1982, since the Philippine government 
nearly doubled the rescue funds for 1981 to $400 million from the $193 million which 
had previously been agreed with the IMF (see, Bello,1985:192). In the following year, 
although the country's debt had reached an unsustainable level, the Stand-by Credit 
Arrangement became effective in February 1983. The IMF showed its support for the 
Marcos government.28 Later that year, the IMF changed its attitude. In spite of the peso 
devaluation, the IMF cancelled the last two tranches of the Credit programme for the 
year, since the government did not achieve the monetary targets for the 1983 credit. 
However, it was reported that an IMF official gave foreign creditors assurances 
concerning the Philippine economy as late as August 1983 (see Thompson and 
Slayton,1985:76).
The massive rescue operation between 1981 and 1983 resulted in a further expansion 
of the state's role in the economy, a huge public spending, an accumulation of foreign 
debt and a reduction in foreign reserves. Given the massive rescue operation, the 
balance of payments problem was predictable. In fact, this had been a repeated pattern 
in the past: serious balance of payments crisis after massive government spending. This 
time, the Philippines was hit by its worst ever balance of payments crisis due to the 
structural weakness of the economy, the unprecedented level of spending through 
foreign debt and the prolonged delay of adjustment efforts.
28 See, for example, Times Journal, 20 March 1983.
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In early 1981, when the financial system was first hit by the Dewey Dee scandal, the 
economic policy-makers, including the governor of the Central Bank, did not realise 
how serious the consequences of the scandal would become. They were still confident 
about state activism in the economy and their ability to manage the economy. Soon after 
the Dewey Dee scandal, on 17 January 1981, Marcos announced that he would lift 
martial law. He stated that it was the most "propitious time" to lift martial law because 
the nation was at its strongest.29 He stressed economic gains and the restoration of 
monetary and banking stability during the martial law period.30 By 1983, Jaime C. Laya, 
the Central Bank governor claimed that the economic crisis was "A Crisis of 
Confidence".31
Despite some policy-makers' confidence and continuing support from international 
financial institutions, it became clear by the early 1980s that the government had failed 
to develop an efficient state apparatus to coordinate the government's economic 
projects. State control over economic activities had started to deteriorate in the late 
1970s. Conflicts among policy elites over key economic policy were revealed in the late 
1970s and deepened as the economic condition deteriorated in the early 1980s. Gerardo 
Sicat, the former Director General of NEDA and Monetary Board member until 1981, 
notes that the creation of the Ministry of the Human Settlement by the first Lady, 
Imelda Marcos, was a critical event in terms of the government's loss of control over 
the economy. "Eventually, the coordination of the economic programs of government 
became more difficult. Sometimes, the power centres gave conflicting commands " 
(Sicat,1985:59). Sicat admitted that, although the state's capacity to raise financial 
resources through taxes, savings and foreign loans improved, the state was not so 
successful in controlling public expenditure and private investment (see Sicat, 1985:54- 
59).
29 See, Bulletin Today, 20 January 1981, p.9.
30 See, "An Encounter With Destiny", President Marcos' speech on 17 January 1981 proclaiming the 
termination of the state of martial law at the Heroes Hall, Malacanang Palace, reprinted in Times 
Journal, 18 and 19 January 1981.
31 See Laya (1982). For critics against this view, IBON (1984).
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Many observers have pointed to the problems of loose control over state-owned 
enterprises and their subsidiaries.32 When Marcos first took office in 1966, there were 
only 37 state-owned enterprises. As the state's involvement in the economy expanded, 
the number of state-owned enterprises increased to reach 120 in 1975, having more 
than tripled in the first ten years. By 1984 the number had grown further to 303 (see 
Manasan,1995: Table 1). According to the Commission on Audit's report in 1984, 
fewer than two-thirds of all state-owned enterprises were audited by the Commission 
and several did not even file a financial statement.33 The defects of the audit system were 
often revealed.34 For example, the Ministry of Human Settlement, which had a total of 
seventy-three subsidiaries, was "notorious for its role as a dispenser of political 
patronage" (Haggard, 1988:94).35
The first Lady, Imelda Marcos, who was Human Settlement Minister, Metro Manila 
governor and board chairman of the National Electrification Administration (NEA), was 
keen to provide "support" for the rural and urban poor.36 For example, the Metro 
Manila Commission planned to spend P4 billion to improve basic services, including 
housing, water and power supply, from 1981 to 1985.37 The Movement for Livelihood 
and Progress, or Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK), was also launched by the 
Ministry of Human Settlement in September 1981 with high media interest.38 The initial 
funds were PI billion, but within a few months they had doubled. According to the 
advertisements, the programme was designed to help "the poorest of the poor," 
especially with interest-free "livelihood loans" of not more than P3,000 and to provide
32 See, for example, Haggard (1988:94) and Manasan (1995:2-6).
33 See Commission on Audit, 1984 Annual Financial Report. Volume II: Government-Owned or - 
Controlled Corporations (Manila: 1985) cited in Haggard (1988:94).
34 See, for example, Business Day, 3 January 1985 and 4 January 1985.
35 For a similar view, see Casper (1987:118). See, also IBON Facts and Figures, no. 177 (December 
31,1985).
36 See, for example, Times Journal, 1, 2 and 3 January 1980.
37 See Times Journal, 15 January 1981.
38 KKK-related articles repeatedly appeared on the front page of daily newspapers such as Bulletin 
Today and Times Journal in September 1981.
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credit for small-scale rural businesses.39 However, it was reported that proper 
procedures for examining loan applications were often ignored and this programme 
was used to redistribute money to local government officials, barangay captains, mayors 
and governors (see Wuifel,1988:257). It was later revealed that Marcos bailiwick 
(Regions I and II) and Romualdez territory (Region VIII) acquired a total of P595.98 
million or almost 40 per cent of the total PI,512.62 million KKK approved funding at 
the end of 1985.40
Over the issue of economic management and public spending, fierce conflicts between 
technocrats like Sicat and Virata, and Imelda Marcos and the other leaders of Marcos's 
ruling party were revealed. As the economy declined, economic management became a 
critical issue for the regime's survival. Technocrats could not avoid becoming involved 
in the ensuing political struggle. From 1978, Virata and other cabinet members had 
been appointed members of the new National Assembly by the President. The caucus 
meeting of the Marcos ruling party (KBL: Kilusang Bagong Lipunan) played a critical 
role in decision making. In the early 1980s, the political role of Marcos cronies was 
legitimised, as they were made members of the central committee of Marcos's ruling 
party (see Wurfel,1988:237). Eduardo Cojuangco, Roberto Benedicto and Antonio 
Floirendo became regional party chairmen.
In the early 1980s, under strict budget constraints, Virata and Sicat opposed lavish 
construction projects like the Heart Centre, the Lung Centre and the International 
Convention Centre, which were promoted by Imelda Marcos and her allies (see, De 
Dios,1988:106 and Sicat,1985:62). In the Committee, disagreements between Virata 
and Imelda Marcos were often uncovered over such issues. As a member of the 
Monetary Board, Virata was concerned about the huge non-performing assets of the 
PNB and the Benedicto-owned Republic Planters Bank, which mainly financed sugar 
planters. In 1982, the Monetary Board called for a stop to the rediscounting of funds 
through the Central Bank for the sugar industry, since they had reached their legal limit
39 See, also, Jose Conrado Benitez (1983) "The Kilusan: Breakthrough for the Poor" in Fookien 
Times Philippine Yearbook, 1982-1983; Times Journal, 13 April 1983, cited in Wurfel (1988:257); 
and Times Journal, 5 April 1983.
40 See Business Day, 12 June 1986, p.22.
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(see De Dios, 1988:107), although the decision was reversed due to strong opposition 
from the sugar industry, which was heavily damaged by the sugar price slump. 
However, the Monetary Board's stance caused Benedicto to be hostile towards Virata. 
During a KBL meeting in April 1983, the leaders of KBL vehemently accused Virata of 
economic mismanagement.41 They blamed government economic policies for being 
subservient to the IMF. Sicat, the Director General of NEDA who had once expected 
the martial law regime to bring economic discipline, left the government in 1981. In 
1983, it is reported that Virata submitted his resignation but the resignation was not 
accepted.42
Within the military, another key state organisation which played a critical role under the 
martial law regime, internal conflict was also revealed in the early 1980s. There was a 
struggle between Ver, allied with Imelda Marcos, and Defence Minister Juan Ponce- 
Enrile, allied with Fidel Ramos.43 Although Marcos asserted that he would continue in 
power, the succession problem occasionally surfaced in the early 1980s with rumours 
of his ill health. Enrile and Imelda Marcos were often seen as the two strongest 
contenders for succession.
Outside the state, various forms of anti-Marcos movements also became active during 
the economic recession. Two elections in three years (legislative elections in 1978 and 
local elections in 1980) had brought new political activity. The handful of leaders in the 
Liberal Party had not collaborated with Marcos (see Thompson,1995:102). Heavy 
spending for ailing companies owned by Marcos's cronies fuelled criticism against the 
government among business elites. For example, the Makati Business Club was 
established and became critical of government policy. Influential religious leaders were 
also critical of the President. The New People's Army, a communist-led militant group, 
strengthened their power in rural areas. The National Democratic Front (NDF) was 
formed on the initiative of communist leaders to unite their forces. In Mindanao, 
Muslim leaders also energised their opposition movements against the government. In
41 See Business Day (Special Report), 27 February 1984, p. 13.
42 See De Dios (1988:108) and Asian Wall Street Journal, 27-28 May 1983.
43 See, for instance, Thompson (1995:108) and Wurfel (1988:240).
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Manila, urban violence erupted more frequently.44 The "Light-a~Fire Movement" had 
started in mid-1979 and attacked symbolic places including the "floating Casino", a 
favourite project of Imelda Marcos.45 Although the radical movement was smashed by 
the authority within a year, the population was surprised by the involvement of elite 
businessmen. The movement was headed by a Havard-trained businessman, Eduardo 
Olaguer, who was Vice-President of Business Day, part-time professor of the Asian 
Institute of Management, chief executive officer of a bus company and an active critic 
of the Marcos cronies. As security conditions deteriorated, the government lost public 
support, especially among business.
By late 1982, both the Prime Minister and Finance Minister Virata recognised the depth 
of the economic problems and thought that spending through foreign borrowing was 
unsustainable.46 He often urged reform of the monetary system since the economy 
suffered severely from fluctuations in exchange and interest rates, due to monetary 
expansion fuelled by political activities.47 However, it became much more difficult to 
control the economy due to a series of events in 1983 which were critical for the 
Philippine economy and politics. The economic and political crisis had deepened as the 
power of the authoritarian regime had eroded.
In August, Benigno Aquino, Jr., a leading Marcos opponent, was assassinated at the 
airport when he returned from the U.S. This brutal murder severely eroded the 
credibility of the Marcos Presidency. The assassination was a turning point for the anti- 
Marcos movements. Thompson (1995:115) notes that "antigovemment protests after 
Aquino's murder", in contrast to previous efforts by opposition politicians, "lasted for 
months, put Marcos on the defensive, and provided opposition politicians with a 
noncommunist following". The political instability had an adverse effect on the 
Philippine economy, since it made the maintenance of foreign credits harder and they
were already starting to be withdrawn in late 1982 when the Mexican and Brazilian
44 For radical movements during this period, see Thompson (1995:83-88), de Dios (1988:81-95) and 
Wurfel (1988:244).
45 For the radical movement, see Business Day, 8 April 1986, p. 24.
46 Virata claimed that the main reason for the debt crisis in 1983 was that foreign credits were 
withdrawn in late 1982, triggered by the Mexican and Brazilian defaults. See, Virata (1984:274-275).
47 See, for example, Times Journal, 17 April 1983.
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defaults occurred (see Virata,1984:274-275). A large number of overseas commercial 
banks terminated their short-term lending to the Philippines in the last quarter of 1983. 
In addition, political unrest in the wake of the murder triggered an acceleration of capital 
flight (see Remolona and Lamberte,1986:113).48 International reserves fell by over $1 
billion between July and October 1983 (Mosley,1991:52). In October, a moratorium on 
debt repayments was declared by the Philippine government. Immediately after the debt 
moratorium, foreign exchange and import controls were imposed. In order to improve 
the government's fiscal and external balance, import tariffs were increased and export 
taxes were implemented.49 The substantial depreciation of the peso from June 1983 was 
allowed to continue until June 1984. Furthermore, in October 1984, when all 
emergency exchange controls were lifted and the exchange rate was allowed to be 
determined by market forces, the peso depreciated sharply.
Even worse, in late 1983, "the most shocking economic scandal" was uncovered by an 
IMF team that inspected the Central Bank account (de Dios,1988:109). The inspection 
team reported that they had discovered an overstatement of the country's dollar reserves 
by $600 to $800 million, or 42 per cent to 58 per cent of the reserve. The international 
reserve had been overstated through manipulated transactions between the Central 
Bank, the PNB and its subsidiary, the National Investment Development Company 
(NIDC), and the Philippine National Oil Corporation.50 The scandal seriously hurt the 
credibility of the government, which had already been eroded. Distrust was angrily 
voiced by the international financial community. Although governor Laya insisted that 
the incident was caused by statistical errors and some of them had been made before he 
became the governor, he resigned as governor of the Central Bank.51 It must be noted 
that, although his explanation did not entirely persuade the international financial 
community, Marcos still retained Laya in his cabinet. He became the Minister of
48 Boyce points out that this widely accepted version of the timing of capital flight has been disputed. 
Statistical evidence reviewed by his study suggests that capital flight in fact peaked in 1981
(Boyce, 1993:258 and notes 26). For further analysis , see Boyce (1993:279-302).
49 Lamberte, et al. (1985) reviews the government's response to the balance of payments crisis 
between 1983 and 1985.
50 For the overstatement, see for example, Business Day, 13 March 1984, p.2 and 24 April 1984,p.2.
51 See FEER, 5 January 1984:48-50; FEER, 29 March 1984:56-59; Times Journal,18 January 1984; 
and Javate-de Dios (1988:517-522).
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Education, a key ministerial post.
Between 1981 and 1983, the government had conducted massive rescue operations to 
prevent further decline of the economy and to support the regime. The Central Bank 
and other state financial institutions were actively involved in the rescue operations. The 
Central Bank provided huge amounts of rescue funds, a measure which it had never 
previously taken. It became evident that to avoid further economic deterioration, curbs 
on public spending and changes in banking policy were necessary. Yet, threatened by a 
constellation of political institutions dependent on the resumption of elections and on 
the dictatorship losing legilimacy, the President was more concerned about generating 
broad support through public spending and protecting the business interests of his 
close cronies. The interests and capacities of the President in implementing necessary 
policy reform measures were undermined. In spite of the massive rescue operation, it 
proved impossible to restore the monetary and banking stability under the Presidential 
dictatorship in decline. The worst economic and banking crisis was yet to come.
Crisis and Reform of the Banking Sector between 1984 and 1986
Between 1984 and 1986, the banking sector faced its most serious turmoil. During the 
Philippines' worst ever economic recession, state banks, which formed the largest share 
of the entire banking sector, suffered huge losses. Since foreign credit was no longer 
easily available, the massive rescue operation for ailing banks was unsustainable. 
Election related spending reemerged as a serious threat to monetary stability. Both the 
IMF and the World Bank had maintained an exceptionally strict stance on lending 
conditionality in 1984 and 1985. Facing economic turmoil, scarce foreign credits and 
stronger pressures from the IMF and World Bank, the government finally implemented 
draconian stabilisation measures after the 1984 elections.
Faced with its worst ever economic and banking crisis, the Central Bank had altered 
previous policies to restructure the banking sector. The new governor, Jose B. 
Fernandez, Jr., took a tough stance on closing insolvent banks. The Central Bank also 
reformed monetaiy policy and foreign credit policy. Nevertheless, despite some 
regulatory reforms, the Marcos government did not improve the economy and banking
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sector. After prolonged delay, the implementation of radical stabilisation measures led 
to a severe economic recession. The new Central Bank governor's initiative to rebuild 
the banking sector was not fully supported by the President The government did not 
solve the most serious problem in the banking sector, which was that of huge non­
performing assets in state banks. The government was not able to initiate the 
rehabilitation of the PNB and DBP, since these reforms potentially led to further job 
losses and closure of businesses which relied on state bank credits. Without financial 
support from foreign creditors, the government did not have incentives to implement 
banking reform. Negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank were halted, since the 
Philippine government consistently resisted reforming the monopoly of the sugar and 
coconut industries, which were dominated by Marcos's close cronies. As the Marcos 
authoritarianism declined, it became increasingly difficult to restore the stability of the 
banking sector.
In January 1984, when the economy was teetering on the brink of collapse, Jose 
Fernandez became the Central Bank governor. He had to face the worst balance of 
payments problem in the entire postwar era. Political uncertainty fuelled a sense of 
crisis among local business communities and foreign investors. Because of dishonest 
reporting about foreign reserves under the previous governor, Jaime Laya, the Central 
Bank had lost its credibility among the international financial community. Fernandez 
was chosen from among a very small number of candidates to meet the demands of the 
job. In 1989, Wilfrido C. Tecson, the President of the Bankers Association of the 
Philippines recalled: "When Jobo accepted the Central Bank governorship, no one in 
the banking community envied him. In fact, most of us really felt that he had for one 
brief moment lost his sanity".52
After completing his MBA degree at Harvard University, Fernandez started his banking 
career as assistant to the President of the Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) in 
1949. The PBC occupied a prominent position in the banking community, as it was the
52 See "Closing Remarks of the Bankers Association of the Philippines President" by Wilfrido C. 
Tecson at the joint luncheon of the BAP, Makati Business Club and Management Association of the 
Philippines in honour of Governor Jose B. Fernandez Jr. on January 12, 1989, reprinted in The 
Central Banker January-February 1989, p47.
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first Filipino commercial bank. Miguel Cuademo, who had been president of the bank 
since it was established in 1938, left the PBC to become the first governor of the 
Central Bank in 1949. The vice-president of the PBC, Alfonso Calalang, also joined the 
Central Bank as deputy governor. Later, he also became the governor of the Central 
Bank. Fernandez's boss, the new president of the PBC was Don Jose "Pepe" 
Cojuangco Sr., father of Corazon Aquino, who had been a congressman and close 
associate of President Quezon in the 1930s. In severe economic circumstances, 
President Marcos appointed Fernandez, who had had a tie with his opposition leader, 
Benigno Aquino, who was assassinated shortly before Fernandez's appointment. Don 
Jose "Pepe" Cojuangco Sr, Benigno Aquino's father-in-law, was a very influential 
person in Fernandez's career in the banking sector,
Fernandez left the PBC bank and established the Far East Bank and Trust Company in 
I960,53 which had steadily expanded its businesses during the 1960s and 70s. In 1983, 
the Far East Bank was the fifth largest private commercial bank in terms of assets in the 
Philippines. The Bank had the largest net income of private commercial banks in the 
same year.54 Fernandez had experience as a representative of the banking community, 
when he was the President of the Bankers Association of the Philippines for three 
consecutive terms from 1971 to 1974, and a member of the Joint IMF-CBP Banking 
Survey Commission in the early 1970s. Fernandez also had close relationships with 
American and Japanese bankers, mainly through share-holding arrangements of the Far 
East Bank. In 1973 and 1974, the Far East Bank established relationships with 
Chemical Bank and Mitsui Bank respectively. Each bank bought 12.5 per cent of the 
share-holdings of the Far East Bank. Fernandez was the only Filipino banker at that 
time who sat on the international advisory board of Chemical Bank.
53 For a brief history of the Far East Bank, see Far East Bank and Trust Company (1990) "A Vault 
of Memories: Far East Bank's Thirty-year Chronicle" (Manila); Espiritu, Octavio V. (1990:116) "Far 
East Bank: 30 years... into forever", in 1990 Fookien Times Philippines Year Book and Hutchcroft 
(1998:102-104). See also Business World, 27 February 1990, "Special Feature: CB; a changing of the 
guards".
54 See Business Day, 1983 ed., "1000 Top Corporations in the Philippines".
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Due to the legislative election in May, 1984 was a very difficult moment in which to 
control the money supply. As of the third week of April, the Central Bank's credits 
outstanding to the national government amounted to P18.23 billion.55 The inflation rate 
in Metro Manila soared to 40% in February.56 In spite of Fernandez's resistance,57 it 
was reported that Marcos's party, the KBL, had access to limitless government funds 
for the election. P4.6 billion cash was printed during the campaign.58
Until the election was over, the Central Bank could not tighten monetary policy, in spite 
of consistent pressure from the IMF and the World Bank. After the election, the new 
Central Bank governor, Jose "Jobo" Fernandez took initiatives to reform monetary and 
banking policy. Facing the threat of uncontrollable inflation, further capital flight and 
peso depreciation, the Governor decided to adopt a radical measure to stabilise the 
economy. After failing to attract investors for a series of Central Bank bills (Central 
Bank Certificates of Indebtedness: CBCIs) in 1983, from September 1984 the Central 
Bank started to issue CBCIs ("Jobo" bills) which were sold at very high interest rates 
(40 per cent on 30-60 bills in September). As a result, domestic interest rates increased 
rapidly. The Manila Reference Rate jumped to 25.75 per cent and bank lending rates 
jumped to 30 per cent in September 1984 (Lamberte, et al., 1985:33). Due to this issue 
of Central Bank bills with high interest rates, formal commercial lending came to a 
virtual standstill. Between 1983 and 1985, total liquidity fell by almost one third in real 
terms (Lim,1996:65, Table la). This radical measure "very nearly killed the patient" 
(Mosley,1991:52). In the real economy, GDP fell sharply by over 10 per cent between 
1983 and 1985, investment fell from 27 to 16 per cent of GDP and measured 
unemployment rose from 7.9 to 11.1 per cent (ibid.). Due to the serious delay in taking
decisive action to stabilise the economy, the measures were much more painful than
55 Business Day, 10 May 1984, p.3. See, also Business Day, 1 May 1984, p.2 and Business Day, 14 
May 1984, p. 6.
56 Business Day, 3 May 1984, p.2
57 Reports of the dispute between Fernandez and Marcos over the funds for projects connected with 
the election date back to the beginning of Fernandez's governorship. See, for example, FEER, 2 May 
1984:13.
58 This figure, P4.6 billion, is cited in FEER, August 30,1984:24, Wurfel (1988:287) and 
Thompson (1995:125). Lamberte (1989:51) also roughly estimated that the government pumped 
around P5 billion into the economy through election-related spending activities a few months before 
the National Assembly election of May 1984.
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they should have been.59 In its worst ever economic recession, the Central Bank faced 
the overwhelming task of rebuilding the banking sector.
Shortly before the implementation of the radical stabilisation measure, Fernandez 
declared a "crusade" in August 1984 to rebuild the banking system.60 First of all, the 
Central Bank announced that it would stop rescuing all banks, including insolvent ones, 
to protect financial stability. He promised to take a strict stance in dealing with the 
problem of the weak banks, and prosecute those responsible for fraud, mismanagement, 
and DOSRI abuses. Second, the Central Bank sought to support the consolidation of 
the stronger and more conservatively managed banks by improving their public image. 
The Central Bank also hoped to bring funds back into the banking system by restoring 
public confidence and solving "image" problems in the banking system. Third, the 
Central Bank encouraged mergers and acquisitions among banks by suggesting and 
arranging options.
The Central Bank's decision to close insolvent banks was its most controversial 
decision, which had a significant impact on the banking sector. In addition to the 
limitation of government resources, the effectiveness of a policy which aimed 
essentially at rescuing "all" ailing banks, including insolvent ones, was seriously in 
doubt by 1983. Since massive rescue funds were allocated to insolvent companies 
owned by Marcos cronies, the Central Bank was severely criticised because of the 
further misuse of public funds. After all, the rescue operation did not improve the 
economy and the banking system.
After the declaration of the "crusade", the Central Bank closed the Royal Savings Bank 
(RSB), one of the leading thrift banks with 23 branches in Southern Tagalog. The Bank 
had already closed unofficially on 29 June 1984 after losing P100 million in deposits 
in less than one month and the Central Bank sought investors to rescue the bank.61 As
Lamberte (1989:27) observes, depositors took the closure of RSB as a signal that
59 See Sicat (1985:26) and Business Day, 8 January 1985, p.9.
60 See Business Day, 7 January 1985; FEER, 13 September 1984:56; FEER, 7 May 1987:81; and 
Hutchcroft (1998:174).
61 One of potential investors was Metrobank but the negotiation was not successful. See Business 
Day, 16 April 1984,p.7.
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showed the authority's decisiveness. In this climate of economic and political instability, 
many depositors started moving their funds into more liquid banks. Between 1984 and 
1986, the Central Bank closed another three banks, including Banco Filipino Savings 
and Mortgage Bank (BF), Philippine Veterans Bank (PV) and Pacific Banking 
Corporation. All the banks closed had suffered huge losses due to mismanagement and 
DOSRI loans.
The evaluation of the assets and liabilities of banks inevitably left some ambiguity. 
However, it must be noted that the Central Bank's authority to handle the banking crisis 
was undermined by the direct intervention of President Marcos. During this period, the 
Monetary Authority's decisions were particularly arbitrary, due to this frequent 
intervention. All members of the Monetary Board, the decision-making body of the 
Central Bank, were appointed by the President and the majority of them were members 
of the Cabinet. Two of the three seats for private sector representatives were left vacant. 
Between 1984 and 1986 the Monetary Board consisted of Jose Fernandez (the Chair of 
the Board and the Central Bank governor), Cesar E. A. Virata (Minister of Finance), 
Roberto V. Ongpin (Chair, Board of Investments and Minister of Trade and Industry), 
Vicente B. Valdepenas, Jr. (Director General of NEDA) and Cesar A. Buenaventura 
(private sector representative, President, Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp).
After Roberto V. Ongpin, who had planned ambitious development projects, was once
convinced by other Monetary Board members to suspend these projects due to the
economic conditions, there was a broad consensus with regard to the importance of
economic stabilisation measures and the redirection of banking policy to stop massive
spending. However, the policy of the Central Bank was not fully supported by the
President. Vicente B. Valdepenas, Jr. (Director General of NEDA), who joined the
Cabinet and the Monetaiy Board in July 1983, recalled that there were not many
opportunities to meet the President and discuss economic policy during his tenure.62
As the regime was losing support during the severe economic and banking crisis,
President Marcos intervened directly in the Monetary Board's decision-making.63 The 
52 Interview, Dr. Vicente Valdepenas, Jr., 16 June 1998.
63 Singson, senior deputy governor under Fernandez, notes that on at least two occasions he 
(Fernandez) dared to defy the President by refusing to accede to certain unreasonable requests (Tinig 
Bangko Sentral, July-Aug 1994:20).
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KBL (Marcos ruling party) caucus became more important in terms of economic 
policy-making, while the Monetary Board of the Central bank was losing support from 
the President.64
The rescue of the Republic Planters Bank and the Banco Filipino were prominent 
examples. The Republic Planters Bank (RPB), which was controlled by Roberto 
Benedicto, a close presidential crony, had reserve deficiencies during the economic 
crisis. However, through a presidential letter of instruction, the Central Bank allowed 
penalties for RPB's reserve deficiencies to be accounted for as a central bank advance.65
The closure of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (BF) was the most 
controversial case. The Banco Filipino was founded by the Aguirre family in 1964. As 
a thrift bank, the bank was the second largest in terms of assets and had the largest 
branch network (more than 80 branches in Metro-Manila alone). A few days after the 
Central Bank closed RSB, Banco Filipino unilaterally declared a "bank holiday" when 
the Central Bank refused to grant it further assistance. According to the Central Bank, 
Central Bank examiners had discovered a misuse of P979 million of emergency aid 
which had been provided by the Central Bank from early June (FEER, 2 August 
1984:78-79). They found that payments from the bank to depositors in the same period 
totalled only P670 million (ibid.). However, a little later President Marcos ordered the 
Central Bank to provide BF with a P3 billion emergency loan. Nonetheless, the bank 
failed to reverse its rapidly deteriorating financial situation. Finally, CB closed it on 25 
January 1985. At the time of its closure, BF had more than two million deposit 
accounts amounting to P897 million. The exact reason why Marcos attempted to rescue 
the bank through direct intervention was not entirely clear. However, Marcos might 
have felt that it was necessary to scotch the rumours that the Aguirre family was being 
punished, since they were not on the Marcos side in the parliamentary elections.66 The 
ugly rumours and the closure of the bank, whose depositors were low-income workers
64 See, for example, Business Day, 3 ,4  and 7 January 1985. The nomination of Jose Fernandez as 
the Central Bank governor was also the result of consultation with KBL leaders. See Business Day,
12 January 1984, p.3.
65 See FEER, 26 July 1984:48; FEER, 13 September 1984:57 and Manapat (1991:125).
66 See FEER, 30 August 1984:48-49 and 26 December 1991:68-69 and Hutchcroft (1998:178).
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and small entrepreneurs, would fuel further social unrest and opposition movements 
during the economic crisis.
The Central Bank took a strict stance regarding the closure of Banco Filipino, in 
comparison with other banks which also suffered from mismanagement and DOSRI 
abuses. There was speculation that the personal conflicts between Fernandez and the 
Aguirre family might have been one of the reasons for the fierce disputes between the 
regulator and the regulated (see Hutchcroft,1998:178-179).67 Nonetheless, there was 
also solid evidence that the bank had violated the law. 57.6 per cent of the total loan 
portfolio was extended to Aguirre-related companies as of 31 July 1984.68 The Central 
Bank justified its strict stance vis-a-vis the Banco Filipino was by pointing to this clear 
violation of regulations. Taking decisive action against insolvent banks was a positive 
step forward in rebuilding a healthier banking sector, although this was not fully 
supported by the President. Rescuing all banks, including insolvent ones, without 
exception might have provided grounds for a "moral hazard" problem.
During the balance of payments crisis, there were also major changes in the Central 
Bank's selective credit policy. Rediscount windows, which had been a main instrument 
for selective credit, became far less important in financing the assets of the commercial 
banking sector.
By the mid-1980s a substantial amount of credit was provided by the Central Bank to 
commercial banks through the Central Bank's rediscount window. However, by 1985 
the Central Bank had practically closed the subsidised rediscount windows. Instead of 
quoting fixed discount rates, it started to peg them on the 90 day Manila Reference Rate 
(MRR90). Since the MRR is based on actual transactions, credit allocation through 
rediscount windows can be seen as an instrument of short-run stabilisation rather than 
an instrument for development finance (Lamberte, et al.,1985:32). Tighter eligibility 
rules for rediscount windows were also imposed in March 1984.
67 The legal battles between the Central Bank and the Aguirre family continued until the end of the 
1990s.
68 For details of the violations, see Business World, 20 - 24 May 1991.
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In the early 1980s, the Central Bank encouraged private banks to acquire foreign credits 
through foreign swaps which generously transferred currency risks from the private 
banks to the Central Bank (Dohner and Intal, Jr.,1989:174). Between 1983 and 1984, 
total swaps increased both in absolute terms and as a proportion of total commercial 
bank assets. However, from 1985 the Central Bank stopped using foreign swaps. As 
revealed later, foreign swaps were an extremely risky strategy for the Central Bank, due 
to the potential for further devaluation.
These major changes in credit policy were significant in terms of favouritism in the 
banking sector, since rediscount windows and foreign currency allocation had been a 
key instrument of "preferential" credits.69 In fact, in spite of the massive rescue 
operation, rapidly growing conglomerates, including financial institutions in the 1970s, 
which were owned by Presidential cronies and relied heavily on financial resources 
allocated by the state, had lost their businesses during the economic crisis. Notable 
examples were Herminio Disini's Herdis group of companies, Ricardo Silverio's group 
of automobile and financial companies and Rodolfo Cuenca's CDCP (the biggest 
construction company) and his other companies.70
It should be noted that not all the banks were distressed by the economic turmoil. In the 
banking sector, some banks managed to expand their businesses in the severe 
recession. Following Central Bank policy, leading private commercial banks 
consolidated their position through mergers. The Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) 
acquired Family Bank & Trust Co. (FBTC). Philippine Commercial and International 
Bank (PCIB) absorbed a successful bank, Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA). 
Far East Bank acquired the Pacific Bank which was closed in 1984. In 1984, while 
state-owned banks, namely the PNB and DBP, suffered huge losses, big private banks 
succeeded in making profits. In particular, leading private commercial banks, including 
the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Philippine Commercial & International Bank 
(PCIB), Metropolitan Bank and Far East Bank consolidated their positions in the
69 See Patrick and Moreno (1985:347,351) and Hulchcroft (1993b: 172).
70 Silverio's businesses declined, in part, because he lost favour with the President. Doner (1991:182) 
notes that Silverio's car manufacturing business (Delta) was already in deep trouble regardless of its 
owner's financial problems.
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banking sector (see, FEER, 25 April 1985:94). In 1984, Far East Bank had a net 
income (profits after tax) of P236 million, an increase of 50.2 per cent on the previous 
year, while the Bank of the Philippine Islands posted a net income of P217 million, up 
by 39.8 per cent. Metro Bank had a PI 50.4 million net income, an increase of 30 per 
cent. Philippine Commercial & International Bank (PCIB) also increased their profits, 
by 70 per cent, and had a P102 million net income. The rising profits of big commercial 
banks during the serious economic recession only revealed the distortions of the 
Philippine banking sector in the early 1980s.
In the 1970s, the rapid growth of some banks, including Allied Bank, United Coconut 
Planters Bank, Traders Royal Bank and Republic Planters Bank, which were controlled 
by close Marcos cronies, distinctively suggested influence of state activism and the 
advantages of Presidential favours. These banks also received massive rescue funds in 
the early 1980s. However, during the economic and banking crisis, the tight control of 
the President and his cronies on the economy and the banking sector were loosening. 
The relationship between Presidential favours and success in the banking business 
became ambiguous during this period. During the economic crisis, big private 
commercial banks were successful in making profits, while many bank owners and 
officers supported the opposition to Marcos.
The Bank of the Philippine Islands was headed by Enrique Zobel, who was the 
founding chairman of the Makati Business Club (MBC). This business organisation 
was formed in 1981 by business leaders who shared a sense of crisis regarding the 
control over the economy by the President's cronies, massive behest loans through state 
banks, media control, the rise of poverty and the increase in social unrest and radical 
left-wing opposition.71 The MBC aimed to be a "forum for constructive ideas". In fact, 
they became a rallying point for members of the business community who wished to 
voice criticism against government policies and the Marcos regime. The MBC was 
"extremely active" in Makati demonstrations which called for Marcos's resignation after 
Benigno Aquino's assassination (see, FEER, 21 June 1984). Before the legislative 
elections of May 1984, the MBC clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with the
71 See, Speech by Cesar Buenaventura, Vice Chairman, MBC, printed in Inside M BC , March 1997.
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government.72 They urged the adoption of an austerity programme and stressed the 
importance of political reform to rebuild the economy.73 A number of MBC members 
were also supporters of NAMFREL (the National Citizen's Movement for Free 
Elections), which played a critical role as a monitor of polling during the 1984 and 
1986 elections.
Another leading member of the Makati Business Club, Jaime Ongpin (brother of 
Roberto Ongpin), who was president of Benguet Corp. (a leading mining company), 
was an outspoken critic of government economic policies. While he was actively 
involved in activities against the Marcos government, he kept his position as director of 
Philippine Commercial & International Bank (PCIB),74 whose large shares were 
supposed to be acquired by investors led by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez (the 
brother of Imelda Marcos).75 The President of the PCIB, Antonio Ozaeta, was also one 
of the core members of the MBC.
Another "winner" during the economic crisis, Metro Bank, was also known as a tightly 
managed bank with solid business bases in the local Chinese community. The Bank 
was founded in 1962 by George Ty with Placido Mapa, Sr. (former Minister of 
Agriculture), Don Pio Pedrosa (former Minister of Finance) and Emilio Abello (former 
Ambassador to the U.S.). Since then the Metro Bank had been steadily growing.76 
Although the Bank had close connections with key economic policy-makers, its success 
seemed to be secured by keeping a distance from Marcos cronyism during this
72 See, "A Report on the Political Situation" a speech by Jaime Ongpin at the Makati Business Club 
on 29 February 1984, reprinted in Business Day, 1-2 March 1984, p.5. See, also Business Day,
5 March 1984, p.5.
73 See Business Day, 26 April 1984, p. 16 and Business Day, 27 April 1984, p. 15.
74 See, Philippine Commercial & International Bank, Annual Report 1983.
75 See, Manila Times, 10 June 1986 and Hutchcroft (1998:137).
76 For a brief corporate history of the bank, see George Ty, "Thirty Years of Metrobank", in Fookien 
Times Philippines Yearbook 1992; Sobrepena (1998) and FEER, 9 November 1995:60-64.
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period.77 George Ty, one of the most successful businessmen in the Philippines, was 
careful enough to avoid political interference.78
The success of the Far East Bank often prompted speculation about favouritism on the 
part of the Central Bank governor, Jose Fernandez, who was the founder of the Far East 
Bank.79 In particular, the acquisition of the Pacific Bank's assets by the Far East Bank 
was criticised in the banking community since the deal was favourable to the Far East 
Bank (See, FEER, 7 May 1987:82). However, the success of the Far East could hardly 
be explained by close connections with the Central Bank alone. Even before Fernandez 
became the Governor of the Central Bank, the Far East Bank had steadily expanded its 
business. Antonio Gatmaitan, former president of Commercial Bank of Manila, 
commented on the Pacific Bank deal by observing that "it was an obvious but very 
small" illustration of favouritism in the banking sector.80
The case of the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) is worth noting. 
Thompson's study (1995:87) revealed that Alfonso Yuchengco, the Chairman of the 
Board of the RCBC, one of the largest commercial banks, backed the Light-a-Fire- 
Movement (LAFM), a radical urban terrorism movement. The wealthy businessman 
provided most of the funding for the LAFM. Although the RCBC did not expand its 
business successfully in comparison with other more successful big banks, the bank 
was able to maintain a healthy condition during the economic crisis. His involvement in 
the radical opposition movement did not seriously affect his banking business.
During the economic crisis, due to the failures of state banks and crony banks, leading 
private commercial banks consolidated their position regardless of their political ties.
77 After his Governorship of the Central Bank, Andres Castillo joined Metro Bank as President. 
Placido Mapa, Jr., who was former President of PCIB, Director General of NEDA and President of the 
PNB under the Marcos government, also joined the Metro Bank after he resigned from these 
government posts and became President in 1989. Edgardo Espiritu was the President of the Metro 
Bank before he was appointed President of the Philippine National Bank under the Aquino 
government.
78 He has been seen as "the lone wolf o f Philippine banking" (FEER, 9 November 1995:60).
79 For detailed arguments, see Hutchcroft (1998:180-181).
80 Interview, Antonio Gatmaitan, 3 June 1998.
99
After the Dewey Dee scandal, the big commercial banks immediately tightened their 
credit policy, while the state banks were actively involved in rescue operations. They 
provided funds strictly to viable customers only. In the uncertain climate in the banking 
sector, which was intensified by banking closures, depositors moved to the big banks, 
which seemed to be stable. Big commercial banks increased investments in national 
government securities with low risk.81 Issuing the "Jobo" bills with high interest rates 
was certainly beneficial for the big commercial banks.
Although the big commercial banks had grown during the economic and banking crisis 
in the early 1980s, the state banks, namely the PNB and DBP, which had dominated the 
banking sector, could not avoid huge losses. In fact, both banks had become technically 
bankrupt by 1986. To support the state-led industrialisation strategy of the Marcos 
government, the two state-owned banks aggressively expanded their lending activities in 
the latter half of the 1970s, as state-allocated resources increased due to foreign 
borrowing. In the early 1980s, because of the financial instability created by the Dewey 
Dee scandal, the state-owned banks were actively involved in rescue operations on 
behalf of the government, unlike the other big private banks, which tightened up their 
lending activities during the recession. Between 1980 and 1984, the total assets of the 
state-owned banks more than doubled: the PNB's assets rose from 38,652 million 
pesos in 1980 to 87,196 million pesos in 1984 and the DBP’s assets from 27,086 
million pesos to 66,800 million pesos.
By 1985, the non-performing assets of the PNB and DBP had become a matter of
serious concern for economic policy-makers. In 1984, the PNB, in its first loss since
World War II, registered a PI, 102 million loss. And the DBP also made a loss for the
first time in its 38-year history. It's losses amounted to P6,641 million. Between 1983
and 1985, the total losses of the PNB and DBP amounted to nearly P30 billion. The
Marcos government was forced to pump in P5.6 billion in 1984 just to keep the DBP
functioning, despite restrictions which allowed the bank to lend only from previously
established, fully funded credit lines (FEER, 3 October 1985:49). In 1984, the
government cash flow to three public financial institutions including the PNB (P6.1
81 The Commercial bank investments in securities rapidly increased during the economic recession, 
and had reached P22.3 billion by the end of 1984 (Business Day, 1 May 1984,p.2)
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billion), the DBP (P5.8 billion) and the PGC, the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan 
Guarantee Corporation (P0.8 billion), amounted to Pl.2.7 billion (2.4 per cent of 
GNP).82
In spite of the emergency in 1983, the Marcos government did not initiate reform of the 
state-owned banks. Facing a serious balance of payments problem, the government's 
expenditure was strictly monitored by the IMF after the declaration of a moratorium on 
principal debt repayments. To rehabilitate the PNB and DBP, the removal of non­
performing assets from their books was essential, but the government could not form 
and implement a rehabilitation plan without considering the impact on negotiations with 
the IMF. During the severe balance of payments crisis of late 1983-1986, the IMF 
tightened conditionality, increased surveillance and demanded policy reform as a 
condition of further support. In order to improve the balance of payments problem, the 
government implemented macro-economic reforms including foreign exchange and 
import controls, tax reforms such as increase in import tariffs and export taxes, 
government expenditure cuts and rigid control of the money supply. In 1984, the 
Central Bank issued high-interest bills ("Jobo" bills) to dramatically tighten monetary 
policy after peso devaluation and the increase of spending for the legislative elections. 
Thanks to these reforms, by 1985 the balance of payments problem started to improve. 
Nevertheless, the IMF and other creditors maintained a tough stance in negotiations for 
further support.83
Negotiations with the IMF stalled, mainly due to the issues of government expenditure 
and the dismantling of monopolies in the sugar and coconut industries.84 The coconut 
and sugar industries had become the targets of the first-ever joint reform effort of its 
kind by the IMF and the World Bank (FEER, 31 October 1985:103-110). Dismantling 
the monopolies in the Philippines' main agricultural sectors was seen as a significant
82 These figures were in "the Philippines's letter of intent to the IMF" reprinted in Business Day, 2-4 
January 1985.
83 The strict stances of the IMF and other creditors were reported by FEER. See FEER, 9 May 
1985:98-99; FEER, 30 May 1985:12; FEER, 6 June 1985:12; FEER, 1 August 1985:8; FEER, 29 
August 1985:62-63; FEER, 10 October 1985:10; FEER, 24 October 1985:12; FEER, 31 October 
1985:103-110; and FEER, 28 November 1985:8.
84 See, for example, Business Day, 11 May 1984, p.2 and Business Day, 14 May 1984, p.6.
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indication of the government's commitment to reform the economy, since they were 
controlled by close Marcos cronies: the coconut industry by Eduardo Cojuangco and 
the sugar industry by Roberto Benedicto. In addition to economic domination, both of 
them played critical roles in the ruling party, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). Both of 
them became regional party chairmen when President Marcos created and gave 
prominence to the caucus of the ruling party. At that time, the determination of the IMF 
to reform the agricultural sector was unusual, since the IMF normally limited itself to 
short-term stabilisation targets such as control of the money supply, budget deficits, 
public sector outlays and exchange-rate policies.
Because of a lack of financial incentives from the IMF and World Bank and the 
political instability intensified by the assassination of former Senator Benigno Aquino, 
Jr. in August 1983, a major restructuring of the state-owned banks with large layoffs 
was avoided by the President. A rehabilitation plan involving the merger of the PNB 
and DBP was proposed by Prime Minister Virata, but it was suspended by the 
President.85 Immediately before the Presidential election of February 1986, President 
Marcos announced that the PNB and the DBP would not be merged as long as he was 
President.86 It was later disclosed by former Prime Minister Virata that the wife of 
former presidential advisor on legal affairs Manual M. Lazaro, who was an official of 
the DBP employers association, had successfully lobbied the President to block the 
PNB-DBP merger.87
The first quarter of 1986 was the most turbulent quarter ever experienced by the 
Philippine financial system. The presidential election and the EDSA revolution 
adversely affected the economy and the banking sector. Political events led to record 
highs in liquidity levels.88 It is reported that during the two-month presidential election 
campaign, a desperate Marcos administration pumped nearly P10 billion in additional 
liquidity into the economy (FEER, 8 May 1986:85). In addition, another P2.8 billion
was released in the two weeks that followed the election to counteract the effects of a
85 See FEER, 8 May 1986:86. Also see, Business World, 22 July 1996 and FEER, 18 July 1985.
86 See Business Day, 5 February 1986, p.2.
87 See Business Day, 12 May 1986, p.2.
88 It was predicted in the beginning of 1986. See, for example, Business Day, 8 January 1986, p.5 
and 10 January 1986.
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campaign for civil disobedience launched by opposition leader, Corazon Aquino, to 
protest against the widespread fraud during the elections (ibid.). Aquino urged 
depositors to pull their money out of banks which had close connections with the 
Marcos family and its cronies.89 Massive withdrawals of deposits occurred in the six 
banks under government control and in some of the others controlled by Marcos's 
cronies including Security Bank, United Coconut Planters Bank, Republic Planters 
Bank, Traders Royal Bank, Union Bank, and Commercial Bank of Manila.90 When the 
new government took over, cronies and political allies of former President Marcos 
withdrew their deposits from banks for fear of sequestration (Lamberte,1989:33).
Conclusion
The Philippine economy and the banking sector faced their worst decline ever in the 
early 1980s. Faced with the economic and banking crisis, the interests and capacities of 
the President to implement reform were severely undermined by the constellation of 
political institutions questioning the legitimacy of the dictatorship and demanding the 
resumption of electoral contests. While the dictatorship was in decline, the Marcos 
government failed to restore public confidence in the banking sector.
During this period, the political institutions centred on the dictatorship were changing. 
Marcos resumed elections in 1978 and officially lifted martial law in January 1981. The 
President continued to have a decisive influence on policy-making, due to his unlimited 
power to issue decrees. However, although they were unfair, the restoration of elections 
activated political opposition. As the regime's survival came increasingly to depend on 
the outcome of these political contests, election-related spending reemerged as a serious 
threat to monetary stability. The tight control of the President began to fade and the 
inability of the authoritarian regime to redirect the economy was revealed during the 
economic crisis. As the economic crisis deepened, fierce conflicts among policy elites
over economic policy surfaced. The Marcos government had been losing the support of
89 This controversy was reported by a business daily. See, for example, Business Day, 17 February
1986, p.16; 18 February 1986, p.2„p.5,p.l8; and 20 February 1986, p.2,p.20.
90 For the campaign for civil disobedience and its consequence on the banking sector, see 
Almendral (1987:209 and 734-737); Hutchcroft (1998:188); and FEER, 10 July 1986:79 and 
23 M ay 1991:65.
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the IMF and the World Bank due to its dishonest reporting of foreign reserves, 
uncontrollable government spending, Presidential cronyism and the lack of commitment 
to reform the economy. Political events such as the brutal murder of the opposition 
leader, Beniguno Aquino, triggered various opposition movements against the 
dictatorship and damaged business confidence in the country.
During the economic crisis, the disputes between KBL leaders and Monetary Board 
members, including Prime Minister Virata, who urged tightening of fiscal and monetary 
policy, became fiercer. After all, the President, who still wielded absolute power over 
policy-making, did not support the austerity measures promptly enough. The Central 
Bank was not able to tighten monetary policy nor to stop public spending until its 
foreign credits line was shut down.
During the 1984 elections, monetary stability further deteriorated. After repeated delay, 
the implementation of the radical stabilisation measures by the Central Bank caused 
severe economic recession. The new Central Bank governor, Jose Fernandez, took 
initiatives to rebuild the banking sector but his initiatives were not fully supported by 
the President. Despite some regulatory reform, the authoritarian government was not 
able to improve the economy and the banking sector. With the Presidential dictatorship 
in decline, the Central Bank's attempts to restructure the banking sector were often 
undermined by the direct intervention of the President, whose short-term goal was the 
survival of his regime. Critical reform, especially the rehabilitation of the state banks, 
was not implemented. In the banking sector uncertainty continued into the next 
administration. Ailing state banks, which had dominated the Philippine banking sector 
were symbolic of the state of banking at the end of the Marcos dictatorship. The 
stability of the banking sector was not restored under the Marcos dictatorship. The 
Marcos government left the banking sector in ruins.
104
Table 2-1. Reserve Money and Central Bank Assistance 
to Financial Institutions (in Billion Pesos)
Assistance to (2)/(l)
Period Reserve Money Financial in Per Cent
Year (Quarter) Institutions
(1) (2)
1983(4) 27.7 1.2 4.3
1984(1) 24.8 1.9 7.7
(2) 27.1 3.2 11.8
(3) 28.7 9.4 32.8
(4) 33.4 10.9 32.6
1985(1) 30.5 12.2 40.0
(2) 31.6 12.5 39.6
(3) 32.6 13.3 40.8
(4) 38.0 13.8 36.3
1986(1) 40.4 19.1 47.3
(2) 38.0 13.9 36.6
(3) 39.5 13.8 34.9
(4) 50.0 12.7 25.4
1987(1) 48.1 14.3 29.7
(2) 49.0 15.5 31.6
(3) 49.7 15.4 31.0
(4) 56.9 15.4 27.1
1988(4) 67.2 15.0 22.3
1989(4) 92.8 15.0 16.2
1990(4) 108.7 14.8 13.6
1991(4) 129.3 14.2 11.0
1992(4) 144.8 13.9 9.6
1993(4) 171.7 4.2 2.4
1994(4) 182.4 4.0 2.2
1995(4) 212.7 3.2 1.5
Note: Central Bank's assistance to financial institutions 
includes emergency loans and over drafts.
Sources: Central Bank, Quarterly Economic and Financial Report 
(various quarters), cited in Lamberte,1989, Table 14 
BSP, Selected Philippine Economic Indicators,
April 1996, Table 14
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Chapter 3.
The Transition from Marcos to Aquino and Banking Sector Reform 
Introduction
When Aquino came to power in 1986 after the twenty-year Marcos era, the Philippines 
was still in deep economic turmoil. The national economy had recorded negative 
growth for the previous two years. Unemployment and under-employment rapidly 
increased during the recession. The huge foreign debt and non-performing assets of the 
state-owned banks were symbolic of the failure of economic management under the 
Marcos government. Although some measures had been implemented to stabilise the 
economy under the Marcos government, the new government had to face the 
demanding task of rebuilding the economy and banking sector in a climate of political 
uncertainty.
In spite of some successful economic reform initiatives, including privatisation, trade 
liberalisation, export promotion, and rehabilitation of state-owned banks, many 
observers stressed the continuity of the Philippine political economy under the Marcos 
and Aquino governments.1 Especially after the failure of progressive land redistribution 
through agrarian reform, a pessimistic view prevailed in terms of the ability of the 
Aquino government to sustain economic reform (see de Dios, 1990:124).
In terms of redistribution of wealth and poverty alleviation, the achievements of the 
Aquino government were less than expected.2 The domination of the economy by a 
small number of elites did not change significantly. The President tended to rely on 
family members and close allies of her late husband in terms of policy-making. They 
played an important role in the Legislature, although they did not support all the
government's policies.3 There was strong continuity with regard to the backgrounds of
1 See, for example, Hutchcroft (1998), Jayasuriya (1995), Lindsey (1995) and Fauslino (1992).
2 For the achievements of the Aquino presidency, see the Presidential Management Staff (PMS) 
(1992a-j). For assessments of the Aquino government from various perspectives, see Abueva and 
Roman (eds.) (1993); Abueva and Roman (eds.) (1998a); and Abueva and Roman (eds.) (1998b).
3 See Caoili (1993:24). For the presence of her family in the government, also see FEER, 26 March 
1987: 70-73.
106
the members of the newly-restored Legislature.4 Corruption and favouritism were not 
eradicated under the new democratic government. The regulatory power of the state 
apparatus could not be enhanced over such a short period.
However, it would be wrong to assume that there was no difference in terms of 
economic policy and policy-making between the Marcos and the Aquino governments. 
In terms of banking reform, the Aquino government had mixed results. It failed to take 
strong initiatives to reform the banking sector through the legislative process after the 
Legislature was restored. The failure to enact the new Central Bank Act, which was one 
of the urgent reforms required by the 1987 Constitution, was a prominent example. The 
establishment of a more independent Central Bank was broadly supported by business 
representatives, bankers and economists after the disastrous failure of banking and 
monetary management under the Marcos dictatorship. The World Bank was also keen 
to support the measure through conditionality lending. In spite of strong support, the 
government did not take all the action necessary to enact vital reform. Nevertheless, the 
transition from Marcos to Aquino was a critical trigger in reforming the banking sector.
In terms of the macro-economy, the Aquino government was able to steer the economy 
out of the severe economic turmoil of the mid-1980s, despite unfavourable 
circumstances, including political instability, particularly several coup attempts and 
natural disasters.5 The GDP growth rate rose from 3.4 per cent in 1986 and was above 
6 per cent in 1988 and 1989, although it slowed down to 3.0 per cent in 1990 (see 
Table 1-1.). Foreign debt stock also gradually decreased. In 1991, exports reached $8.8 
billion, almost double the $4.8 billion level in 1986. The improvement of the 
macroeconomy was a precondition for the recovery of the banking sector which was 
severely damaged by economic and political turmoil in the last years of the Marcos 
dictatorship.
4 See, for example, Gutierrez (1994) and Caoili (1993:14-16).
5 For a similar view on the Aquino government, see, for example, Rigoberto Tiglao in FEER, 3 
September 1992, reprinted in Abueva and Roman (eds.) (1993:63-64).
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Although the political and economic uncertainty continued during the early period of 
the Aquino era, the banking sector started to recover from the banking crisis under the 
previous government. The commercial banks started to recover as soon as the economy 
grew after the new government took power. In 1988, all major performance indicators 
including resources, portfolio levels, deposit levels, liquidity, profitability and solvency 
rapidly improved.6 The total assets of the commercial banking system expanded from 
the 1986 level of P 264 billion to over P 599 billion in 1991 (see Table 1-3.). Domestic 
credits grew from 136 billion pesos in 1986 to 331 billion pesos in 1991 (see Table 1- 
2.). Total deposits improved from P 144 billion at the end of 1986 to P 337 billion at 
the end of 1991 (see Table 1-2.). In terms of the commercial banks' business 
statements, a 2,607 million pesos total loss in 1986 had turned into a 15,706 million 
pesos profit by 1991 (see Table 1-5.). The Non-performing Loans Ratios (non­
performing loans divided by total loans) significantly improved from 20.4 per cent in 
1986 to 6.6 per cent in 1991 (see Table 1-6.).
It must be noted that the structure of the banking sector was largely altered by the
restructuring of state banks. The highly-indebted state banks, namely the PNB and
DBP, were rehabilitated, largely reducing their presence in the banking sector. This can
be seen as a significant change in the Philippine banking sector, which had always been
dominated by the state banks. The end of Marcos cronyism also contributed to the
revitalisation of the economy and the banking sector. After Marcos and his cronies had
left and active state interventionism had ended, the sources of favouritism in the banking
sector were much reduced. In addition, the role of the Central Bank in finance was
redirected, and the preferential credit allocation by the Central Bank was significantly
narrowed. Foreign exchange policy was also liberalised in the early 1990s. After private
businesses had more access to foreign exchange, the Central Bank no longer had a
dominant influence on foreign exchange allocation. The reduction of direct credit
allocation through the Central Bank provided the Bank with protection from political
interference. Furthermore, the Central Bank initiated various liberalisation measures
through regulatory reform in the early 1990s. On the Central Bank's initiative,
6 For the initial recovery of the banking sector, see, for example, Manual L. Morales "The Role of 
Banks in the Recovery Effort", in Fookien Times Philippines Yearbook 1987-1988 and Marianne V. 
Go "Philippine Banking" in Fookien Times Philippines Yearbook 1989.
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"consolidation and competition" in the banking sector was facilitated through various 
regulatory reforms including the encouragement of mergers and acquisitions, increases 
in capital requirements, deregulation of the numbers of branches and the entry of new 
domestic banks.
In this and the following chapters, the successes and failures of the Aquino reforms in 
the banking sector are examined by focussing on the decisions and interactions of 
policy elites in the context of changing political institutions. After President Aquino 
took power by extraordinary means, the "EDSA revolution", the political institutions 
were transformed by the end of the authoritarian government and the restoration of 
democracy under the new Constitution. During the first year, the President held 
absolute law-making power until the new Constitution was written and the new 
Legislature was opened as a result of the elections in May 1987. It should also be 
noted that the end of the dictatorship triggered restoration of the Central Bank control 
over monetary and banking policy. Unlike the former dictator, the new President did 
not intervene in Central Bank decisions on monetary and banking policy. With an 
absolute law-making power, the President implemented a key structural reform, namely 
the rehabilitation of state banks, which were left in ruin by the previous government. 
Supported by the President, the Central Bank took measures to strengthen the banking 
sector. In the early 1990s, the Central Bank further initiated reforms to liberalise the 
banking sector. Under the Aquino government the Central Bank was able to implement 
regulatory reform more effectively than under the late Marcos government due to an 
improvement in its relationship with the President.
However, structural reform was not smoothly implemented after the Legislature was 
restored under the new 1987 Constitution. The establishment of the new Constitution 
and the restoration of the Legislature radically altered the process of policy-making. 
The restoration of the executive-legislative relationship was a critical factor in deciding 
the fate of economic reform. The fierce conflicts over key economic policies and the 
lack of policy coordination between the Executive and Legislature, in particular the 
Senate, prevented the successful implementation of structural reform in the banking 
sector, including the Central Bank reform. Since there were no legislative elections
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between 1987 and 1992 due to the transitional provisions of the 1987 Constitution, 
legislators did not need to ask for support from the President for immediate electoral 
purposes during the early years of the Aquino government.
In this chapter, banking reforms in the early period of the Aquino government are 
examined. A discussion of the changes in economic policy which mobilised support for 
the government from the IMF, the World Bank, the US government and other donor 
countries will be follow by an analysis of the rehabilitation of state banks. This chapter 
covers the last years of the Fernandez governorship. He retained his governorship of 
the Central Bank until the end of his tenure in January 1990. In the following chapter, 
regulatory reforms in the banking sector introduced by the new governor, Jose Cuisia, 
Jr., and the failure of the structural reforms under the newly restored constitutional 
democracy are analysed.
Redirecting Marcos's Policy
The day after Corazon C. Aquino took her oath, the new President formed the first 
Aquino Cabinet (from February to November 1986). It reflected the broad coalition of 
the anti-Marcos movement including politicians, civil activists, academics, businessmen 
and the military. Vice-President Salvador Laurel became Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Juan Ponce Enrile stayed as Minister of Defence. Aquino's close allies and her 
husband's friends occupied important posts. Joker Arroyo, a corporate lawyer and 
strong critic of the Marcos dictatorship was appointed to the powerful position of 
Executive Secretary. Neptali A. Gonzales (Secretary of Justice), Ernesto Maceda 
(Secretary of Natural Resources), Ramon Mitra, Jr. (Secretary of Agriculture), and 
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Secretary of Local Government) were close associates of 
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. They had been candidates in Benigno Aquino's LABAN party 
in the 1978 legislative elections in Manila (see Thompson,1995:220). They were seen 
as "traditional" machine politicians in the new government.
Jaime V. Ongpin (Secretary of Finance), Jose Concepcion, Jr. (Secretary of Trade and 
Industry), Solita C. Monsod (Director General of National Economic and Development
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Authority) and Alberto G. Romulo (Secretary of Budget and Management) were 
appointed to key economic ministries. They were also members of the Monetary Board, 
the governing body of the Central Bank. Jose B. Fernandez, Jr. (Central Bank governor 
and the Chairman of the Monetary Board) stayed in his post. A representative from the 
private sector, Cesar Buenaventura (President of Pilipinas Shell) also retained his seat 
on the Monetary Board. He was suspected of being a beneficiary of Marcos 
government subsidies intended to stabilise oil prices (see Montojo, 1998:54), but he was 
also a close ally of Jaime Ongpin and an active member of the Makati Business Club 
formed in 1981 by leading businessmen to discuss economic matters. Buenaventura 
became influential as a critic of the economic policy of the Marcos government.
Jaime Ongpin and Jose Concepcion were leading businessmen who were vocally 
opposed to the dictatorship of the Marcos government and the domination of the 
economy by Marcos' cronies. Jaime Ongpin, an MBA-holder from Harvard University, 
had been President of the Benguet Corporation, a leading mining company in the 
Philippines. Even before the assassination of Benigno Aquino, he openly criticised the 
government's economic policy. He was a leading opponent of the ambitious "Eleven 
Major Industrial Projects", which had been initiated by Roberto Ongpin, his own 
brother, who was Minister of Trade and Industry under the Marcos government. In the 
early 1980s, he strongly attacked the government when it used a massive amount of 
public money to bail out Marcos' cronies' companies such as the Construction 
Development Company of the Philippines (CDCP).7 By late 1984, with Corazon 
Aquino and former Senator Lorenzo Tanada, he was one of the leading figures in the 
Convenor's Group, which was formed to unite opposition forces against the Marcos 
government. Ongpin was also an active member of the Makati Business Club.
It should be noted that Ongpin was thought to have influenced Aquino's decision to
retain the Central Bank governor, Jose Fernandez. When Aquino came to power in
1986 after a series of extraordinary political events, the Philippine economy was still in
a process of slow recovery from the economic turmoil that had occurred between 1983
7 See Ongpin's paper "The Eleven MIP's" which was presented to the Financial Executive Institute of 
the Philippines (FINEX) on March 16,1983. For the CDCP controversy, see, also, Times Journal,
1 March 1983; 3 March 1983, p.8; and 4 March 1983, p.8.
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and 1985. Due to draconian stabilisation measures, the government's external and fiscal 
deficits had started to improve, but the government, the Central Bank and the 
government's financial institutions were still heavily indebted after massive rescue 
operations to help insolvent companies. The Central Bank governor continued to face 
extremely demanding tasks after the transition from Marcos to Aquino. Jaime Ongpin, 
incoming Secretary of Finance, who had criticised the economic policy of the Marcos 
government and the Central Bank, strongly supported the retention of governor 
Fernandez. In an interview with leading national newspapers, Ongpin stressed the 
competence of Fernandez as Central Bank governor.8
Jose Concepcion, Jr. was President of Republic Flour Mills (RFM), one of the 
country's leading companies. RFM was established by Salvador Araneta, who was the 
father-in-law of Concepcion. Jose Concepcion, Jr. was an active member of the 
Bishops-Businessmen's Conference for Human Development (BBC), which was 
established in 1971. He had close contacts with Manila Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin 
who was an influential religious leader and had mobilised people against the Marcos 
dictatorship in 1986 (see Thompson,1995:126-127). After Aquino's assassination, Sin 
and many other bishops openly supported the opposition. In the anti-Marcos 
movement, the BBC played an important role as opinion leader. Bishops and 
businessmen including Ongpin and Concepcion set up the opposition-oriented Veritas 
magazine. Jose Concepcion, Jr. was at the core of the National Citizens Movement for 
Free Elections (NAMFREL). NAMFREL played a critical role as an electoral 
watchdog group in the 1984 legislative election and the 1986 presidential election. In 
the latter election, although COMELEC, the official government body for the election, 
declared a victory for Marcos, the NAMFREL vote-count, according to which Aquino 
had won, was broadly trusted.
Solita C. Monsod was an economist who had been educated in the Philippines 
(Bachelor in Economics from the University of the Philippines) and in the US (a 
Masters in Economics, from the University of Pennsylvania). As an economist, she 
criticised the economic policy of the Marcos government. She was an active participant
8 Sunday Inquirer Magazine, July 6, 1986.
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in workshops and seminars which discussed alternative economic policies.9 She joined 
the government on leave from the University of the Philippines School of Economics 
where she was an Associate Professor. Her husband, Christian S. Monsod, who had a 
prominent career in business, was also a leading critic of the Marcos dictatorship. He 
had worked for Meralco Corporation before martial law and was a famous investment 
banker at Filcapital Development Corp. in the early 1980s. He was among the business 
leaders who were actively involved in the anti-Marcos movement. He became 
NAMFREL Metro Manila Coordinator in 1984 and then national Chairman in 1986.
Alberto G. Romulo, lawyer and accountant (CPA), was elected to the Batasang 
Pambansa (National Assembly) in the 1984 elections (representing Quezon City) and 
was a pillar of the opposition to the Marcos regime. Alberto G. Romulo was replaced 
by Guillermo N. Carague, his under-secretary, when Romulo ran for and won a Senate 
seat in May 1987. Carague, a lawyer and accountant, had a stable and progressive 
career at Sycip, Gorres, Velayo (SGV), a leading accounting and management 
consultancy firm before Romulo asked him to assist the government.
Predictably enough, given the transitional nature of the new government, there was no 
solid consensus on key economic policy issues among key economic ministers and 
Monetary Board members in the first Aquino Cabinet. There were fierce disputes over 
economic policies such as debt repayment, land redistribution and trade liberalisation.10 
In addition to political instability, deep differences among key economic ministers 
impeded the strong government initiatives to reform the economy in the early years of 
the Aquino government. However, there was broad agreement on economic 
development strategy which aimed essentially to redirect the active state interventionism 
of the late Marcos government. Aquino herself was fully committed to this economic 
development strategy, although she confessed that she did not have a clear idea of how 
to alleviate poverty.11 For Aquino, to undo what Marcos had done was a critical policy
9 For example, see De Dios (et al.) (1984).
10 Deep differences among the Aquino Cabinet are often cited. See, for example, Putzel (1992, 
Chapter 6), the Presidential Management Staff (PMS)(1992b:27), Nemenzo (1988:222-223), and 
FEER, 28 August 1986:28-35.
11 See Aquino's lecture in Abueva and Roman (eds.) (1993:8).
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goal (see Nemenzo, 1988:223). However, it should be noted that this did not 
necessarily mean that Aquino entirely lacked a vision of economic development. 
Filipino economists who criticised economic policy under the Marcos government and 
recommended various economic reforms to the new government in the "Yellow Book" 
noted that "the bulk of these reforms aim simply at undoing the biases and penalties 
carried over from the previous regime" (Alburo, et al.,1986:i).
The enthusiasm felt after the "EDSA revolution" prompted the formulation of a 
distinctive economic policy manifesto by Filipino economists at leading local academic 
and research institutions including the School of Economics (University of the 
Philippines), Ateneo de Manila University and the Philippine Institute for Development 
Studies. By early May, less than three months after the change of government, an 
agenda for reform entitled Economic Recovery and Long-run Growth (Alburo, et al., 
1986) had been produced on the initiative of the New Planning Secretary (Director 
General of NEDA), Solita Monsod and other leading Filipino economists. The 
document, known as the "Yellow Book", urged institutional and policy reforms based 
on minimum government intervention, liberalisation, decentralisation and redistribution 
of the resulting growth. Although some key recommended reforms in the "Yellow 
Book" were not included in the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan 1987- 
1992, which was published by the government in December 1986,12 this development 
strategy based on liberal reform was influential in government economic policy-making 
during the early Aquino government.13
12 A notable example was the limitation of debt service payments. Despite its emphasis, 
redistributive reform including land reform was also limited. In the "Yellow Book", the key 
recommended reforms included the following: "(1) an expansionary monetary policy and a limitation of 
debt service payments to what the Government could afford to pay; (2) greater independence of the 
Central Bank from political influences, a limitation of the involvement of the central bank in 
development finance and reform of government financial institutions; (3) tax reforms relying more on
a direct and broader basis; (4) a more open trade regime, with an exchange rate determined by the free 
market; (5) elimination of government intervention in the labour market (including minimum wages); 
(6) and a substantial extension of land reform" (Alburo, et al.,1986:i).
13 Rigoberto Tiglao observes that many recently announced government policies or major proposals 
for new policies appear to draw directly from the "Yellow Book" (see Business Day, 19 May 1986,
p.2)
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The Central Bank summarised the four principles of the New Economic Development 
Strategy as follows: (1) "the substantial reduction in the extent of government 
intervention in the economy; (2) the re-establishment of competitive markets; (3) 
renewed emphasis on rural development and on the equitable sharing of the fruits of 
sustained recovery; and (4) a more competitive and outward-looking economy through 
trade liberalisation and flexible exchange rate policies" (Central Bank, Annual Report 
1986:3).
The core of the new development strategy showed a shift in emphasis away from the 
state-led and capital-intensive development strategy of the Marcos government. The 
Marcos government adopted some liberalisation and export promotion measures. 
Economic policy-makers like Finance Minister Cesar Virata recognised the importance 
of export promotion and foreign investment.14 However, these measures were still 
limited.15 Liberalisation measures often contradicted active state interventionism under 
the Marcos government. For example, on the one hand, in the banking sector, interest 
rate policy was progressively liberalised from the latter half of the 1970s.16 On the other 
hand, the Central Bank provided massive credits with preferential interest rates through 
rediscount windows. As a result, the impact of interest rate liberalisation on resource 
mobilisation was not clear. Although some export promotion measures, such as the 
establishment of export processing zones, were implemented, foreign exchange policy 
did not promote exports. Trade liberalisation was initiated in the early 1980s but it was 
halted during the economic crisis. To reduce current account deficits and raise 
government revenue, an export levy was imposed and trade liberalisation measures were 
not implemented.
By contrast, under the Aquino government, the redirection of state interventionism, 
market-oriented policies, liberalisation and export promotion became the key elements 
of economic development strategy. Although each instance of various policy reform 
should be examined on its own merits, the new economic strategy can, in general, be
14 Some authors stress the negative impact of the adoption of export oriented industrialisation on the 
economy in the mid-1980s. See, for example, Bello (1982) and Broad (1988).
15 See Haggard (1990b;216) and Bello (2000:239-240).
16 For the liberalisation of interest rate policy, see Lamberte (1988) and Laya (1982:99-116).
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seen as an important guideline for reform.17 In terms of banking reform, the 
rehabilitation of state banks, which involved a significant reduction in their size and the 
redirection of the direct involvement of the Central Bank in development finance were 
consistent with the economic strategy. Despite frequent reshuffles in the Aquino 
Cabinet, this new economic development strategy played an influential role and 
furnished a guideline, which importantly, was inherited more or less intact by the 
Ramos government.
The new development strategy, which stressed the reduction of the state's involvement 
in the economy, the establishment of competitive markets and more outward-looking 
economic policies, was consistent with the policies recommended by the IMF and the 
World Bank. Economic liberalisation was a broad international trend in the 1980s and 
1990s. Nevertheless, as Haggard (1990b:247) points out, overemphasis on the 
influence of the World Bank or outside creditors on policy choices might miss the 
critical feature of the post-Marcos politics of economic reform. It must be noted that the 
experience of the Philippines played a critical role in altering its economic development 
strategy. This development strategy did not reflect "new" ideas among local 
economists.18 Although the detailed policy measures and the success or failure of their 
implementation must be examined separately in each policy area, we can at least say that 
liberalisation as an economic development strategy emerging in the context of the 
failures of active state interventionism under the Marcos government was broadly 
supported by the Marcos opposition as an alternative policy agenda.
During the early years of the Aquino government, the core policy of liberalisation 
involved redirecting the active state interventionism which had existed under the Marcos 
government. Prominent critics of the economic policy of the late Marcos government 
included Filipino economists and business representatives who were proponents of the
"new" development strategy under the Aquino government. They were influential
17 Economic reform under the Aquino government is examined by various studies. For example,
Montojo (1998, Chapter 4), Medalla (et al.) (1995), Montes (1992) and Alburo (1993) examine trade 
liberalisation. Montojo's study (1998) also includes the reform of the oil industry (Chapter 3). For the 
limitation of agrarian reform, see Putzel (1992). Magadia also examines agrarian (1999, Chapter 3) 
labour relations (Chapter 4) and urban housing (Chapter 5) reforms.
18 See, for example, de Dios (et al.) (1984) and Sicat (1985).
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supporters of the "EDSA revolution" and their leaders became key cabinet members 
under the Aquino government. All key economic ministerial posts were occupied by 
critics of the Marcos government and its economic policies. Due to the dramatic decline 
of the economy after active state interventionism, the redirection of previous policy was 
broadly supported. With the transition from Marcos to Aquino, active state 
interventionism as a key economic development strategy was terminated, although the 
critical role of the state in the economy remained unchanged. Under the Aquino 
government, the move towards liberalisation as part of the economic policy agenda was 
consolidated towards the end of her term. This policy shift generated broad support for 
the government from the IMF, the World Bank, the US and other donor countries, 
especially in the early years of the Aquino government.
Changing International Influences
The "peaceful" end of Marcos's 20 year rule brought hopes of a new era for the 
country. The "goodwill" of the international financial community should not be over­
emphasised since the disbursement of new credits was less than expected and private 
creditors kept their strict lending stance towards the country. Yet, the transition from 
Marcos to Aquino was a critical trigger in altering the attitude of the international 
financial community.
After the dramatic "people's power revolution" in February 1986, the Aquino 
government restored amicable relations with the US government, the IMF, the World 
Bank and other donor countries. In addition to the adoption of a liberal economic 
development strategy during the first years of the Aquino government, various factors, 
including sympathy for the "people's power revolution", Aquino's debt policy, 
continuing political instability due to radical military factions and communist guerrillas, 
and the US base agreement, contributed to the consolidation of support for the 
government. Although the "EDSA revolution" adversely affected the economy in the 
short term, the re-establishment of favourable relations with external creditors was 
critical to improving the heavily-indebted economy. The IMF's tolerance for growth- 
oriented policy with larger budget deficits was in sharp contrast to its strict stance
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towards the Marcos government. Expansionary fiscal and monetary policy contributed 
to efforts to revitalise an economy, which was in deep recession. The improvement of 
the macroeconomy was a vital precondition for the recovery of the banking sector.
Enthusiasm after the "people's power revolution" influenced the lending decisions of 
the international financial institutions. Immediately after the "EDSA revolution", the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), whose headquarters were located in Manila, became 
the first financial institution to provide emergency loans to the new government. At the 
end of the Marcos era, there had been little agreement between the ADB and the 
Philippines on loans. One week after Aquino took power, the newly-appointed 
Secretary of Finance, Jaime Ongpin, met Masao Fujioka, the President of the ADB, and 
agreed on a US$100 million emergency loan to ease the serious unemployment 
problems in rural areas. According to Fujioka, they discussed the loan over lunch in a 
Japanese restaurant and it took just 45 minutes to reach a detailed agreement while 
Ongpin was eating tempura teishoku (set meal). Within 11 days, the members of the 
ADB Board agreed with the Governor's proposed emergency loan and it was 
authorised by a formal Board meeting on 7th April 1986 (See Fujioka,1994:179-183). 
Ongpin called the loan agreement "a new world speed record from inception to 
approval".19 This might not be a exaggeration in comparison with the tireless efforts of 
his predecessor to negotiate a new foreign loan in the previous year. Fujioka explained 
that the quick decision was prompted by the excitement after the "people’s power 
revolution", in which hundreds of thousands of people were mobilised against the 
Marcos dictatorship. The headquarters of the ADB are located very near the site of the 
"EDSA revolution". The members of the ADB Board appeared to be moved by the 
extraordinary events, as were other observers throughout the world. In these 
circumstances, it was very easy for the Board members to agree the emergency loan.20
More importantly, the establishment of the new democratic government influenced 
lending negotiations with the IMF. Immediately after the "EDSA revolution", the IMF 
initiated Article IV consultations with the new authorities, and a mission visited Manila
during March 10-15, followed by others in April, June and July/August, 1986. The new
19 Remarks at ADB Loan Signing April 1987.
20 See Fujioka (1994:179-183) and Interview with Masao Fujioka, 9 July 1998.
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government chose to cancel the ongoing standby arrangement in advance of the third 
programme review and to request a new 18-month standby arrangement for SDR 198 
million. This was complemented by a SDR 224 million Compensatory Facility. Both 
were approved by the IMF in September 1986.
Although there were fierce conflicts on economic issues such as foreign debt 
repudiation and trade liberalisation among economic secretaries of the Aquino Cabinet, 
there was a consensus that an expansionary economic policy was necessary to reverse 
the two-year austerity programme.21 By July 1986, negotiations between the 
government and the IMF were completed. Agreements were reached on most key 
components of an IMF aid programme including the increase of ceilings on the budget 
deficit, liquidity and inflation targets. Consistent with the growth-oriented strategy of 
the government, the Fund programme raised the medium-term GNP growth target from 
a strong negative rate in 1984 and 1985 to 1.5 per cent in 1986, and to 6-7 per cent for 
1987. The external current account balance was also raised, from equilibrium in 1985 
and 3 per cent of GNP surplus in 1986 to deficits of 1.6 and 2 per cent of GNP in 
1987 and 1988 respectively. The consolidated public sector deficit was allowed to rise 
from 6.1 per cent of GNP in 1985 to 7.5 per cent of GNP in 1986 and to remain at 
levels higher than 5 per cent of GNP in the following two years.22 The adoption of a 
growth-oriented policy, which allowed large budget deficits, contributed a great deal to 
the improvement of the economy in the initial years of the Aquino government. 
Government expenditure, including that on rural-based projects under the Community 
Employment and Development Programme (CEDP) and on salary hikes for 
government workers, contributed not only to the generation of jobs and incomes in 
rural areas, but also to the mobilisation of support for the new government.
The Philippine negotiators felt that the IMF team was very receptive to the main policy 
thrust of the Aquino government.23 This was in sharp contrast to the IMF's negative
21 See, for example, Business Day, 7 April 1986, p.3.
22 This data on monetary targets is adopted from "Program Performance Audit Report, Economic 
Recovery Program and Economic Recovery Technical Assistance Project" in World Bank (1992:4).
23 A Philippine monetary official commented that "there has been a complete switch in attitude (see 
Business Day, 24 July 1986, p.3). Also, see FEER, 14 August 1986:104-105.
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attitude and aggressive posture in talks with the government of former President 
Marcos in 1985. The IMF mission reviewed the status of structural reforms in the three 
areas of their concern: the sugar and coconut sectors, the import liberalisation 
programme and the restructuring of government financial institutions. Central Bank 
governor Fernandez said that "the discussions would be less weighted on macro figures 
for this year and the next and more on the accomplishment of structural reforms which, 
with or without the Fund, we will have to do anyway".24
It is reported that the IMF mission was satisfied with the decisive position of the 
government regarding the dismantling of the monopolies in the sugar and coconut 
industries, which had previously been the major stumbling block to successful 
negotiations. After Marcos left, it was very easy to satisfy the IMF by dismantling the 
monopolies, although the improvement in the production of sugar and coconut was a 
totally different matter. Ongpin noted that "abolishing the monopolies was basically a 
stroke of the pen. It didn't really require any involved implementation".25
The establishment of the new government and its new economic policy was also 
warmly welcomed by the World Bank. Some of these economic reforms, such as tax 
reform, trade liberalisation, the public expenditure programme and rehabilitation of the 
state banks, were supported by the Economic Recovery Loan of the World Bank with 
the Japanese government as co-financer. These issues had been matters of concern 
between the Philippine government and the World Bank since the World Bank started 
policy-based lending in the early 1980s.
The World Bank mission visited Manila in April 1986 and its economic report 
provided the foundation for the Economic Recovery Loan.26 Along with the Philippine 
government and the IMF, the World Bank's report recommended the adoption of 
growth-oriented policies, to be financed through a much-intensified effort on public 
resource mobilisation (the report having pointed out that the country's tax effort was
24 Business Day, 18 July 1986, p.2.
25 Euromoney, interview with Jaime Ongpin, July 1987:122.
26 See World Bank (1986) "The Philippines, A Framework for Economic Recovery", Report No. 
6350-PH November 5, 1986.
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exceptionally low), and by expanded external financing through concessionary loans 
and debt relief. In addition to the US$300 million of the ERL, the Philippine 
government received large co-financing loans from Japan. The Export-Import Bank of 
Japan contributed Yen 50 billion (equivalent to US$300 million at that time) and the 
OECF contributed Yen 30 billion (equivalent to US$180 million at that time).
Support from the US government facilitated debt negotiations with the IMF and World 
Bank, which were favourable to the Aquino government. The US’s support for the 
government was closely connected with Aquino’s debt policy, continuing political 
instability and the US military base issue. When Aquino became President, the huge 
foreign debt which the former dictator had left was the most contentious economic 
policy issue. In the early days of Aquino's government, this was also the main area of 
concern for the US government. Finance Secretary Ongpin and Central Bank Governor 
Fernandez, who were in charge of the debt negotiation, were committed to full 
repayment of foreign debts and negotiated with creditors for various debt reduction 
schemes and new concessional loans. President Aquino fully backed Ongpin's and 
Fernandez's position. In June 1986, when US Secretary of State George Shultz visited 
Aquino, he received reassurances with regard to the government's policy on this issue. 
The US support for Aquino's debt policy was supposed to be influential in smoothing 
negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank. The Japanese government, the biggest 
donor country to the Philippines during the Aquino era, also repeatedly expressed its 
opposition to the selective repudiation policy during debt negotiations. In fact, in terms 
of foreign debt policy, there was no realistic alternative option for the Philippine 
government since all creditors, including the US government, strongly opposed the 
selective repudiation of foreign debt.
However, Finance Secretary Ongpin and Central Bank Governor Fernandez were 
severely criticised for their foreign debt policy. There was a fierce dispute among 
Cabinet members over this issue. Some key economic policy-makers, namely Solita 
Monsod, Director General of the NEDA, strongly advocated the selective repudiation of 
foreign debts. Alberto Romulo was another influential Cabinet member, later Senator, 
who supported the selective repudiation policy. This position was broadly supported by
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economists, civic activists and politicians who played a leading role in the "EDSA 
revolution".27 The organisation Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) was formed to 
unite critical voices against the government's debt policy. This fierce dispute later 
became one of the reasons for Secretary Ongpin's resignation.
In its first years, the Aquino government faced continuing political instability.28 The 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and New People's Army (NPA) continued 
to challenge the new government. The secessionist movement in Mindanao led by the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and insurgency in the Cordilleras were still 
active. More importantly, radical military factions led by Marcos loyalists and some 
members of the Reform Armed Forces Movement (RAM) continued to threaten the 
new government. By the end of 1989, there had been seven coup attempts, two of which 
were serious and led to many casualties. In spite of some scepticism about Aquino's 
ability to restore political stability, the US government continued to support the 
government. Further political instability in the Philippines impeded smooth negotiation 
of the lease agreements on the US bases, which were due to expire in 1991.
US President Ronald Reagan accelerated the process of appropriations for additional 
US financial aid to the unstable newly-democratised country. An additional $200 
million of financial assistance repeatedly stalled in the American Senate. It was only 
finally passed after the importance of the aid was recognised by Senators to generate 
support for the position of the US government in the Philippines over the US bases
• 29issue.
27 For powerful arguments by proponents of the selective repudiation policy, see de Dios and 
Rocamora (eds.) (1992).
28 The fragility of the Aquino government is documented by Reid and Guerrero (1995). For the 
official investigation into coup attempts, see Hilario Davide, et al. (1990) "The Final Report of the 
Fact-Finding Commission". Also, see, PMS(1992d) "The Aquino Management of the Presidency: In 
the Face of Crisis".
29 See, Montojo (1998:86). For the close links between US aid and the military bases issue under the 
Aquino government, also see Pregg (1991).
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It should also be noted that support from the US government, the IMF and the World 
Bank was helpful in facilitating foreign debt negotiation with private foreign banks.30 
For example, it is reported that senior US officials, including US Treasury Secretary 
James A Baker III and Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker, had been 
exerting "moral suasion" on Citibank to ease up its strict stance on debt negotiation 
with the Philippine government in February 1987.
After the new government restored amicable relations with the US government, the IMF 
and the World Bank, their lending conditionality was not strictly enforced. The IMF's 
and the World Bank's stance on conditionality was veiy strict in the Philippines in 1984 
and 1985. However, except for this period, the conditionality of the IMF and the World 
Bank cannot be seen as strong "leverage". In particular, during the initial years of the 
Aquino government, the IMF's decisions on lending negotiations were supposed to be 
influenced by US pressure to speed up negotiations or to loosen the terms of lending 
conditions (see Montojo,1998:254). Under the new government, the World Bank also 
"took a golden opportunity" to implement lessons learnt from its experience of the 
previous ten years (see Mosley,1991:55), the key lesson being the vital importance of 
the government's commitment to policy reform. The World Bank "handed over to the 
Philippine Government the policy initiative in determining the next steps to be taken 
within the reform programme" (ibid.).
As the World Bank admitted, its critical role was "intellectual leadership" rather than the 
enforcement of recommended policies. In its overall evaluation to the Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERL), the Bank notes that "the Bank’s intellectual leadership 
provided an important influence during the transition period. Had this been the only 
accomplishment of the ERL, it would have been sufficient to consider the operation a 
success".31 Initially, the release of the third tranche of the Economic Recovery 
Programme was delayed because some conditions were only partially fulfilled, namely 
those regarding public expenditure, trade liberalisation and the privatisation of six
30 See Business Day, 19 February 1987, p. 13. For the debt talks, also see Business Day, 4  February 
1987, p.2 and 24 February 1987, p.2.
31 "Program Performance Audit Report, Economic Recovery Program and Economic Recovery 
Technical Assistance Project" in World Bank (1992:22).
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banks. Later, however, the Philippine government managed to get these conditions 
waived. It should be noted that massive co-finance with the Japanese government might 
be seen as another factor which made the enforcement of conditionality difficult for the 
World Bank. Due to differences in the timing of disbursements, the Philippine 
government received large funds from the co-financer on some occasions before the 
World Bank had assessed conditionality requirements and formally decided on 
proceeding with the disbursement.32
Rebuilding the Banking Sector: Rehabilitation of the State Banks
After the transition, financial instability continued. The extent of the CB's assistance to 
financial institutions reached a peak during the first quarter of 1986. The Presidential 
election in February 1986 shook the financial system due to the expansion of election- 
related spending and the massive withdrawal of deposits from the banking system. As 
part of the anti-Marcos campaign, Aquino attacked Presidential cronyism in the 
banking sector. She urged the withdrawal of deposits from Marcos's crony banks. 
After the elections many businessmen, including cronies under the Marcos government, 
pulled their money out of the banks because of fear of sequestration.
In 1987, two further banks, PISO Development Bank and Manila Bank were closed. 
PISO Development Bank was the largest private development bank in the country and 
one of the conduits of foreign currency loans from the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). The bank suffered huge losses from foreign currency loans 
totalling P560 million due to the sharp peso depreciation during the economic crisis.33 
Three months after the closure of PISO Bank, Manila Bank, a universal bank, 
collapsed. When the bank ceased operating, Manila Bank had 633,614 deposit 
accounts valued at P 1.9 billion (see Lamberte, 1989:28-30), Manila Bank actually 
experienced a bank run in 1984. This rapidly depleted its deposits, which stood at P 4.1
32 The Bank notes that the "Bank accepted the different disbursement arrangements in a spirit of 
pragmatism." See, for this coordination problem, "Program Performance Audit Report, Economic 
Recovery Program and Economic Recovery Technical Assistance Project" in World Bank (1992:21).
33 For the PISO bank's closure, see, for example, Business Day, 5 February 1987, p. 13.; Business 
Day, 6 February 1987, p.8; and Business Day, 12 February 1987, p. 13
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billion at the end of 1983 (ibid.). In 1985 a son-in-law of Marcos, Gregorio Araneta III, 
was elected Chairman of the Board of Manila Bank and this was said to be helpful in 
preventing the bank's closure under the Marcos government (see FEER, 11 June 1987). 
Although the Central Bank continued to prop up the Manila Bank until the latter's 
overdrafts with the CB swelled to P 6.1 billion, it closed the Manila Bank after the May 
legislative elections in 1987.34
To rebuild the banking sector, the first task was the rehabilitation of the state-owned 
banks, most notably the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the 
Philippines (DBP). During the first year of the Aquino government, while the President 
held dominant legislative power, the rehabilitation of the state banks was chosen as the 
only major banking reform. With regard to the importance and urgency of this reform, 
there was a loose consensus among the fragmented economic policy elites in the first 
Aquino Cabinet. The reform was also strongly supported by the IMF and the World 
Bank. There was little opposition among policy elites to reducing the direct involvement 
of the state in the banking sector through the rehabilitation of the state banks, although 
the transfer of the liabilities of the state banks to the national government was 
controversial. The Central Bank governor, Fernandez, the former President of the BAP, 
was a persistent opponent of excessive involvement of state banks in the banking 
sector. Owners and managers of the big private commercial banks welcomed the 
reform. They were in position to gain from the reduced presence of the state banks. For 
the officials of the state banks, Aquino's decision to rehabilitate the PNB and the DBP 
was clearly more acceptable than the abolition or merger of the state banks.
The new economic development strategy enabled the Aquino government to
significantly reduce the direct involvement of the state in the banking sector through the
rehabilitation of state banks. By the end of 1985, the two major state-owned banks held
nearly half of the total assets of the banking system (see Table 3-1). In 1985, the PNB
was the largest of all the banks in the Philippines in terms of assets, i.e. 76 billion pesos
(see Table 3-1). The DBFs assets amounted to 72 billion pesos, the second largest.
However, about 70 per cent of the combined loan portfolio of PNB and DBP consisted
34 For the Manila Bank's closure, see Business Day, 27 May 1987, p. 14; Business Day, 28 May 
1987, p. 13; and Business Day, 29 May 1987, p.9.
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of non-performing loans.35 Both banks suffered huge losses equivalent to almost three 
per cent of GNP and became technically bankrupt.
Their lending activities were closely connected with government economic policies. As 
state-owned banks, they aggressively involved themselves in lending activities to 
support the state-led development strategy of the Marcos government and engaged in 
massive rescue operations during the economic downturn after 1979, especially 
between 1981 and 1983. Both banks were established to promote the allocation of 
subsidised credits to "priority" sectors. Their reliance on deposits from national 
government and semi-government agencies had been fairly high, although both banks, 
especially the PNB, also mobilised deposits from the private sector. There were strong 
links between foreign debt accumulation, an increase in central bank credit and the 
expansion of state-owned banks in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
To support state-led industrialisation, the strategy of the Marcos government, the two 
state-owned banks aggressively expanded their lending activities in the latter half of the 
1970s as state-allocated resources increased due to foreign borrowing. In the early 
1980s, unlike the other big private banks, which reduced their lending activities during 
the recession and the financial instability created by the Dewey Dee scandal, the state- 
owned banks, as the government's main instrument, were actively involved in rescue 
operations. Between 1980 and 1984, the total assets of the state-owned banks more 
than doubled: the PNB's assets rose from 38,652 million pesos in 1980 to 87,196 
million pesos in 1984 and the DBP's assets from 27,086 million pesos to 66,800 
million pesos (see Table 3-1.).
By 1985, the non-performing assets of the PNB and DBP had become a matter of
serious concern for economic policy-makers. In 1984, the PNB registered a PI, 102
million loss, its first since World War II. The DBP was even worse with losses
amounting to P6,641 million, the first losses it had suffered in its 38-year history. The
government of President Marcos was forced to pump in P5.6 billion in 1984 just to
keep the DBP functioning, despite restrictions which allowed the bank to lend only
35 This figure is from "Project Completion Report, Part II: Project Review from the Borrower's 
Perspective", in World Bank( 1992:76).
126
from previously-established, fully-funded credit lines (FEER, 3 October 1985:49). 
Between 1983 and 1985, the total losses of the PNB and DBP amounted to nearly P30 
billion.
In spite of the emergency prevailing in 1983, the Marcos government did not initiate 
reform of the state-owned banks in serious trouble. During the period of political 
instability intensified by the assassination of former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. in 
August 1983, a major restructuring of the state-owned banks with large layoffs and 
significant reduction of loans to his close cronies was avoided by the President. Under 
the Marcos government, a rehabilitation plan involving the merger of the PNB, the DBP 
and other banks was proposed by the Monetary Board, but it was suspended by the 
President, as examined in the previous chapter.
The transition from Marcos to Aquino was a critical trigger for the initiation of reform 
of the state-owned banks. In one PNB publication, the "EDSA revolution" was referred 
to as "a miracle" which saved the country from massive economic ruin (PNB,1996:74). 
After Marcos left, the Aquino government was able to initiate reforms of the state- 
owned banks thanks to the IMF's favourable view of expansionary government 
budgets. The restructuring of the state banks was one of the key structural reforms 
recommended by the IMF in the first lending negotiation with the new government. The 
World Bank also encouraged this reform with its Economic Recovery Loan (ERL). 
Reforms were focussed on three main areas: changes in the guiding principles of 
Government Financial Institutions, the transfer of non-performing assets to the national 
government and organisational reform.
As early as 1985, the problems of the state-owned banks had been identified and 
discussed by the World Bank and the economic policy-makers of the Philippine 
government (mostly within the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance), resulting in 
a projected financial sector loan which ended up being absorbed into the ERL package. 
Even at this stage, it was not difficult for economic policy-makers and World Bank 
officials to reach agreement on the principal guidelines for the reforms, namely that 
"they should be allowed to operate on strictly commercial lines rather than as
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instruments of political patronage," although there were some differences of opinion on 
issues such as private equity and capital/asset ratios for the DBP.36 After the regime 
change from Marcos to Aquino, this principal guideline was maintained. By early 1986 
an amicable agreement between both parties had been negotiated on all but minor 
details. Although this reform was one imposed as a condition of the Economic 
Recovery Loan, it had already been implemented before the loan was formally approved 
by the Board of the World Bank.
Through Resolution No. 1077, dated 28 November 1986, the Monetary Board of the 
Central Bank issued revised policies with respect to the role of the financial system in 
general, and government financial institutions in particular, in fostering sustainable 
economic growth. The guiding principles included: (1) limitation of GFIs' market 
share relative to the entire banking system; (2) GFIs' financial viability and 
independence from government assistance; (3) equal treatment with private banks in 
terms of regulatory requirements; (4) borrowing without national government guarantee 
except as may be required by official foreign sources in connection with debt 
restructuring; (5) limited access to public sector deposits and a required liquidity 
balance against these deposits; and (6) a ban on subsidised government credit 
programmes from GFIs' resources.37
Following these guidelines, the Revised Charter of the PNB was embodied in E.O. No. 
80, dated 3 December 1986. It was intended to serve as "the basis for the operations of 
a reorganised and rehabilitated, smaller but stronger and more operationally viable 
bank". In the Revised Charter the primary objective of the PNB was defined as that of 
providing "banking services for the development of agriculture and small and medium 
scale enterprises, particularly in the countryside" but "within the context of financially 
viable and stable banking institutions". The new policy statement was approved by the
36 Mosley (1991:57). For issues that were an initial source of disagreement, see Mosley 
(1991:58),Table 12-7.
37 See "Project Completion Report, Part II: Project Review from the Borrower's Perspective", in 
World Bank (1992:76).
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PNB Board and Monetary Board on December 23, 1986.38
The new Charter of the DBP, which was revised through E.O. No. 81, dated December 
3, 1986, laid the groundwork for the rehabilitation programme. According to this new 
charter, the DBP was to evolve primarily into a wholesale bank, channelling funds to 
other financial institutions for lending to private business enterprises in order to pursue 
its primary objective of providing medium- and long-term financing to the private 
sector. A new policy statement was approved by the DBP Board and Monetary Board 
on December 2 3 ,1986.39
The essential part of the reform was the removal of huge non-performing assets from 
the books of the PNB and the DBP. P47 billion of non-performing assets (NPAs), P55 
billion of liabilities, including government deposits and foreign borrowings, and PI6.7 
billion of contingent liabilities were transferred to the national government from the 
PNB.40 The transfers reduced the PNB's total assets from P76.1 billion in 1985 to 
P26.9 billion in 1986 and its capital accounts to P2.5 billion. As with the PNB, non­
performing assets amounting to P61.4 B and liabilities amounting to P62.2 billion were
transferred from the DBP to the national government in 1986. The total assets of the
38 The policy statement includes the following: (1) interest rate policies shall ensure positive spreads 
and consistency with interest rates prevailing in the market; (2) loans are to be made on the basis of 
viability assessment; (3) uncovered foreign exchange risks are to be avoided and a favourable foreign 
exchange position maintained; (4) lending in support of government programmes for social purposes 
is to be undertaken only if funds are specifically provided by the government and treated off books; (5) 
private deposits are to be actively sought to reduce dependence on government deposits; and (6) public 
offering of shares is to be initiated by early 1989.
39 The new policy statement includes the following: (1) DBP shall submit to the test of financial 
viability to ensure a sound capital structure, generation of sufficient earnings to cover costs and earn a 
profit margin, build-up of appropriate reserves, and protection of its equity base; (2) DBP shall 
compete in the market and operate on an equal footing with its private sector counterparts; (3) public 
sector lending shall be avoided; (4) interest rates shall be guided by full recovery of all costs and 
consistency with those prevailing in the market; (5) exposure to a single client shall be limited to 15 
per cent of DBP’s unimpaired capital and surplus, and total equity investment in any single company 
shall be limited to 15 per cent of DBP's own total equity; and (6) DBP shall conduct lending activities 
in support of government programmes only if funds are specifically provided, DBP is appropriately 
compensated and such lending is treated off books.
40 Data on the PNB and DBP are taken from "Project Completion Report, Part II: Project Review 
from the Borrower's Perspective", in World Bank (1992:69-82).
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DBP were thus reduced from P72 billion in 1985 to P9.5 billion in 1986.
The transfer of non-performing assets was approved by President Aquino in 1986 
while the legislature was closed and a new Constitution was being written. After the 
government's representatives (Ongpin, Secretaiy of Finance and Fernandez, the 
governor of the Central Bank) had already agreed with the World Bank on the basic 
principles of the Economic Recovery Loan, Aquino authorised the recommendation of 
the transfer by Ongpin and Fernandez in a Cabinet Meeting without serious discussion. 
Later, Solita Monsod (the former Director General of NEDA) recalled the decision­
making in the Cabinet meeting with dissatisfaction. According to Monsod, Ongpin and 
Fernandez insisted that the transfer of non-performing assets was the only realistic 
option to rehabilitate the state-owned banks, referring to a very long list of diversified 
borrowers and adding that they (Ongpin and Fernandez) had already reached an 
agreement with the World Bank.41
The disposal of the non-performing assets transferred from the PNB and DBP to the 
national government was made part of the government's privatisation programme. 
Proclamation No.50, dated December 8,1986, established a Committee on Privatisation 
(COP) to control the programme. The COP was composed of the Secretary of Finance 
(Chairman), the Secretary of Budget and Management, the Secretary of Justice, the 
Secretary of Trade and Industry and the Director General of the National Economic 
and Development Authority. While the COP formulated policy guidelines and 
approved sales, the Asset Privatisation Trust (APT) was responsible for actual 
marketing and disposal of the assets. The APT was also established under 
Proclamation No. 50 to dispose of the non-performing assets transferred from the 
PNB and DBP as well as certain government corporations earmarked for privatisation. 
The privatisation progressed gradually.42 Of the 399 non-performing accounts lodged 
with the APT for disposal, 230 had been fully or partially sold within four years (until 
end-December 1990) (World Bank,1992:80). The APT's biggest account, Nonoc 
Mining & Industrial Corp. (formerly Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corp., which
41 Interview with Solita Monsod, 4 June 1998.
42 For issues relating to privatisation and the APT under the Aquino government, see, for example, 
Patalinghug (1996), Manasan (1995) and Business World, 6 January 1992.
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had collapsed in 1984 owing to weak copper and nickel prices on the market), was sold 
for US $325 million on October 12, 1990. The DBP had an exposure of P12.7 billion 
in the company, or 16% of the total of the bank's non-performing accounts (PEER, 4 
June 1987:75).
Organisational and institutional reforms of the state banks included two key 
components: first, cost reduction through leaner staffing and streamlining of branch 
networks and second, managerial strengthening through organisational change, 
improvements to the credit review process, strengthening of the management of risk 
assets and staff training.
These text-book style institutional reforms had been formulated and implemented by 
strong initiatives from top management. After the short tenure of Vicente R. Jayme, 
Edgardo B. Espiritu (the former President of Metrobank) was appointed as President 
of the PNB with a brief to rehabilitate the Bank. Joker Arroyo (the Executive Secretary) 
became the new Chairman of the PNB. Jesus Bstanislao and Roberto Anonas were 
appointed as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and Vice-Chairman and Chief 
Operating Officer respectively to rebuild the DBP. Jesus Estanislao was the former 
President of Associated Bank and a consultant to the Philippine Commercial Bank. He 
was also a Director of the Centre for Research and Communication, a leading research 
institution which had affiliations with a conservative catholic force, namely Opus Dei. 
Roberto Anonas was also an experienced banker.
By 1988, at the end of the rehabilitation programme supported by the ERL, initial
measures for cost reduction were implemented.43 2,002 PNB personnel had been made
redundant. As a result, the PNB's personnel complement compared favourably to those
in the private sector in relation to total assets, loans and deposits. Rationalisation of the
bank's domestic and overseas branch networks also led to the abolition of ten regional
offices and nine overseas offices and divestment of lending functions from 25 branch
offices. To ensure the PNB's overall operational efficiency, every aspect of management
such as credit control, financial management and operational management was reviewed
43 The following data on cost reduction measures was taken from "Project Completion Report, Part 
II: Project Review from the Borrower's Perspective", in World Bank (1992:77).
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and reorganised.
The DBP revitalised its branch banking network through the streamlining of the 
organisational structure of the branches and the intensification of deposit generation 
activities. To correct the previous unbalanced lending policy, which had concentrated on 
narrowly-selected sectors and regions, the bank also adopted the Proactive Balanced 
Development Program (PBD), which focussed on three main sectors including Urban 
Development, Regional Development and Sectoral Development.44 Within two years, 
the DBP had reduced staffing levels from 3,350 to less than 2,000 (FEER, 4 June 
1987:76). The DBP offered attractive incentives to those who volunteered for 
retirement. According to its original plans, that level should have been achieved by 1988 
but the DBP opted to do it quickly to remove the air of uncertainty created by a phased 
reduction. Also, the number of departments was trimmed to 11 major groupings from 
an unwieldy 38. The bank's experience with "behest" loans contributed to the new 
credit philosophy of the DBP. The key principle was to "maintain a prudent and 
diversified loan portfolio" (ibid.). Total exposure, including loans, guarantees and 
equity investments in any single project, was now limited to P50 million and could not 
exceed 60% of the total project cost.
After the initial rehabilitation programme, there were still many questions left in terms 
of the viability of the PNB and DBP and the corruption of the state banks. Although 
they stressed their independence from the government, they still enjoyed the privilege of 
having considerable access to government deposits. After the partial privatisation of the 
PNB through the public offering of its shares, the issue of government deposits was 
still a controversial matter. Despite the conditionality of the World Bank's Economic 
Recovery Loan, the audits of the state-owned banks were conducted by a government 
body (the Commission of Audit) rather than an independent body. The PNB’s 
inefficiency and its loose review process were often pointed out.45 In fact, after the 
currency crisis of 1997, the seriousness of the PNB's non-performing loans was 
revealed.
44 Estanislao, in Fookien Times Philippines Yearbook 1987-1988, p. 108.
45 See, for example, Delhaise (1996:166-167).
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Under the Aquino government, there was ample cause for speculation about various 
forms of favouritism, fraud and corruption with regard to the operations of the state 
banks. For example, some asset sales which were transferred from the PNB and DBP 
were often criticised due to their unfairness.40 In May 1990 Senator Enrile filed Res. 
No. 834, which urged an investigation of suspected PNB behest loans to the 
Petrochemical project proposed by the Taiwanese-owned USI Far East Corporation 
through the Luzon Petrochemical Corporation.47 Concern was first voiced by Joker P. 
Arroyo, former Executive Secretary and Chairman of the Board of Philippine National 
Bank. Although an investigation by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee with fifteen 
public hearings did not find any of the principal features of a behest loan in the case, 
the Monetaiy Board of the Central Bank was accused of giving the Luzon 
Petrochemical Corporation special treatment in terms of the Debt/Equity conversion.
Controversy regarding suspected election-related finance still continued under the 
Aquino government. In May 1992 Edgardo Espiritu, the President of PNB and a 
supporter of LDP presidential candidate Ramon Mitra, criticised President Aquino for 
selectively releasing funds to local government units to buy political support for her 
chosen candidate, Fidel Ramos of the Lakas Edsa-NUCD.48 The Aquino government 
denied this accusation but the resignation of Espiritu was accepted with amicable 
statements from the President.
Speculation regarding share-dealing by the PNB continued under the Ramos 
government, provoked by a successful businessman, Lucio Tan, who had once been 
accused of using his close connections with President Marcos to the benefit of his 
companies. Favouritism in the allocation of state credits could not be eradicated. As a 
"public" lending agency, state banks could not avoid extra risks in its lending activities. 
The role of the state-owned banks remains a controversial issue. Towards the end of the 
1990s, state banks, particularly the DBP and the LBP, grew rapidly.
46 See, for example, PDI, 2 November 1992, "Behest loans to behest sale".
47 For a summary of this case, see Salonga (1995:173-175).
48 See, Manila Chronicle, 8 May 1992 and 16 May 1992; and Manila Bulletin, 14 May 1992.
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Nevertheless, the rehabilitation of the state banks was a significant reform measure in 
the economy and banking sector. After the initial rehabilitation of the PNB and DBP, 
their presence was much less dominant in absolute terms, although they steadily 
expanded their businesses later. This was a critical event since the banking sector had 
always been dominated by state banks in the Philippines. With the rehabilitation of 
these banks, the most urgent objective of the initial reform had been achieved. The PNB 
and DBP were no longer the cause of government budget deficits under the Aquino 
government. It could not be assumed that without proper regulation, private banks 
would be better managed than public banks. Nonetheless, in the Philippine context of 
the mid-to-late 1980s, the new restrictions on the state-owned banks' activities 
constituted a positive step towards building a solid banking system. The amount of 
credit which was allocated by the state-owned banks was a critical matter in determining 
the extent of favouritism, as the dramatic decline during the economic crisis of the 
Marcos cronies, including Herminio Disini, Rodolfo Cuenca and Ricardo Silverio, 
suggested. The huge expansion of the state-owned banks fostered unprecedented 
presidential cronyism and added to the fragility of the entire banking system under the 
Marcos government.
In addition to the rehabilitation of the state banks, the end of Marcos cronyism in the 
banking sector can be seen as an important event in revitalising the banking sector. 
After President Aquino took power, she established the Presidential Commission on 
Good Government (PCGG) by means of her first executive order, which had three 
main objectives: (1) to recover the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the 
Marcos/Romualdez families and their associates; (2) to investigate the cases of graft 
and corruption in government by order of the President; and (3) to adopt safeguards to 
ensure that the practices of the Marcoses should not be repeated. The PCGG was given 
full authority to sequester and freeze ill-gotten wealth. In the banking sector, the PCGG 
sequestered a controlling share of United Coconut Planters Bank and Traders Royal 
Bank; and a part of the shares of Allied Bank, Philippine Commercial International 
Bank and Republic Planters Bank. The PCGG seized documents from the Security 
Bank.
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The fates of banks owned by Marcos' cronies were determined by various factors 
including their owners' and managements' determination, tactics, financial resources, 
political influence and luck. UCPB, which was led by Aquino's first cousin and a close 
Marcos crony, Danding Cojuangco (who fled the country with Marcos), was 
sequestered and brought under a new management team, in spite of the fact that the 
chair of the bank, Ponce Emile, retained his post in the new government (see PEER, 10 
July 1989:78). Benedicto made a compromise settlement with the PCGG early on, 
gaining civil and criminal immunity from prosecution in exchange for information and 
part of his assets, including frozen funds at Traders Royal Bank. Roland Gapud of 
Security Bank was also one of sixteen former cronies who made a compromise 
settlement with the PCGG. Lucio Tan's Allied Bank evaded PCGG's grasp due to, at 
least in part, his bank's contribution to the generation of foreign currency during the 
crisis and its continuing constant access to foreign currency.49
As many argued, the PCGG's performance was not entirely satisfactory.30 However, the 
end of Marcos cronyism in the banking sector contributed to its revitalisation. As a 
means of dealing with the sequestered banks, the process was not entirely unfair. The 
non-crony elites gained from the lost wealth of Marcos’s cronies but the way in which 
they obtained a share in the sequestered banks was very different from the practices of 
the powerful Marcos cronies. The PCIBank's case was an important example. The 
prominent family bank owner, the Lopez family, which was forced out by Marcos, 
regained part ownership of the bank under the Aquino government. In November 1987, 
fifty-two per cent of the shares of PCIBank, owned by the Development Bank of the 
Philippines, were sold by bidding and were bought by a group led by the industrialists 
Eugenio Lopez, a former owner of the bank, and John Gokongwei. The share deal 
involved P 1,345 billion, one of the largest single share transactions in local business 
history at that time.51 The selling price per share was P66.10 compared with a book
value of close to P30 per share, or a premium of 120%. It was not easy to judge
49 For the survival of the Allied Bank, see FEER, 15 December 1988:112-116 and Hutchcroft 
(1998:188).
50 For an assessment of the PCGG from various points of view, see Abueva and Roman (1998b: 133- 
155). See, also, Nozawa (1991).
51 See Manual L. Morales "The Role of Banks in the Recovery Effort", in Fookien Times 
Philippines Yearbook 1987-1988.
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whether the bidding was entirely fair but it was clearly different from the way in which 
the Marcos cronies, namely "Danding" Cojuangco and Benedicto, had acquired their 
banks under the Marcos dictatorship. After the Marcos era, there were no banks like the 
Marcos crony banks, including United Coconut Planters Bank, Traders Royal Bank, 
Republic Planters Bank and Allied Bank, which had grown rapidly in a very short time 
in the 1970s, delivering benefits as a result of the government's policies and Presidential 
favour.
Conclusion
The transition from Marcos to Aquino caused a change in policy elites, in the 
interactions among them and in economic policy, although the new government had 
mixed results in terms of banking reform. It also triggered a recovery in the economy, 
although corruption and favouritism were not eradicated as expected. In spite of the 
instability of the banking sector in the early years and continuing political uncertainty, 
the banking sector was restored to stability under the Aquino government.
After the failure of active state interventionism under the long-term authoritarian 
government, the new government, which took power as a coalition to end the 
authoritarian regime, was committed to redirecting previously-adopted economic policy. 
During this period, the government took initiatives to redirect active state 
interventionism, to dismantle the state monopoly, to rehabilitate the state banks and to 
end Marcos cronyism. In particular, the rehabilitation of the state banks which was 
implemented by the President before the restoration of the Legislature was seen as a 
significant reform in the banking sector. These were policy areas which a loose 
consensus among the policy elites in the fragmented Aquino government regarded as 
urgent.
Redirecting Marcos's policy generated support from the US government, the IMF, the 
World Bank and other donor countries. The US government strongly opposed the 
selective repudiation of foreign debt. However, once the Philippine government 
adopted a foreign debt policy which was in favour of the US government, they were
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supportive of the new democratic government, which had been facing serious security 
and economic problems. In the early Aquino years, US security concerns also 
facilitated US economic assistance. Their support contributed to the recovery in the 
economy and the banking sector.
It must also be noted that the transition improved the relationships between the Central 
Bank and the President. Unlike her predecessor, President Aquino did not intervene in 
the Central Bank's policy decisions. The Central Bank, backed by the President, started 
to improve the stability of the banking sector through regulatory reforms. However, the 
government initiatives to reform the economy were undermined by the fragility of the 
transitional government. There were fierce conflicts among policy elites in the Aquino 
Cabinet. They did not agree on the key policy issues, including foreign debt, trade 
liberalisation, land reform and the US bases policy. In addition, the government, which 
had to put a high priority on restoring political order, was not very effective in 
reforming the economy through the legislative process. Under the newly-restored 
democratic system, structural reform through the legislative process was not smooth. 
An ineffectual executive-legislative relationship was once again an obstacle to reforming 
the economy. The next chapter examines further some of the successes of liberalisation 
by regulatory reform towards the end of the Aquino government and the failure of 
structural reform through the legislative process.
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Table 3-1. Total Assets: Banking System, PNB and DBP 
(in Million Pesos)
Year
Banking System PNB PNB/
Banking
System
DBP DBP/
Banking
System
PNB+DBP/
Banking
System
1980 188,824 38,652 20.5% 27,086 14.3% 34.8%
1981 226,057 44,866 19.8% 34,707 15.4% 35.2%
1982 226,057 58,710 26.0% 43,988 19.5% 45.4%
1983 265,016 70,502 26.6% 54,934 20.7% 47.3%
1984 388,901 87,196 22.4% 66,800 17.2% 39.6%
1985 331,757 76,157 23.0% 72,043 21.7% 44.7%
1986 304,085 26,913 8.9% 9,504 3.1% 12.0%
1987 330304 31,268 9.5% 10,532 3.2% 12.7%
1988 392,054 38,758 9.9% 11,432 2.9% 12.8%
1989 479,010 56,302 11.8% 11,322 2.4% 14.1%
1990 609,695 73,463 12.0% 17,151 2.8% 14.9%
1991 691,098 93,799 13.6% 27,011 3.9% 17.5%
1992 811,959 107,809 13.3% 41,015 5.1% 18.3%
1993 1,019,065 131,755 12.9% 56,733 5.6% 18.5%
1994 1,253,911 148,208 11.8% 60,614 4.8% 16.7%
1995 1,595,482 167,199 10.5% 67,531 4.2% 14.7%
1996 2,109,636 196,921 9.3% 75,726 3.6% 12.9%
1997 2,776,563 248,612 9.0% 101,205 3.6% 12.6%
Sources: PNB Annual Reports (various years),
DBP Annual Reports (various years),
Philippine Banking Almanac (various issues), 
Philippine Statistical Year Book 1999, Table 16.9
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Chapter 4.
Aquino Reforms in the early 1990s: Initiating Liberalisation through 
Regulatory Reform and the Failure of Structural Reform 
in the Banking Sector
Introduction
Under the Aquino government, the Central Bank implemented various regulatory 
reforms within the existing legal framework. After the initial economic recovery, the 
Central Bank undertook various liberalisation measures in the early 1990s. 
Liberalisation, which was initiated by the Aquino government to redirect active state 
interventionism, was further promoted in the early 1990s. In the banking sector the 
Central Bank implemented important reforms such as deregulation of the establishment 
of new banks and new branches and on foreign exchange control. The banking 
business experienced rapid changes through regulatory reform.
A confluence of factors facilitated these liberalisation measures, but support from the 
President and the emergence of a consensus among the Monetary Board members (a 
majority from the Cabinet) was a critical precondition enabling the Central Bank to 
initiate liberalisation in the banking sector in the early 1990s. In the beginning of the 
1990s signs of economic deceleration appeared. Security was a matter of serious 
continuing concern for domestic and foreign businesses. In particular, the coup attempt 
in December 1989, which damaged the centre of the financial district in the country, 
raised serious doubts about the business climate among foreign investors. In the early 
1990s, the Gulf War and natural disasters adversely affected the economy further. The 
government had to show its strong commitment to reforming the economy to attract 
foreign investment and loans. The IMF and the World Bank consistently encouraged 
the liberalisation of the economy and the banking sector. After the end of the "Cold 
War" and the controversial Senate decision to terminate the lease agreements on the US 
bases, "special" US support was no longer expected.
After taking office, President Aquino continued to support the Central Bank’s initiatives 
to reform the banking sector. After fierce conflict over the main economic issues and
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repeated reshuffles of the Cabinet, the key Economic Secretaries became more 
cooperative with each other, consensus on liberalisation reform being consolidated as a 
key economic strategy to attract foreign investment and loans and to promote exports in 
the early 1990s. Banking reform was broadly supported by the business sector, which 
expected an improvement in services and a lowering of interest rates as a result of 
various liberalisation measures. While the entry of new domestic banks provided some 
big businesses with a good opportunity to enter the profitable banking sector, the big 
commercial banks, which were the most powerful in the banking sector, were potential 
losers since the entry of powerful new entrants was a threat to their business. However, 
once the consensus among policy elites in the Cabinet and the Central Bank emerged, 
opposition from the banking sector was not strong enough to defeat the liberal reform. 
It is also worth noting that the big commercial banks were beneficiaries of other 
liberalisation measures during this period. The significant reduction of the state banks' 
presence provided the big domestic banks with opportunities to expand their 
businesses. Another liberal reform measure, namely deregulation of the opening of new 
branches, was supported by the big commercial banks, which were keen to expand their 
own businesses. Foreign currency liberalisation also created new business 
opportunities for them, such as dealing with remittances from overseas Filipino 
workers.
By contrast, structural reform through the legislative process came to a standstill, 
although the vital necessity of banking sector reform was recognised. Although the 
Central Bank advocated several amendments to existing laws to strengthen monetary 
authority, the President refrained from intervening and left the reforms to the 
Legislature. In the newly-restored constitutional democracy, the process of structural 
reform was constrained by the inefficiency of the Bicameral system of the Legislature 
and by conflicts between the Legislature, particularly the Senate and the President. 
Under the Aquino government, although the Central Bank implemented various 
regulatory reforms within the existing legal framework, further structural reforms 
through the legislative process were not implemented. The capacity of the Central Bank 
to implement regulatory reforms in the banking sector was enhanced by support from 
the President and the emerging consensus among the Cabinet. However, the capacity of 
the Aquino government to promote structural reform through the legislative process
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was constrained by the restoration of the Legislature. In this chapter, the key events in 
the banking sector of the early 1990s, namely liberalisation through regulatory reform 
and the failure of structural reform under the Aquino government, are explored by 
focussing on the decisions of the policy elites and the interactions among them in the 
context of changing political institutions after the restoration of democracy.
Initiating Liberalisation through Regulatory Reform
The transition from the Marcos government to the Aquino government led to changes 
in the relationship between the President and the Central Bank. In terms of presidential 
interference in monetary and fiscal issues, there was a sharp contrast between the 
Marcos presidency, especially in the first half of the 1980s, and that of Aquino. Apart 
from "behest" loans and the rapid growth of crony banks, President Marcos often 
intervened in the Central Bank's decisions under the martial law regime in the early 
1980s. During the economic and banking crisis, the reform initiatives of the Central 
Bank were not fully supported by the President. President Marcos reversed the Central 
Bank decisions to deal with ailing banks, most notably in the cases of the Banco 
Filipino and the Republic Planters Bank. Massive spending for the elections in 1984 
and 1986 seriously damaged monetary stability.
In order to strengthen coordination between monetary and fiscal policy, Aquino added 
another Cabinet member (Budget Secretary) to the members of the Monetary Board, 
the decision-making body of the Central Bank. However, unlike Marcos, the new 
President did not intervene in the Central Bank's decisions. Under the Aquino 
government, the Central Bank governor and the Secretary of Finance maintained a grip 
on monetary and fiscal policy. Although there was fierce controversy on fiscal and 
monetary issues, especially on debt repayments, in her Cabinet and with the Legislature, 
President Aquino supported the position of the Central Bank governor and the 
Secretary of Finance, who were in charge of these issues. On the debt repayments 
issue, the Central Bank governor and the Secretary of Finance were strongly opposed 
to restrictions on debt repayments through a selective repudiation of Marcos crony- 
related debts, or the imposition of ceilings on annual debt repayments (debt cap) that 
were endorsed by the Legislature. Although the Finance Secretary was replaced twice
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(Jaime V. Ongpin, Vicente R. Jayme and Jesus P. Estanislao) and Jose L. Cuisia, Jr. 
replaced Jose B. Fernandez, Jr. as Central Bank governor under the Aquino 
government, basic stance on this issue and the support the President gave the Central 
Bank remained unchanged. Under the Aquino government, the Central Bank regained 
relative autonomy vis-a-vis the Presidency in spite of continuing political uncertainty. 
This was a critical precondition for the implementation of various regulatory reforms 
and liberalisation measures in the early 1990s.
After the initial recovery of the banking sector from the ruin of the mid-1980s, the 
Central Bank took the initiative and began to liberalise the banking system. A Central 
Bank official notes that "The thrust for the nineties is liberalisation" (Suleik,1992b: 14). 
Senior deputy governor, Gabriel Singson, at that time explained that "a thrust of the 
policy initiatives" under the Aquino government is "that of removing economic 
control."1 In the early 1990s, the most important reform initiatives were the 
liberalisation of rules and regulations on the establishment of new banks and new 
branches and on foreign exchange control. In particular, the liberalisation of foreign 
exchange control, which ended over four decades of pervasive exchange control, was a 
vital reform due to its long-term impact on the economy.
In February 1990, the Central Bank governor was replaced by Jose L. Cuisia, Jr., who 
first joined a state financial institution under the Aquino government as administrator of 
the Social Security System (SSS).2 Cuisia was chosen by the President as the 
successor of governor Jose Fernandez, who was appointed by President Marcos. There 
was no clear explanation for the President's choice but Fernandez's recommendation 
was seen as an influential factor in her decision.3 Cuisia was an MBA-holder from the 
University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School and had extensive experience in the 
financial sector. He worked for the Ayala Investment & Development Corporation as 
senior Vice-President for Corporate Finance and later moved to Filinvest Credit 
Corporation as its Executive Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer. Before
1 See Business World, 6 January 1992, "Measures encouraging liberalisation were laid last year".
2 For Cuisia's background, see, for example, Business World, 27 February 1990, "Special Feature: 
CB; a changing of the guards".
3 Interview, Paderanga, Jr., 10 June 1997.
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President Corazon C. Aquino invited him to join the SSS, he had been President and 
Chief Executive Officer of the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) and Director 
of the Philippine National Bank. Cuisia, who had had a long career in the private sector, 
essentially shared policy preferences with his predecessor. The new governor was fully 
committed to reducing state intervention in the banking business and to keeping a 
"conservative" approach to debt policy. Under Cuisia's governorship, the Central Bank 
continued to implement banking reforms initiated by governor Fernandez to develop a 
stable banking sector.
In order to facilitate financial stability and effective resource allocation, the Central 
Bank took conventional policy measures such increasing the minimum paid in capital, 
reforms of reserve requirements and rediscounting policy reforms. The minimum paid- 
in capital, which was increased in 1989, was raised again from September 1990 as 
follows: (1) for expanded commercial banks from P1.0 to PI.5 billion; (2) for 
commercial banks, from P500 million to P750 million; (3) for thrift banks (Head 
Offices - National Capital Region) from P10 to P20 million; (4) thrift banks (Cebu and 
Davao) from P5 to P10 million and (5) for investment houses from P20 to P50 million 
for old and P100 million for new businesses.
To improve resource allocation by reducing intermediation costs, a gradual unification 
of reserve requirements across banks and deposit types was implemented in 1989 and 
1990. A series of adjustments to the reserve requirement ratios for demand deposits, 
short-term deposits and deposit substitutes over this period of time was undertaken to 
equalise and rationalise the imposition of the reserve ratio across banks and non-banks 
(Suleik,1992b: 16).
The Central Bank also reformed rediscounting policy, rationalising its rediscounting 
window to enhance its role as a mechanism for liquidity control, rather than for credit 
allocation. The CB moved away from its early role as the "bank of first resort" 
(Suleik,1992b: 16). The Central Bank gradually reduced its role in the credit allocation 
programme by transferring the administration of ALF, IGLF and APEX funds to the 
Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the Philippines in 1990.
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In May 1989, the moratorium on the establishment of new banks was lifted through the 
issuance of CB Circular 1200.4 This was followed in April 1991 by the easing of 
regulation regarding the establishment of new branches under Circular 1281. An 
auction system was introduced for the awarding of franchises to eligible commercial 
and thrift banks wishing to open more branches in Metro Manila, in the big cities of 
Cebu and Davao and in the first-class cities and municipalities. In addition, banks were 
provided with incentives to open more branches in other areas, particularly those which 
continued to be "under-banked" in relation to economic activity and population. To 
open branches in these areas did not require minimum bids. Rural banks were also 
given the privilege of nationwide branching under Circular 1280 of April 1991, to 
improve credit delivery in the countryside. The regulations pertaining to ATMs were 
also eased, the operation of ATMs in off-site or off-premises areas being allowed in 
May 1991 to facilitate the delivery of banking services to a broader of clientele.
Foreign exchange liberalisation can be seen as a critical reform to support the key 
development strategy under the Aquino government, which stressed export promotion 
and foreign investment as an engine for economic growth.5 Cuisia stated that "the 
deregulation of foreign exchange transactions is aimed at substantially enhancing the 
country’s export trade as well as its ability to attract foreign investments".6 After the 
initial economic recovery, including increases in exports, improvements in the foreign 
reserve position and the reduction in foreign debt, the government took initiatives to 
liberalise the economy. Along with the trade liberalisation efforts and the Foreign 
Investment Act of 1991, foreign exchange liberalisation was seen as the key measure to 
promote exports and to attract foreign investment. It must be noted that foreign 
exchange liberalisation led to a significant reduction of the Central Bank’s direct role in 
controlling and allocating foreign exchange.
4 For the liberalisation of regulation relating to new banks and new branches, see Martinez (1993) 
and Suleik (1992b: 15).
5 For an overview of the foreign exchange liberalisation, see Zialcita (1994).
6 Jose L. Cuisia, Speech delivered before the meeting of the Wharton Club of the Philippines on 29 
July 1992, reprinted in Philippine Banking Almanac, 1993 Edition, pp.53-56.
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In 1991, liberalisation of the rules governing foreign exchange was announced and 
gradually implemented. The full implementation was scheduled to begin the following 
year. The key measures included the following: (1) the allowable retention of export 
receipts by exporters was raised to 40 per cent from the previous ceiling of only 2 per 
cent; (2) the access of exporters to foreign exchange resources from the foreign 
currency deposit units (FCDU's) was increased; (3) full and immediate repatriation 
privileges for all types of foreign investment - whether direct equity or in listed shares / 
securities was allowed; and (4) non-trade foreign exchange regulations were liberalised 
(Suleik,1992b: 16).7
In the early 1990s, liberalisation reform was accelerated by various factors. By the end 
of the 1980s, the high economic growth period brought about by expanding 
government expenditure was ending. GNP slowed down to 0.5 per cent in 1991. The 
Gulf War led to higher oil prices and to a reduction in remittances from Filipino 
overseas workers in the Middle East. Natural disasters adversely affected the economy 
further. The political instability was the most serious threat to attracting foreign 
investment. In particular, the coup attempt in December 1989, which damaged the 
country's financial centre, raised serious doubts among foreign investors about the 
business climate of the country. The IMF and the World Bank continued to encourage 
liberalisation efforts. Special support from the US government was not expected after 
the controversial decision by the Senate in 1991 to terminate the lease agreements on 
the US bases and the end of Cold War.
Faced with a declining economy, a loss of "special" support from the US government 
and continuing political instability, the Aquino government decided to promote 
liberalisation reform, to attract further foreign investment and loans which were seen as 
essential for economic growth. The Aquino government recognised that improving the 
economy was crucial to the survival of the government. After the coup attempt in 
December 1989, the Aquino Cabinet members held a meeting in early 1990 where they 
acknowledged their failure to improve economic conditions, particularly with regard to
rural and urban poverty.8 The Cabinet members reconfirmed the critical importance of
1 For detailed lists of the liberalisation measures, see Zialcita (1994: Table 12.1.).
8 See, Manila Chronicle, 19 May 1990, p. 14, cited in Montojo (1998:219).
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the liberalisation reforms which aimed to expand the economy through market- 
mechanisms.9 A solid consensus among Cabinet members was crucial to the promotion 
of liberalisation. In terms of the working relationships among the Aquino Cabinet 
members, there was a sharp contrast between the early years of the Aquino government 
and the latter years of the early 1990s. The former Director General of NEDA, 
Paderanga, pointed out that the working relationship between Cuisia, Estanislao and 
himself was totally different from that between Fernandez, Ongpin and Monsod in the 
first Cabinet of the Aquino government.10 According to him, this strong consensus on 
economic policy was the critical driving force behind liberal reforms. Estanislao also 
stressed the importance of the decisive leadership of President Aquino and of 
cooperative initiatives taken by Aquino Cabinet members to liberalise the economy in 
the early 1990s.11 The appointment of a new Central Bank governor helped to foster a 
co-operative relationship among the Cabinet members. In discussions of fiscal and 
monetary policy, it was not very easy for governor Fernandez, who was appointed by 
President Marcos, to build good working relationships with some of the Cabinet 
members and legislative leaders. Fernandez was often severely criticised, due to the 
Central Bank's role in the accumulation of the former dictator's personal wealth.
By the 1990s, liberalisation measures were broadly supported by key policy-makers 
and domestic businesses. The "competitor's" policy was studied and referred to as the 
model of liberalisation. The other ASEAN Four countries, including Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand, were seen as competitors which were more successful in 
promoting exports and attracting foreign investment to expand their economies through 
liberal reforms. For example, the Central Bank deputy governor at that time, Singson, 
explained that the loosening of foreign exchange regulation was in keeping with the 
"more liberal exchange regulatory environment of competitor countries in the ASEAN 
region such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand".12 Until the foreign currency crisis of
9 For the economic reform package (or "new economic order") and solid consensus, see, for example, 
Business World, 15 June 1990, pi; 18 June 1990, p i; 20 June 1990, p i; 21 June 1990, p i; 25 June 
1990, p i; 27 June 1990, pi
10 Interview, Dr. Cayetano Paderanga, Jr., 10 June 1997.
11 Interview, Dr. Jesus Estanislao, 3 July 1998.
12 Business World, 6 January 1992, "Measures encouraging liberalisation were laid last year". See, 
also Suleik (1992a:37).
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1997, the "competitor's policy" had been an influential model of economic policy. A 
Central Bank official pointed ont that a study of the other ASEAN Four countries' 
policy was the first thing needed to form a draft of regulatory reform.13
There were many beneficiaries of these liberalisation measures among domestic 
businesses which expected improved services and lower interest rates. There were also 
strong proponents for the entry of the new domestic banks. This liberalisation measure 
created an opportunity for some big businesses to enter the profitable banking sector. 
Asian Bank became the first commercial bank authorised to upgrade from a thrift bank 
in more than a decade. The bank was backed by the Andres Soriano Corporation, the 
holding company of one of the country's largest industrial conglomerates. Strong new 
entrants were a potential threat to the existing big commercial banks, which constituted 
the most powerful segment of the banking sector. However, the consensus which 
emerged on the reform measure among the Monetary Board members included the 
Cabinet members; opposition from the existing big banks was not strong enough to 
resist the reform measure.
The deregulation of the opening of new bank branches was welcomed by the 
commercial banks, which were keen to expand their businesses, although the Central 
Bank denied that the deregulation was the result of strong pressure from the 
commercial banks. Central Bank officials stressed that the deregulation had been 
carefully planned by the Central Bank after many years' study and discussion about the 
number of bank branches needed to improve financial stability and services.14 The total 
number of the expanded Commercial Banks' branches increased from 1273 in 1990 to 
1618 in 1992.
13 A Monetary Board member commented that he was sometimes irritated by the attitude of Central 
Bank officials to policy reform. They were not keen to do something that other countries had not yet 
done. The member insisted to them that they should have done what they thought was best for the 
Philippine economy. It did not matter what other countries were doing. Interview, Mr. Guillermo 
Carague, 25 November 1997.
14 Interview, Mr. Fernando Silvoza and Ms. Editha Alido, 25 November 1997.
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The impact of deregulation on foreign exchange was a further reason why the banking 
sector supported the liberalisation measures. Foreign exchange liberalisation provided 
new business opportunities, especially for the expanded commercial banks which 
enjoyed certain advantages in foreign currency dealing. For example, Rafael B. 
Buenaventura, the President of PCIBank at that time, welcomed the reform to liberalise 
foreign exchange control, since it created a business opportunity with regard to foreign 
workers' remittances,15 which was estimated to have risen from US$ 4 billion to US $ 7 
billion a year at that time. This was attractive in a country whose annual export of goods 
totalled only US$ 8.8 billion in 1991,
These liberalisation measures, with the regulatory reforms initiated by the Aquino 
government in the early 1990s, played a critical role in improving the financial system 
(see Gochoco-Bautista and Reside, Jr., 2000:86-87) although liberalisation did not 
always facilitate the development of a stable banking sector and economy. In the short 
run, they stimulated the banking sector without destabilising the financial system. The 
new banks tried hard to attract deposits with favourable saving rates and various 
campaigns and these moves also stimulated the businesses of the existing banks. In the 
more competitive business environment, management and the owners of banks were 
forced to be more concerned about solvent lending activities and effective management, 
at least in the short run.
The Central Bank was able to initiate liberalising regulatory reform in the early 1990s. 
With support from the President and a consensus among the Cabinet and Monetary 
Board members, it was not very difficult for the Central Bank to promote liberalisation 
in the banking sector through regulatory reform. By contrast, structural reform through 
the legislative process under the Aquino government was not smooth, as will be seen in 
the following section.
15 See Rafael B. Buenaventura, Speech delivered at the Centre for Research and Communication 
(CRC) on 27 August 1992, reprinted in Philippine Banking Almanac, 1993 Edition, pp. 17-20.
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The Restoration of the Legislature and Banking Sector Reform
The restoration of the Philippine Congress on 27th July 1987 marked the return of the 
country to parliamentary politics. The outcome of structural reform through the 
legislative process was constrained by institutional and organisational factors related to 
the newly restored Legislature. The executive-legislative relationship reemerged as a 
critical factor influencing the success or failure of economic reform.
The Aquino government had failed to enforce structural reforms in the banking sector, 
although it had implemented some important economic reforms through the legislative 
process such as the Foreign Investment Act. After the disastrous failure of the banking 
sector under the Marcos government, the importance of Central Bank reform was 
broadly recognised. The establishment of an independent monetary authority was one 
of eighty-one specific reforms identified in the 1987 Constitution.16 The Central Bank 
advocated reform and the World Bank and the IMF strongly supported it. In addition, 
big commercial banks were in favour of Central Bank reform. The Bankers Association 
of the Philippines (BAP) also endorsed the reform. They largely shared the idea that, 
under the authoritarian government of the Marcos era, the economy and the banking 
sector had been adversely affected by the lack of an independent Central Bank. Since 
there was no strong opposition in the business sector, the establishment of an 
independent Central Bank was seen as a relatively easy structural reform.
Commentators often point to "weak" Presidential leadership on economic reforms 
under the Aquino administration.17 However, in terms of fiscal and monetary policy, this 
was not entirely accurate since the President did not compromise her position with the 
Legislature on key fiscal and monetary policy. President Aquino had been determined 
to pursue her administration's policies with respect to the country's external debt and
16 For a review of the performance of Congress with respect to the specific agenda, see Institute for 
Strategic and Development Studies (1998) "Evaluation of the Performance of the 8th Philippine 
Congress in Relation to the Legislative Agenda in the 1987 Constitution" in Abueva and Roman 
(1998a: 116-125).
17 See, for example, Daily Globe, 30 June 1992, "Departure, Not Continuity, from Aquino's 
Leadership", by Noel C. Cabrera and Manila Standard, 30 June 1992, "A Failed President", by Nestor 
Mata, cited in Abueve and Roman (eds.) (1993).
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the management of the budget deficit. This was a serious source of conflict between the 
Executive and legislators. Both the House and the Senate made strong efforts to alter 
the government's policy. Restrictions on foreign debt repayments were popularly 
supported by the general public. In addition, the policy led to an increase in government 
budgets, which were influenced by legislators. The failure of the structural reforms 
highlights the difficulty of reform under a constitutional democracy which faced 
economic turmoil and political instability. The legislative process was particularly slow 
under the newly-restored bicameral legislature. There were no effective formal or 
informal procedures or rules to facilitate reaching a consensus on the priority of bills in 
the national interest. Under the constitutional democracy, the conflicts between the 
Executive and the Legislature became a serious obstacle to forming and implementing 
vital economic reforms.
Before the restoration of the Legislature, the Central Bank proposed amendments to 
banking laws to the President. The main objectives of the amendments to the Central 
Banking Act included: (1) to enhance the supervisory power of the Central Bank to 
prevent and penalise irregularities and fraud by banks; (2) to clarify the roles of the 
receiver and liquidator and their powers and privileges; (3) to impose stiffer penalties 
for submitting false statements and violation of laws and regulations; and (4) to prohibit 
banks with outstanding Central Bank emergency advances from expanding the total 
volume of its loans or investments, or granting new loans or renewals of existing loans 
(see Lamberte,1989:65). The Central Bank also submitted proposals for amendments to 
the General Banking Act, most of which focused on curbing insider abuses including 
DOSRI loans (ibid.).
However, the President was not keen to amend these laws by Presidential decree. 
President Aquino acted on only two of the recommendations; one was the clarification 
of the role and powers of the receiver and liquidator and the other related to inter-bank 
settlements. Mario B. Lamberte, the Deputy Director of the PIDS and a leading expert 
on the financial issues facing the country, explained that the President simply chose the 
two least controversial issues.18 Therefore, the fate of structural reform rested with the 
Legislature,
18 Interview, Dr. Mario Lamberte, 23 June 1998.
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After the Central Bank failed to persuade the President to amend the banking laws by 
presidential decree, the World Bank mission was invited in 1988 to evaluate the 
financial system of the Philippines. The mission endorsed the overall direction of the 
Central Bank's initiatives for structural reforms (see World Bank,1988). They agreed 
with most of the CB-initiated proposed amendments to the Central Bank Act and 
General Banking Act. The World Bank incorporated them into the set of conditions 
attached to the Financial Sector Adjustment Loan.
The recommendation by the World Bank mission covered a broad range of issues 
including (a) banking operations and financial conditions; (b) supervision and 
regulation of commercial banks; (c) supervision and regulation of securities market 
institutions; (d) legal issues affecting the Central Bank; (e) an enlarged role for the 
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; (f) legal issues involved in debt recovery 
and insolvencies; (g) a proposal to set up special courts for banking and insolvency 
cases; (h) a government / Central Bank-directed credit programme; and (i) gaps in 
financing selected real sectors (export finance, provision of long term credits and 
foreign exchange resources).19 With respect to the enhancement of the regulatory power 
of the Central Bank, the key recommendations included the following issues: rules on 
emergency advances to banks; criteria for bank insolvency; regulatory instruments, 
detecting and countering insider abuses; and protection of Central Bank officials from 
law suits.
However, the World Bank's support for structural reform in the banking sector was not
sufficient to push structural reforms through the legislative process. Under the Aquino
administration, the fate of structural reform was left largely in the hands of the
Legislature, since President Aquino was not keen to implement structural reform by
Presidential decree before the Legislature was restored in 1987. The legislative process
required to pass laws is "usually a long and tedious process, made more so, by the
present bicameral structure" of Legislature (de Leon, in Velasco,1989:96). Particularly
under the Aquino government, the legislative process was constrained by the
institutional inefficiency of the Legislature, newly-restored after more than fifteen year's
19 For details, see World Bank (document) (1988:155-164).
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closure, and the fierce conflicts between the Executive and the Legislature, particularly 
the Senate, over key legislation including foreign debt issues, land reforms, annual 
budgets and the U.S. bases issue.
These fierce conflicts can be understood in the context of the unique features of the 
Aquino government during the transitional period: the suspension of legislative 
elections between 1987 and 1992, and the continuing tradition of Philippine 
parliamentary politics, namely the lack of a strong political party which shared the 
legislative agenda and disciplined the voting decision of member legislators. The 1987 
elections demonstrated the popularity of President Aquino, who deposed Marcos. The 
elections resulted in a landslide victory for Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN), the pro-Aquino 
coalition party, which captured 150 of the 200 contested seats in the House and 22 of 
the 24 seats in the Senate. Aquino's popularity and widespread anti-Marcos sentiment 
were the main factors contributing to this landslide victory (see Velasco,1989:68). 
However, this victory in itself did not secure the successful promotion of the 
Executive's legislative agenda. LABAN itself was a broad coalition party with no 
common legislative agenda. Once elected, legislators did not need to cooperate with the 
President in order to ask for her support for immediate electoral purposes since there 
was no legislative election between 1987 and 1992. In addition, although the LABAN 
party's candidates were endorsed by the President in the elections, President Aquino did 
not belong to the party. President Aquino did not lead any political party which she 
could use to bridge the gap between the executive and legislative branches for her 
legislative agenda.
To understand the difficulty of implementing structural reform under the newly- 
restored democracy, it is worth briefly examining the legislative process involved in 
policy-making. Under the 1987 Constitution (Section 1, Article VI), the Congress is 
composed of two houses: the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate is a 
nationally-elected body with 24 seats. The House of Representatives is composed of 
not more than 250 members, to be apportioned on the basis of area and population. In
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the 1987 elections, 200 legislators were elected.20
Members of the Senate and the House can file bills for legislation on almost any 
subject. The Senate is generally expected to concentrate on legislation which is of 
national concern; the House of Representatives, in addition to national concern, tends to 
spend more time on bills of limited concern. These expectations reflect the 
responsibilities of each House, as stated in the Constitution. Under the 1987 
Constitution, all treaties or international agreements are ratified by the Senate (Section 
3, Article XVIII) while all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorising an 
increase in public debt, bills of local application and private bills are initiated by the 
House of Representatives (Section 24, Article VI). In the bicameral structure of the 
Congress, a bill has to be discussed and passed in both the House and Senate. Thus, 
two bills on the same issue, a House bill and a Senate Bill, are filed and discussed in 
each committee and on the floor of the House and the Senate.
Apart from making laws, the Legislature expresses its concern and declares its intention 
to act upon important issues facing the country by passing resolutions. A resolution is 
filed and is discussed in the Legislature, but a resolution, except for joint resolutions, 
does not constitute legislation and need not be presented to the President for approval. 
The 1987 Constitution also confers on the Senate and the House or any of their 
committees the power "to conduct inquiries in aid of legislations in accordance with its 
duly published rules of procedure" (Section 21 of Article VI). The so-called Blue 
Ribbon Committee of the Senate, otherwise known as the Committee on Accountability 
of Public Officers and Investigations, is responsible for the investigations into the 
conduct of public officers.21
A large amount of legislative work normally rests with the Committees. Every bill filed 
by a member of either the Senate or the House is referred to one or more committees. A
Committee is seen as a sub-division of Congress which prepares a piece of legislation
20 In addition to 200 seats, from the 1998 election, 50 representatives were elected through the party
list system, which essentially aimed to choose representatives from minority political organisations. 
Large parties were excluded from the party list system.
21 For an overview of the investigative function of the Senate and the Committee's activities during 
the first Congress after the restoration, see Salonga (1995:163-184).
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for enactment. Through study, discussion and public hearings in a Committee, a bill is 
finalised. The chair, who is appointed by the Speaker of the House, or the President of 
the Senate, who is elected by the members, is expected to play a vital role. At the eighth 
Congress, the first Congress after the restoration in 1987, the Senate had 35 permanent 
or standing Committees and the House had 43 committees. Since there were 24 
senators, each senator was heavily burdened with committee work. For the First 
Regular Session of the newly-restored Senate, each senator was a member of an 
average of 21 standing Committees. Fourteen of them were also Chairs of at least two 
committees. For the consideration of important issues, there tends to be less reliance on 
committee discussion in the Senate and more on deliberation from the floor, since there 
is little opportunity to discuss matters among Senators in a Committee. Senators are 
often occupied by their work for committees which they carry the responsibility of 
chairing. As substitutes for the Senators, their staff often attend other committees of 
which the Senators are members.
The final form of a bill is shaped by the Conference Committee, which is composed of 
selected members of both the Senate and House. In the Conference Committee, the 
points of difference between the House and Senate bills are discussed. It is expected 
that the House and Senate will reach agreement about the final form of a bill, although 
there is no stated rule as to how such a compromise should be reached. Neither the 
House nor Senate rules are clear on the extent to which the Conference Committee can 
settle differences. Legislative leaders, including Committee Chairs of the Senate and 
House, the Senate President and the Speaker of the House, play a crucial role in 
forming a final bill by settling the differences between the two bills, in particular in 
controversial cases.
The Failure of Central Bank Reform through the Legislative Process
The importance of structural reform in the banking sector had been broadly recognised 
after the economic crisis. In particular, the establishment of an independent monetary 
authority was seen as a critical and urgent task, due to fiscal and monetary 
mismanagement under the Marcos dictatorship. The 1987 Constitution states that:
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"The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, 
the members of whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino 
citizens, of known probity, integrity and patriotism, the majority of whom 
shall come from the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other 
qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority 
shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking and credit. It 
shall have supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such 
regulatory powers as may be provided by law over the operations of 
finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions" 
(Section 20, Article XII).
A bill relating to independent monetary authority was filed in the House on 9th May 
1988 by Exequiel B. Javier (Antique) who was chair of the Sub-Committee on the 
Banks, Currencies and Miscellaneous Matters.22 Javier was a former corporate lawyer 
who had experience in banking and financial businesses. He was one of the founders 
of the BONIFACIO human rights lawyers group. The filed bill was referred to the 
Committee on Government Reorganisation chaired by Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. (3rd 
District, Quezon), who was also a former corporate lawyer with a knowledge of 
banking. The reason why the bill was initially referred to the Committee on 
Government Reorganisation rather than to the Committee on Banks and Currencies was 
not clear. But a secretary of the Committee on Banks and Currencies points to the lack 
of coordination and inefficiency as a "bureaucratic" problem related to filing and 
allocating bills in the House.23 The filed bills are allocated to a Committee by the 
administration of the House, without consulting the author or committee. The author of 
the bill, Exequiel B. Javier, was often invited to the Committee on Government 
Reorganisation as a guest.
22 House Bill No. 9126, an Act amending Republic Act No. 265, was amended to establish the 
central monetary authority, defining its role, responsibilities, objectives and powers in the 
administration of the monetary, credit and banking system and for other purposes. Co-authors are 
Ramon S. Bagatsing, Jr. and Renato P. Dragon.
23 Interview, Atty. Ramon Federizon, 15 May 1997.
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The main points addressed by the amendments included:24 (1) the composition of the 
Monetary Board; (2) legal protection of Central Bank officials from legal action; (3) the 
enhancement of the Central Bank's powers to supervise banks including the power of 
investigation; (4) the imposition of stricter sanctions to prevent violation of banking 
laws; (5) the clarification of the PDIC's role as a receiver of closed banks; (6) the 
redefinition of the processes and criteria involved in bank closures; and (7) the 
provision of clearer rules for emergency loans. These were not dissimilar to the main 
points addressed by the previous recommendations of the Central Bank, although the 
Central Bank's recommendations did not include the issue of the composition of the 
membership of the Monetary Board.
In May 1988, the Committee started to discuss the bill intended to establish the Central 
Monetary Authority. However, its slow process could be seen as a typical example of 
the common perception of the legislative process. Although there were useful public 
hearings on key issues and position papers were submitted by various organisations 
and experts, the process of law-making was repeatedly delayed, particularly in the first 
two years. The Central Bank officials were regular participants in a resource capacity at 
the committee meetings. Governor Fernandez and deputy governors were often invited 
to the committee meetings.25 However, the Central Bank Bill was not given high priority 
among the other bills on which the Committee worked. The Committee dealt with a 
variety of bills and resolutions: for example, HB 24664 "The National Stud Farm"; HR 
924 "the Decentralisation Bill"; HB 5644 "An Act Creating the Department of Ethnic 
Affairs"; HB 28649 "The Creation of the Department of Energy"; and HB 532 
"Philippine Statistical System". In August 1989, three Subcommittees were created by 
the Committee, which still had a very large jurisdiction. For example, Subcommittee A, 
chaired by Enrico G. Dayanghirag, covered 24 institutions which were responsible for 
key development issues including education, agriculture, land reform, trade and industry
24 House Bill No. 9126 and Salient Features of H.B. No. 9126 prepared by Committee on 
Government Reorganisation.
25 Other key resource persons were officials from the Department of Finance and representatives of the 
Bankers Association of the Philippines. See Committee Records and Minutes of the Regular Meeting 
of Committee on Government Reorganisation on 2 June 1988; 13 September 1988; 29 November 
1988; 9 May 1989; 18 May 1989; 25 May 1989; 6 June 1989; 8 August 1989; 18 September 1989; 
and 29 March 1990.
156
and finance.26
The Executive had deliberately kept a distance from legislation concerned with the 
Central Monetary Authority. Although the Committee requested the Executive to 
submit a position paper or comments on the bill, Executive Secretary Catalino 
Macaraig, Jr. politely declined the request. Macaraig explained that, since the 1987 
Constitution (Article XII, Section 20) urged the establishment of an independent central 
monetary authority, providing comments on the bill "could be construed as being in 
violation of the independent central monetary authority".27
The slow process by which legislation moved through the House was a matter of 
serious concern for the Central Bank, Department of Finance and the Bankers 
Association of the Philippines. They asked the Committee to act on HB9126 at the 
earliest possible opportunity.28 The author of the bill, Rep. Javier, also shared this 
concern and expressed the opinion that the Committee on Banks and Currencies would 
be in a better position to deliberate on the bill.29 With the co-operation of the Committee 
on Banks and Currencies, a bill (HB30508) which substituted HB 9126 with minor 
changes was filed and the Committee Report on the bill was submitted in September
26 For the membership list and jurisdiction of these three subcommittees, see Committee Records and 
Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Committee on Government Reorganisation on 8 August 1989. 
The jurisdiction of Subcommittee A included: Department of Agriculture; Department of Agrarian 
Reform; Department of Environment and Natural Resources; Department of Education, Culture and 
Sports; Department of Trade and Industry; National Economic and Development Authority;
Department of Finance; Department of Budget and Management; Energy Regulatory Board; Games and 
Amusements Board; National Computer Centre; National Statistical Coordination Board; National 
Stud Farm; Office of Energy Affairs; Securities and Exchange Commission; Presidential Commission 
on Culture and Arts; Presidential Commission on Good Government; Presidential Committee on the 
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant; Presidential Management Staff; Sacobia Development Authority; 
President's Centre for Social Studies; Philippine Deposit Insurance Coiporation; Philippine High 
School for the Arts and Southern Philippine Development Authority.
37 See Letter from Catalino Macaraig, Jr. (Executive Secretary) to Bienvenido O. Marquez (Chairman, 
Committee on Government Reorganisation, House of Representatives) on 21 October 1988.
28 See Committee Records and Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Committee on Government 
Reorganisation on 18 September 1989.
29 Internal Memo (Code:GIC011), Committee on Government Reorganisation of 21 March 1990: 
"Minutes of the Meeting with the CB Governor Cuisia".
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1990 for a second reading.30 After a prolonged delay, the House Bill was finally 
approved by the House on 24 October 1991 and transmitted to the Senate for debate in 
the Conference Committee. However, it should be noted that the bill concentrated on the 
question of the Monetary Board and the enhancement of the Central Bank's regulatory 
powers. Some critical provisions, such as the transfer of the Central Bank's losses, 
which had become a highly controversial issue from late 1990, were not discussed by 
the House.
The legislative process in the Senate was even slower than that in the House and the 
Senate did not respond promptly to the passage of the bill in the House. Since the 
Senate bill was not finalised, the Conference Committee was not held for discussion of 
the bill. The fate of the bill and of the proposal to establish an independent Central 
Monetary Authority was left in the hand of the next Congress and Executive. The 
Senate's inaction was a result largely of its limited legislative capacity and, more 
importantly, the fierce conflicts between the Senate vis-a-vis the President and the 
Central Bank. After the restoration of the Congress, the Senate Committee on Banks, 
Financial Institutions and Currencies chaired by Alberto G. Romulo, had started to 
prepare the bill to establish an Independent Central Monetary Authority. However, the 
process of the legislation in the Senate was even slower than it had been in the House. 
By September 1989, the bill had not yet been filed, although the Committee had started 
to call for position papers from various organisations and experts on the unnumbered 
bill.31
The first public hearing of the Senate Bill to amend the Central Bank Act, with experts 
including the Central Bank governor, was held in October 1990 after the Committee 
Reports of the House on this issue had been submitted and the Second Reading had 
scheduled. According to Sen. Romulo, the Central Bank was partly responsible for the
delay, since the Committee did not receive a response from the Central Bank for a long
30 House Bill No. 30508, an Act amending Republic Act No. 265, as amended to establish a Central 
Monetary Authority which shall be known as the Central Bank, defining its role, responsibilities, 
objectives and powers in the administration of the monetary, credit and banking system and for other 
purposes. Twelve other members of the House are co-authors.
31 For example, the BAP submitted its position papers and comments on both the House Bill 
(H.B.9126) and the unnumbered Senate Bill in September 1989.
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time after the Committee had asked the Central Bank for comments on their bill in 
February or March 1990.32 The Senate Committee filed two bills, S.B. 1514 and S.B. 
1515, to amend the Central Bank Act (R.A. 265). S.B. 1514 focused on provisions 
regarding the Monetary Board and addressed the issue of the independence of the 
Central Bank. S.B. 1515 included provisions to amend the whole of the existing law.
Although the House Bill seemed to be the outcome of close cooperation between the 
House Committee and the Central Bank, the Senate Bill included some provisions 
which were very different from the Central Bank's position.33 For instance, the bill 
stated that the minutes of the Monetary Board meetings should be released within five 
days without any restrictions. Although the Central Bank agreed with the principle of 
transparency, the disclosure of information without any limitations was unacceptable 
for a monetary authority which dealt with sensitive monetary issues. Also, in the Senate 
bill, the Central Bank governor who chaired the Monetary Board was different from the 
head of the Central Bank who was called a Chief Executive Officer.
The structural problems of the bicameral Congress were among the main factors behind 
the slow functioning of the Senate Committee. Since there were only twenty-four 
senators, many of them chair two committees. Alberto Romulo chaired both the 
Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currency and the Committee on Social 
Justice, Welfare and Development. He was also vice-chairman of three Committees (on 
Finance; Labour, Employment and Human Resources; and Local Government) and a 
member of twenty-four other committees. The Senate floor tends to be the place for 
lively discussion among senators, since they do not have many opportunities to argue in 
Committee meetings. Senators are also active in considering various issues of national 
concern, apart from law-making. Romulo's Committee was very active in investigating 
the financial issues of the day, for example, the transfer of the CB's debts to the national
32 See Senate Committee Records: Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies on 25 
October 1990.
33 See Senate Committee Records: the Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies 
on 25 October 1990.
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government,34 foreign currency loans to the oil companies,35 and high interest rates.36
In addition to these problems, it must be stressed that fierce conflicts concerning 
financial issues between the Executive and the Senate can be seen as a critical factor 
with regard to the slowness of the Committee and the distance between the Committee 
and the Central Bank.
The Committee chairman, Alberto Romulo, was a lawyer and CPA-holder. He was 
elected to the Batasang Pambansa in the 1984 elections and was a pillar of the 
opposition to the Marcos regime. Romulo was also a former member of the Monetary 
Board as the Secretary of Budget and Management under the first Aquino Cabinet until 
he resigned from the post to run for a Senator's position in the May 1987 elections. He 
recognised the importance of an independent monetary authority. He stressed the vital 
importance of the Central Monetary Authority in a Committee Meeting.37 Nonetheless, 
the Chairman did not place the issue of an independent monetary authority high up the 
list of the Committee's priorities. For the chairman, it was clear that the foreign debt 
issue was the most important of the various issues related to financial institutions and 
monetary policies.
The foreign debt had been the most controversial financial issue under the Aquino 
administration and a source of fierce conflict between the Senate and the Executive 
from the early period of the restoration of the Legislature. The Senate firmly opposed 
Aquino's policy on the foreign debt issue, but the Aquino administration did not alter its
34 For a summary of the problem, see The Manila Chronicle, 23 May 1990, "Policy Lessons from 
CB's losses" by Benjamin E. Diokno (Undersecretary, Department of Budget and Management and 
Professor, School of Economics, the University of the Philippines). See, also Senate Committee 
Records: the Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies on 16 May 1990, 21 May 
1990 and 23 May 1990.
35 See Senate Committee Records: the Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies on 
27 September 1990.
36 See Senate Committee Records: the Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies 
on 17 January 1991.
37 He mentioned that "it becomes more obvious now that a Central Monetary Authority really must 
be passed". See Senate Committee Records: the Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and 
Currencies on 23 May 1990.
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policy, which had been adopted on the recommendation of the Central Bank and the 
Department of Finance, The Senate filed resolutions to express its opposition to the 
Executive on this issue from 1987 to 1991, until the end of the eighth Congress (the 
first Congress after the restoration). For example, the Senate filed S.R. 44 in 1988 to 
express its disagreement with foreign debt policy.38 S.R. 148 was also filed in late 1990 
to investigate the country's foreign loan portfolio and determine which loans were 
fraudulently obtained or guaranteed.39 The fierce conflict over the issue of debt 
repayment reached its height when the Congress enacted the 1992 General 
Appropriations Act, which included a provision for the suspension of payment on a 
loan contracted for the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. The President vetoed certain items 
in the 1992 General Appropriations Act. The Congress tried to override the presidential 
veto, although the attempt failed.
Sen. Alberto Romulo and his Committee took strong initiatives to investigate the 
problem of fraudulent loans under the Marcos government. Sen. Romulo was a leading 
advocate for partial debt repayment, which put him in opposition to government and 
Central Bank policy. There was fierce disagreement between Sen. Romulo and 
governor Fernandez on this issue. In addition, in the early 1990s, the Senate's ability to 
enact the bill was severely undermined by the US bases issue, which resulted in the 
most controversial decision taken by the Senate during the Aquino Presidency and 
dominated its discussions between Februaiy and September 1991 (see Salonga,1995, 
Chapter 9).
The necessity of Central Bank reform seemed not to be very controversial, since it was 
broadly supported after the failure of the Central Bank to regulate the banking sector 
under the Marcos government, particularly in the first half of the 1980s, The 1987 
Constitution clearly stated that an independent monetary authority should be
established by the Congress. The IMF and the World Bank were supportive of the
38 The S.R. 44: "Resolution to Express the Sense of the Senate to Suspend, Avoid, and Disengage 
from Any Further Payments on the Balance of the Debt Incurred in Connection with the Philippine 
Nuclear Power Plant, Pending the Formulation of a National Consensus on Our Foreign Debt 
Problem, and to Seek the Final Condonation of, or Definitive Relief from, the Said Balance."
39 For the discussion of this resolution, see Senate Committee Records: the Committee on Banks, 
Financial Institutions and Currencies on 28 November 1990.
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reform. In particular, the World Bank encouraged reform through the Financial Sector 
Adjustment Loan and the Central Bank was keen to advocate reform to enhance its 
regulatory powers. The BAP, which represented the banking sector (big commercial 
banks in particular), was also in favour of reform.
Nevertheless, structural reform was not implemented. After a long tradition of executive 
dominance in policy-making under the Marcos authoritarian regime, Aquino was very 
selective in her use of Presidential power to implement structural reform while she held 
absolute law-making power. The President was not keen to enforce her will on the 
legislative process in a decisive way. Once they were elected, legislators did not need to 
be cooperative with the President's legislative agenda in order to ask her to support 
them in immediate elections, since there no legislative elections were held until 1992. In 
addition, the President did not head any political party which could act as a bridge 
between the Executive and Legislative branches as she sought to push through her 
legislative agenda. Although the Executive attempted to improve coordination with the 
Legislature to prioritise bills,40 it had only limited success. The House approved a bill 
(HB 8697) to establish a joint Executive-Legislative Development Council (ELDC), 
which aimed to provide greater coordination in government, in terms of economic and 
political reform planning and implementation. However, the President did not endorse 
the establishment of the ELDC. The President tended to emphasise the importance of 
the separation of the Executive and Legislative branches of the democratic government. 
Under the newly-restored constitutional democratic system, without a strong 
Presidential initiative, the government, which lacked the formal and informal procedures 
and rules needed to prioritise economic reforms and suffered from the lack of 
coordination between the Executive and the Legislature, was not able to implement the 
vital reform.
Conclusion
The Aquino government had a mixed record in terms of banking sector reform. 
Although the key structural reforms, including amendments to the Central Bank Act
and General Banking Act, were not implemented by the government, the banking sector
40 For example, the President established the Legislative Liaison System, see PMS (1992b: 18-22).
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experienced radical changes during this period. Soon after Aquino came to power, the 
insolvent state banks, which were left in ruin by the former dictator, were rehabilitated 
and their presence was significantly reduced. After an initial recovery of the economy, 
the Central Bank facilitated the liberalisation of the banking sector through various 
regulatory reforms. The banking sector was revitalised by the economic recovery, the 
elimination of Marcos's crony banks, a reduction in the state bank's presence, the entry 
of new commercial banks and the establishment of new branches and new banking 
businesses such as those dealing with remittances from Filipino workers in foreign 
countries.
As "restorationists" claim, there was strong continuity in Philippine society, politics and 
the economy in the transition from Marcos to Aquino. The transition did not affect "the 
social structure" in terms of the concentration of wealth. In spite of the regime change, 
the family backgrounds of the political elites were largely unchanged. President Aquino 
tended to rely on familial ties to consolidate support in the Legislature for the 
government, although they were not always supportive. She had relatives in both the 
Senate (a brother-in-law) and the House (a brother, an uncle, a cousin and sister-in- 
law). Her husband's close friends and relatives also occupied important posts in the 
government. In addition, businesses which opposed the domination of Marcos's cronies 
and supported the "EDSA revolution" had a decisive advantage, benefitting from policy 
reforms such as the redirection of active state interventionism, privatisation and 
liberalisation, although Aquino's "cronyism" was very different from that of Marcos in 
terms of its plurality, accountability and volume.
Nevertheless, the transition triggered a critical change in economic policy and policy­
making. The Aquino government first took strong initiatives to alter the economic 
policy adopted by the Marcos government. Under the new economic development 
strategy, the government reduced state involvement in major export commodities and 
financial markets. In addition to popular support for the Aquino government, which 
terminated the long term dictatorship by extraordinary means, this redirection of 
economic policy generated broad support from the US government, the IMF, the World 
Bank and other donor countries. With regard to foreign debt policy, the US 
government used its strong influence to assume full responsibility for all foreign debts
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left by the previous government. However, once the Philippine government adopted the 
US (and other creditors) recommended foreign debt policy, the US, the IMF, the World 
Bank and other donor countries were supportive of the economic policy of the Aquino 
government. The continuing US security concern also helps to explain this support. 
Due to this broad support, the government was able to adopt an expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policy to stimulate the economy, which had been in severe recession during 
the previous two years. Economic recovery was a vital precondition to rebuilding the 
banking sector.
Importantly, the transition triggered a change in the relationships between the President 
and the Central Bank. Unlike her predecessor, President Aquino did not intervene 
directly in Central Bank decisions on banking policy and also supported the Central 
Bank in its foreign debt policy. After fierce conflict over the key economic issues and 
frequent reshuffles of her Cabinet, a consensus on liberalisation measures as the key 
strategy to attract foreign investment and to promote exports emerged in the early 
1990s. Faced with a declining economy and continuing political instability, and losing 
the "special" support of the US government, the government decided to facilitate 
liberalisation reform to improve the economy in the early 1990s. After the consensus 
among Monetary Board and Cabinet members had emerged, it was not very difficult for 
the Central Bank to initiate regulatory reforms, including various deregulation and 
liberalisation measures to activate the banking sector.
However, the Aquino government was not capable of implementing structural reform in 
the banking sector through the legislative process, after the Legislature was restored. 
The legislative process was constrained by the lack of effective procedures and rules 
necessary to facilitate prompt legislative action. Since there were no legislative elections 
between 1987 and 1992, legislators did not need to be cooperative with the President in 
order to secure her support for immediate electoral purposes in the early years. 
Structural reform was further discouraged by the fierce conflict between the Executive 
and the Legislature. The Central Bank reform was left to the next administration as an 
important phase in the task of developing the economy and the banking sector.
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Chapter 5.
Banking Sector Reform under the Ramos Government (Part I):
The Establishment of the New Central Bank (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
Introduction
Under the Ramos government, the Philippine economy made an impressive recovery. 
The banking sector expanded as the economy grew. After the currency crisis of 1997, 
although the economy faced a downturn, the government was able to manage the macro 
economic shocks relatively well. After the currency crisis, the banking sector showed 
relative stability, although the vulnerability of one state bank, namely the PNB, was 
revealed. The various efforts to reform the economy helped to moderate the economic 
shocks. The economic strategy based on liberalisation and the enhancement of the 
regulatory power necessary to expand exports and attract foreign investments had been 
initiated by the Aquino government. Under the Ramos government, liberalisation was 
consolidated with broad support as a major policy thrust. The establishment of a more 
independent Central Bank enhanced the regulatory power of the monetary authority and 
led to relative monetary stability. The Ramos government became the first 
administration to implement key structural reforms in the banking sector through the 
legislative process. The establishment of the New Central Bank, the Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas, and the entry of new foreign banks had been critical reforms for the 
development of the banking sector since the Central Bank was established in 1949. 
They were landmark laws which reflected the successful promotion of the key 
principles of banking reform since 1986: the liberalisation of the banking sector and the 
enhancement of the Central Bank's regulatory power.
This chapter and the following chapter examine the key structural reforms, the 
establishment of the New Central Bank and the entry of new foreign banks respectively, 
and seek to address a key question: how was the Ramos government able to implement 
these critical reforms which contributed to the improvement of the economy and the 
banking sector?
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The Central Bank has long been a key regulatory authority of the Philippine economy. 
The Central Bank has drafted monetary policy, influenced the foreign exchange rate, 
regulated the banking sector and protected financial stability. The Central Bank has 
been playing a critical role in the control of the growth of the economy for many 
decades. The state has not behaved entirely as a unitary actor in the economy. Yet, the 
case of the Central Bank remains relevant to the study of the development of the state 
apparatus as a regulatory authority.
The establishment of the new Central Bank was seen as "the most fundamental 
structural reform" in the financial system (Singson, 1994:2). The Central Bank was 
financially restructured and improved its capability to manage the macro economy. The 
New Central Bank was established as a more independent body to pursue the primary 
objective of price stability. The Central Bank also enhanced its regulatory power as a 
monetary authority over other banks.
International factors including support (or pressures) from the US government, the 
IMF, the World Bank and other donor countries were influential in promoting (or 
impeding) economic reforms. Economic reform should thus be examined in the context 
of changing international factors. In particular, the Ramos era was a period of critical 
changes in the international arena. With the end of Cold War, US security interests in 
developing countries changed.1 In the Philippine context, the US military bases, which 
had been the foundation for the special relationship between the Philippines and the 
US, no longer existed.2 The Philippine government lost the generous support it had 
received from the US government as a consequence of the special relationship. The 
event became a catalyst, moving the economy in a new direction and facilitating further 
the process of liberal reform which had been initiated under the Aquino government. 
The Ramos government, which faced the loss of "special" support from the US 
government, promoted liberalisation and Central Bank reform to attract foreign 
investment and loans.
1 Needless to say, US security interests have changed significantly since the events of September 11.
2 For the argument which stresses this dimension as a cause of the Ramos reform, see, for example, 
Hutchcroft (1998:244-245).
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Yet these changes in the international environment should not be seen as the sole factor 
underlying the push towards structural reforms in the economy and banking sector. 
The Ramos government was committed to the reforms for reasons relating to its own 
political and economic agenda, which was formulated in the political and economic 
conditions of the Philippines. As noted in the previous chapter, the importance of 
Central Bank reform had been recognised since the mid-1980s, after the role of the 
Central Bank, in maintaining monetary stability and in regulating banks, was severely 
undermined under the Marcos government. However, despite strong support from the 
IMF, the World Bank and local businesses including banks, the Aquino government 
failed to implement this critical reform mainly due to the deadlock between the 
Executive and the Legislature, in particular the Senate.
In the following section, the problems of the Central Bank and the proposals leading to 
the Central Bank reform are first examined. Then, the legislative process involved in the 
establishment of the New Central Bank is analysed. In the final section, various factors 
centring on changing political institutions and the interactions among policy elites are 
examined to explain the successful implementation of the Central Bank reform. In brief, 
the successful central bank reform under the Ramos government was contingent on a 
new constellation of political institutions emerging as a consequence of the 
establishment of the 1987 Constitution. This new constellation strengthened the 
interests and capacities of the President, the centre of the government, and weakened the 
potential for resistance among legislators.
The Establishment of the New Central Bank
The establishment of the New Central Bank (or Central Monetary Authority: CMA) 
was one of most important reforms in the Philippine banking sector. This was the first 
key structural reform of the regulatory authority which included amendments to the law 
under constitutional democracy in the Philippines since the Central Bank Act was 
passed in 1948, This reform had two key objectives: the establishment of an 
independent monetary authority and the financial restructuring of the Central Bank.
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The definition and measurement of Central Bank independence is still a contentious 
issue.3 The Central Bank cannot be entirely independent from the government and there 
are close links between fiscal and monetary policy. However, the independence of the 
Central Bank can be a useful concept in examining the development of the regulatory 
authority. Central Bank independence can be defined in a variety ways, depending on 
the type of central bank operation (see Maxfield,1997:6). They can be divided into two 
main categories: the extent of independence from government and independence from 
regulated banks. The former directly affects the central bank's ability to control the 
money supply. The latter influences the effective regulation and supervision of the 
financial sector. It must be noted that, in Philippine banking history, the Central Bank's 
independence from the government has had a significant impact on the independence 
from regulated banks, particularly until the mid-1980s, since the state banks have had a 
large presence in the banking sector. In addition, the owners and management of private 
commercial banks often try to use close connections with the government, the President 
in particular, to obtain personal favours.
The independence of the Central Bank cannot be secured by legislation alone. As seen 
in the previous chapters, the transition from Marcos to Aquino helped to secure the 
Central Bank's independence, since the new President, unlike President Marcos, did not 
intervene directly in the Central Bank's decisions. The reduction in direct credit 
allocation through the Central Bank also helped to protect the Central Bank from 
political interference. Yet, the legislation provides the basic rules needed to define the 
Central Bank's regulatory powers and the relationship between the Central Bank and 
the government. In the Philippines, the legislation that created the new Central Bank 
was a critical step forward in the enhancement of the regulatory power of the Central 
Bank and its independence vis-a-vis the government and regulated banks.
In the Philippines, the importance of an independent monetary authority had been
recognised after the drastic failures of fiscal and monetary policy under the late Marcos
administration. Faced with economic crisis, the Central Bank was not able to maintain
3 For this controversy, see Maxfield (1997); Fry, Goodhart and Almedia (1996); and Cukierman 
(1992).
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monetary and banking stability. The monetary and fiscal expansion fuelled high 
inflation. The implementation of economic stabilisation measures were repeatedly 
postponed by the President's intervention, due to the legislative elections in 1984. The 
Central Bank had essentially served the President's interests under the dictatorship. As 
a result of this experience, the 1987 Constitution clearly stated that the "Congress shall 
establish an independent monetary authority" (Section 20, Article XII). Since the 
Fernandez era (1984-1990) recommendations had been made urging the Central Bank 
to strengthen its regulatory power through the establishment of an independent 
monetary authority. Key reform measures included: (1) Monetary Board reforms 
(more representatives from the private sector on the Monetary Board); (2) enhancement 
of supervision of banks; (3) improvements in the regulation of emergency loans, 
receiverships and liquidations; (4) legal protection for Central Bank officials; (5) higher 
penalties against illegalities; (6) prevention of irresponsible DOSRI loans; and (7) 
prohibition against development financing.
With respect to the independence of the Central Bank, the termination of development 
finance and Monetary Board reform were important measures. The Central Bank 
cannot be entirely independent from the government. However, the termination of the 
development finance helped the Bank to maintain a distance from political affairs. 
Under the new legislation, the Central Bank's function as the government's fiscal 
agency was more strictly limited than before. The majority representation of non- 
Cabinet members on a full-time basis also had advantages. The changes of Cabinet 
members, which were often caused by various political conflicts, would not affect the 
membership of the Monetary Board. Thus the Monetary Board could maintain a 
greater distance from political conflicts. Due to their full-time membership, the 
Monetary Board members could play a more important role in conducting and 
supervising the Central Bank's operations.
In the previous Congress, a bill to create an independent monetary authority was 
discussed both in the House and the Senate. The House succeeded in drafting a final 
bill for the Bicameral Conference Committee. However, the Committee did not meet 
since the Senate would not finalise their bill by the end of the Eighth Congress. The
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IMF and the World Bank consistently supported the Central Bank’s position through 
their lending activities. The establishment of the independent monetary authority was 
one of the conditions for the second tranche of the World Bank's Financial Sector 
Adjustment Loan, which was agreed in May 1989. Since the Aquino government failed 
to establish independent monetary authority, the release of the second tranche was 
repeatedly postponed.
The problem of the losses of the Central Bank was also an old problem and the World 
Bank's report of 1986 expressed concern over this problem.4 The problem had been a 
matter of concern between the Central Bank and the World Bank and the IMF during 
the Aquino era. They discussed a plan to transfer part of the losses to the national 
government and the Senate Committee had a public hearing on this matter in May 
1990.5 However, the Central Bank underestimated the potential risks of the problem. 
According to governor Cuisia, they started to discuss this matter seriously among 
Monetary Board members from August 1991 and it was only in 1992 that the Central 
Bank submitted its proposal to the Monetary Board.6
As seen in the previous chapter, under the Aquino government the Central Bank 
formulated monetary policy and regulated the banking sector more autonomously since, 
unlike the Marcos government, the Aquino government did not directly intervene in 
Central Bank operations. The Aquino government fully supported the Central Bank's 
position on the foreign debt repayment issue, which had been highly controversial. 
However, structural reforms were not implemented under the Aquino government in 
spite of the Central Bank's advocacy and the support of the IMF and the World Bank. 
The lack of strong initiatives from the President, the fierce conflict between the 
President and the legislative leaders and the inefficiency of the newly restored 
Legislature caused a significant delay to the reform.
4 See The Manila Chronicle, 15 September 1986, "CB deficits mount due to 'Jobo' bills".
5 See Committee Records: Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 16th 
May 1990.
6 See Committee Records: Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 
December 1992, pp.46-47.
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After Ramos took power, the new government swiftly moved to implement this critical 
reform. The Ramos government took the bold initiative of reforming the banking sector 
and tried hard to cooperate with the legislature to enact key legislation. The Central 
Bank was also very keen to advocate reform, as the problem of the Central Bank's 
accumulating losses grew worse. Facing economic downturn and high inflation rates, 
the Central Bank emphasised the importance of the establishment of an independent 
monetary authority as a first priority after the foreign debt problems became a less 
serious matter for the economy. The Central Bank formulated its own draft bill to 
establish the New Central Bank and presented the bill to the President and to the 
Legislature, both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Central Bank's 
proposal was backed by the government and was influential in the drafting of bills in 
the House and the Senate. In order to gain a better understanding of this extraordinary 
event, the "bankruptcy" of the Central Bank and its restructuring, the causes of the huge 
losses and the proposal to restructure the Central Bank are analysed in the following 
section.
The Central Bank Proposal
Due to a series of discussions in the previous Congress and a statement in the 1987 
Constitution, there had been a broad consensus on the importance of the creation of an 
independent monetaiy authority. However, the financial restructuring of the Central 
Bank was a veiy controversial issue, due to the potential losses of public funds. The 
Central Bank claimed that its losses stemmed largely from economic policy during the 
economic crisis between 1983 and 1985 under the Marcos government. The main 
causes of the losses were: (1) the foreign exchange loss caused by the devaluation of 
the peso; (2) the costs incurred by rescue operations to banks and financial institutions; 
(3) the various forms of subsidies to the National Government; and (4) interest
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payments for high-yielding Central Bank Bills.7
The Congressional Planning and Budget Office, which is the research body of the 
House, investigated the causes of the Central Bank losses.8 The most detailed CPBO 
report on the Central Bank losses divided the losses into four categories: losses on 
forward exchange cover (P51.6 billion); servicing CB foreign liabilities (P77 billion); 
concessional loans to exporters and other priority sectors and losses on monetary 
operations including Central Bank bills (P101 billion) and opportunity losses such as 
"losses" due to CB's holding low yielding National Government Securities (PI05 
billion).9
The Central Bank's ability to control the money supply and to curb inflation began to 
be impaired in the 1970s as the country's current account tilted towards a deficit. At the 
end of the 1970s, the current account deficit was accumulating as the country's import 
expenses exceeded foreign currency gained from exports, grants and other sources. As 
the imbalance worsened, the Central Bank had to face the problem of an increase in the 
prices of essential goods and a decrease in the Bank's foreign exchange reserves. In 
addition, at that time, the economy faced oil price hikes and a decrease in the price of 
export commodities. To address these problems, the Central Bank undertook forward 
cover and swap arrangements. In effect, the Central Bank took risks of foreign 
exchange loss through these operations.
7 For the Central Bank's explanation, see The Central Bank, Script For A Computer Presentation on 
Video Tape (Audio Video): "Toward An Independent Central Monetary Authority" presented at Senate 
Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 December 1992 and House Joint 
Committee of Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries and Committee on Economic Affairs, 
23 November 1992, hereafter referred to as the Central Bank, Video Script; House Committee on 
Economic Affairs, "Understanding and Addressing the Huge CB Deficit" prepared for a joint 
committee: Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions and Committee on Economic Affairs; and 
Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 December 
1992.
8 See Congressional Planning and Budget Office (CPBO), "Central Bank Losses and the Proposed 
Central Monetary Authority", submitted to the House Committee on Banks and Financial 
Intermediaries, on 11 March 1993.
9 See Table 5-1 "CB Loss / Special Accounts".
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Through forward cover operations the Central Bank enabled the prices of oil, grains 
and other essential commodities to remain stable by providing fixed rate foreign 
exchange to importers of these products.10 In effect, the Central Bank subsidised the 
prices of these goods by assuming the foreign exchange risk. According to the Central 
Bank, losses on forward exchange cover amounted to P51.6 billion including cover for 
local oil companies (P 41.9 billion), cover for the National Food Authority (P 7.6 
billion) and cover for the National Steel Corp. (P 2.1 billion).11 Swap contracts were 
basically a measure to shore up the Central Bank's dollar reserves. On the swap 
contracts, received foreign exchange from banks was replaced by pesos at the prevailing 
exchange rate.12 At an agreed future date, the Central Bank was supposed to give back 
the foreign exchange to banks at a predetermined rate. In this operation, the Central 
Bank blocked the peso deposits to keep inflation manageable by limiting the supply of 
pesos in circulation. The Central Bank paid interest on the blocked pesos while they 
were not delivering.13
In 1983, the importance of forward cover and swap arrangements intensified under the 
foreign debt crisis. After the assassination of Benigno Aquino, Jr., political instability 
fuelled capital flight and further slimmed the country's foreign credit line. The peso was 
devalued a second time in that year. In October, the government declared a moratorium 
on the payment of principal on foreign commercial bank debts. Because of the lack of 
dollars, public and private sector debtors could not pay their foreign obligations as they 
matured. Under the foreign debt crisis, these debtors were allowed to deposit pesos 
equivalent to their amortisation of reschedulable loans at prevailing exchange rates in 
the Central Bank.14 In effect, the Bank assumed the payment of interest and the foreign 
exchange risk on the portion of liabilities covered by the peso deposits. In this 
operation, the Central Bank also blocked the peso deposits to keep inflation manageable 
by limiting the supply of pesos in circulation. Because of this peso blocking, the
10 See the Central Bank, Video Script, p.2.
" See Table 5-1 "CB Loss / Special Accounts".
12 See the Central Bank, Video Script, p.2.
13 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 
December 1992, p.34.
14 See the Central Bank, Video Script, p.2.
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Central Bank lost opportunities to gain interest income. Losses on these foreign loans 
due to the peso devaluation amounted to P77 billion.
Second, the massive rescue operations to financial institutions during the economic 
crisis also caused huge losses.15 The Central Bank provided massive funds to distressed 
financial institutions in various ways to restore public confidence in the financial 
system under the Marcos government. The Central Bank noted that most of the funds 
advanced to those banks remain outstanding to this day, although the CB did not 
specify the amounts of rescue funds and recipient banks.
Third, the losses of the Central Bank were aggravated by the Marcos government's 
heavy reliance on the monetary authority for budgetary support. The Central Bank 
granted loans at preferential rates: (1) to finance massive public sector spending in the 
1970s; (2) to prop up agriculture and exports; and (3) to help rehabilitate distressed 
industries and government corporations.16 As a result, the Central Bank had to carry 
various low-yielding government securities in its portfolio. For example, the Central 
Bank purchased 2 and 4 per cent bonds for public works (PW & ED bonds) while the 
CB bill's interest was between 20 - 40 per cent during the crisis years, 1983 to 1985.17 
In addition, the Central Bank claimed that many hidden subsidies had been provided to 
the national government. For instance, the Central Bank provided the national 
government with P6 billion as interest-free subscription loans. This loan was a payment 
of the quota for membership of the IMF which had recently increased.18
Fourth, these quasi-fiscal lending operations and emergency rescue operations led to 
monetary expansion which forced the Central Bank to "mop up" at great cost. The 
"Jobo Bill", which was issued in 1984, yielded more than 40 per cent interest to curb
15 See the Central Bank, Video Script, p.3.
16 See the Central Bank, Video Script, p.3.
17 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3
December 1992, p. 16.
18 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3
December 1992, p.45.
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the extremely high inflation.19 These high-yielding debt instruments necessitated large 
interest payments which in turn led to renewed monetary expansion. Thus, "the Central 
Bank finds itself in a vicious cycle where it continuously incurs costs to mop up the 
liquidity created by interest expenses that go with mopping up operations".20
The losses which were caused by emergency loans, concessional loans and other 
monetary operations amounted to P101 billion.21 In addition, according to the Central 
Bank, other "losses" due to the CB holding low-yielding National Government 
Securities came to P I05 billion.
These Central Bank losses were recorded in three special accounts as "assets" on its 
balance sheet. The three special accounts included the Monetary Adjustment Account 
(MAA), the Exchange Stabilisation Adjustment Account (ESAA), and the Revaluation 
of International Reserve Accounts (RIR).2Z Extraordinary expenses placed in the MAA, 
ESAA and RIR rose from PI 1.8 billion at the end of 1982 to P302.5 billion by the end 
of 1991 (MAA: P48.5 billion, ESAA:P87.8 billion and RIR: P166.3 billion). Since the 
early 1980s, the Central Bank had continued to amortise the MAA and ESAA 
accounts.23 From 1982 to 1991, this amortisation had reached a total of P38.2 billion. 
As the Bank's net profits improved, amortisation increased significantly. In the three 
years proceeding the inauguration of Ramos as President, the total amortisation reached 
P23.5 billion: P2.7 billion in 1989, P10.2 billion in 1990 and P10.6 billion in 1991. 
The sharp increase in the amortisation was largely caused by a debt buyback package, 
with foreign creditors help, to reduce its interest payments in 1990 and 1991. The 
remaining foreign obligations were to be converted into longer-term bonds with 
relatively low interest rates.24
19 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 
December 1992, p. 15.
20 See the Central Bank, Video Script, p.4.
21 See Table 5-1 "CB Loss / Special Accounts".
22 For the functions and accumulations of these three accounts, see Appendix 5-1 at the end of this 
chapter.
23 See the Central Bank, Video Script, p.7.
24 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 
December 1992, p.88.
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Apart from the debt buyback package, the Central Bank claimed that it had been taking 
various measures to minimise potential losses including: the transformation of the 
major credit programmes to government financial institutions; improvements in policy 
to support weak banks; the abolition of forward cover contracts for oil and other 
imports; and administrative cost reductions including organisational reforms.25
The Central Bank argued that although these efforts were helpful, they were not enough 
to lower its extraordinary expenses to a level where it could conduct its monetary 
management functions normally.26 Since further debt reduction through negotiations 
with foreign creditors could not be expected, further accumulation of losses led to 
higher inflation.27 Thus, legislative action to eliminate the deficits was urgent.
The Central Bank stressed the following merits of the creation of the New Central 
Bank. First of all, a financial restructuring would improve the macroeconomic condition 
through lower reserve requirements, lower intermediation costs and a reduction in 
interest rates.28 The Central Bank's extraordinary expenses would continue to exert 
tremendous expansionary pressure on the money supply, which would have to be 
mopped up through an increase in reserve requirements and open market operations. 
Reducing this expansionary pressure would lead to lower reserve requirements and 
lower intermediation costs, which in future would help to reduce interest rates and 
inflation. These improvements in macroeconomic conditions would encourage more 
investment and thereby create jobs for more Filipinos.
Second, the creation of an independent monetary authority was essential to prevent the 
recurrence of the financial disasters of previous decades. Since the New Central Bank 
could concentrate on monetary functions due to the termination of quasi-fiscal
25 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 
December 1992, pp.21-24.
26 See The Central Bank, Video Script, p.8.
27 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 
December 1992, p.56.
28 See House Committee on Economic Affairs, "Understanding and Addressing the Huge CB Deficit".
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functions, it would become more transparent.29 The New Central Bank would have to 
bear the cost only of its monetary management. The establishment of an independent 
monetary authority would also enhance the regulatory power of the existing Central 
Bank and improve various regulations to develop a stable financial sector.
Third, the creation of an independent monetaiy authority and financial restructuring 
would improve the fiscal operations of the national government. Due to the end of 
quasi-fiscal operations, the national government would no longer have to complicate its 
operations by supporting the open market operations of the Central Bank. In the early 
1990s, treasury bills were issued by the government as a part of open market operations 
and money was deposited in a Central Bank account. The national government deposits 
with the Central Bank amounted to P56 billion out of the outstanding P 177.8 billion T- 
Bills in January 1991.30 By reducing interest rates through financial restructuring, the 
national government could reduce interest payments on its domestic debt.
Fourth, the Central Bank insisted that the restructuring of the Central Bank's financial 
position did not necessarily require an immediate cash outflow from the National 
Government, although the proposed New Central Bank bill sought to provide the 
independent monetary authority with paid-in capital of P10 billion. In the initial 
proposal of the Central Bank, the subscription of interest-bearing securities for the 
Central Bank was suggested as one way of injecting fresh capital.31 Even without a 
fresh capital injection, the New Central Bank could keep the initial P10 billion net worth 
by transferring P10 billion more assets than liabilities from the existing Central Bank.32
Fifth, the Central Bank stressed the vital importance of the New Central Bank bill, 
arguing that, if the bill were not passed, the Philippines would lose an opportunity to
receive $450 million of concessional loans in the second tranche of the Financial Sector
29 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 
December 1992, p.48.
30 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 17 
January 1991, p. 66.
31 See The Central Bank, Video Script, p.8.
32 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 
December 1992, p.58.
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Adjustment Loans from the World Bank. In fact, the condition for the second tranche 
was the establishment of an independent monetary authority. The government could 
have received the second tranche without the financial restructuring of the Central Bank. 
The Central Bank was desperate to establish an independent monetary authority to 
secure the World Bank loan, but the Central Bank governor, Jose Cuisia, Jr. also 
mentioned a $1.4 billion loan from the IMF over five years, which would be secured if 
the government could restructure the financial losses of the Central Bank.33
The Central Bank's explanation for the causes of the losses inevitably left some 
unanswered questions. The Central Bank could not clearly explain the exact amount of 
losses and beneficiaries from each operation, such as losses from foreign exchange 
operations, emergency loans, concessional loans and the high costs of CB bills. The 
total losses in the three special accounts were only approximately identical to the gross 
losses caused by the above cited operations, although governor Cuisia claimed that 
there were no behest loans among the P308 billion losses.34 He categorically denied the 
existence of the suspected behest loans in expenses of the foreign liabilities which 
recorded in the Exchange Stabilisation Adjustment Account (P87.8 billion). Cuisia 
explained that the Central Bank had absorbed the foreign liabilities of private borrowers 
during the debt crisis. They were not behest loans, because these private borrowers paid 
on the basis of contracts. The private borrowers delivered the pesos to the Central Bank 
and received foreign exchange promissory notes, since the Central Bank could not 
provide dollars. In terms of foreign liabilities, the Central Bank submitted to the data on 
private sector foreign loans assumed by the Central Bank.35 However, the governor did 
not explain clearly which losses were caused by emergency loans and which by 
concessional loans under the Marcos government. In fact, Cuisia himself later admitted 
that there was a lack of transparency with regard to the emergency loans under the
Marcos government, particularly in the case of the P3 billion advanced to the Banco
33 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 
December 1992, p.45.
34 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 
December 1992, p.28.
35 See Letter from Jose L. Cuisia, Jr. (Governor of the Central Bank) to Jose Carlos V. Lacson 
(Congressman and Chairman, House Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions), 14 October 
1992.
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Filipino.36
Although the ambiguity surrounding the Central Bank losses stemmed, at least in part, 
from a technical difficulty of account management, this ambiguity was severely 
criticised by the opposition as an example of the secrecy of the Central Bank and the 
defects of monetary and regulatory policy. In fact, the Central Bank underestimated the 
negative impact of the losses on monetary stability. In addition, the suspected pressures 
from international financial institutions in support of the reforms were criticised by the 
opposition.
However, through numerous hearings and meetings, the Central Bank was largely 
successful in convincing the Executive and the legislative leaders of the merits of their 
claims on this issue. The huge losses of the Central Bank were caused principally by 
foreign currency losses, emergency rescue operations and the high costs of open 
market operations. There was no alternative policy to curb inflation and to prevent 
further deterioration of the national economy during the first half of the 1980s. They 
aimed to stabilise macroeconomic conditions. Thus, the entire economy and the Filipino 
people as a whole were beneficiaries. The National Government, it was argued, should 
pay these costs, at least in part, because some of the losses were caused by quasi-fiscal 
operations including subsidies paid to stabilise key import prices. To prevent the 
recurrence of the losses which caused monetary instability, it was urgently necessary to 
establish an independent monetary authority and to undertake a financial restructuring 
of the Central Bank. Financial restructuring was essential to curb inflation and interest 
rates, which would benefit the national economy. The restoration of monetary stability 
would attract more foreign investment. Furthermore, the financial restructuring could be 
achieved at low cost, since the completion of these reforms would help to secure 
concessional loans from the IMF and the World Bank.
36 See PDI, 21 October 1998, "Cuisia hits BSP grant of emergency loans".
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Drafting House Bill No. 7037
The House was responsive to the drafting of the bill to establish the New Central Bank, 
since the bill had already been approved on its third reading in the previous Congress 
under the Aquino government. The first draft of House Bill No. 296, "An Act 
Amending R.A. 256 to Establish a Central Monetary Authority", was identical to the 
previous bill. The bill included the key provisions to establish an independent monetary 
authority and was fully supported by the Central Bank, although the bill did not contain 
provisions to deal with the Central Bank's losses.37
This time the bill was supported by, and discussed in, the Joint Committee of the 
Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions, chaired by Jose Carlos V. Lacson 
(Lakas-NUCD, Third District, Negros Occidental) and the Committee on Economic 
Affairs, chaired by Felicito C. Payumo (LP, First District, Bataan). There were some 
strong supporters of this bill among the members of minority parties. Margarito Teves 
(LDP, Third District, Negros Oriental) was one of the main authors, although many 
LDP members were opposed to this bill. Exequiel B. Javier (Lakas-NUCD, Lone 
District, Antique) also became a sponsor. He was a former chairman of the Committee 
on Banks and Financial Institutions and a main author of the previous bill, which aimed 
to establish an independent monetary authority under the previous Congress. Under the 
Ninth Congress he was chairman of the powerful Ways and Means Committee.
The first joint committee meeting was held on 8th October 1992. The bill had been
discussed extensively in late 1992 and early 1993. With regard to the provisions to
establish an independent monetary authority, it was not so difficult to reach a consensus
among committee members. However, the issue of the financial restructuring of the
Central Bank was controversial, although Ramos's coalition constituted a majority.
Some congressmen and congresswomen were particularly sceptical about the Central
Bank's proposal to transfer the losses to the national government. Among them Joker
P. Arroyo (Independent, Lone District, Makati), the former Executive Secretary and the
37 Letter from Jose L. Cuisia, Jr. (Governor of the Central Bank) to Jose Carlos V. Lacson 
(Congressman and Chairman, House Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions) on 6th October 
1992.
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Chairman of the Philippine National Bank under the first Aquino Cabinet, was very 
hostile to the Central Bank. In the first joint meeting, Arroyo strongly criticised 
Edgardo Zialcita, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank due to the lack of clarity in his 
explanation of the amount of the losses.38
In addition, the suspected intervention from the IMF and the World Bank on economic 
policy was criticised by members of the opposition. Some members of the Committee, 
including Bonifacio H. Gillego, a leader of the "progressive bloc", (Lakas-NUCD, 
Second District, Sorsogon) and Salvador H. Escudero III (NPC, First District, 
Sorsogon) were suspicious with regard to the close connections between the Central 
Bank and the international financial institutions, including the ADB, IMF and World 
Bank. They requested that the Central Bank submit a list of CB officials who had 
worked previously (or after their retirement from the Central Bank) for these 
institutions.39 Faced with the complicated issues of financial restructuring, the 
Committee chairs were sceptical about finalising the bill in a short time. The chairs 
suggested to the Central Bank governor Cuisia that there might not be enough time to 
draft and pass a final bill to restructure the Central Bank's losses.40
Through intensive work, the bill was passed quickly in spite of initial fears of delays in 
the legislative process. Central Bank officials were frequently invited to join in 
discussions. There were many public hearings with leading economists from the 
country's leading research institutes, including the Asian Institute of Management 
(AIM), Centre for Research and Communication (CRC), the Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies (PIDS), and the School of Economics, University of the
38 See Committee Records: A Joint Committee; Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions and 
Committee on Economic Affairs, 8 October 1992, pp.70-71.
39 See Committee Records and Minutes: the Joint Meeting of Committee on Banks and Financial 
Intermediaries and the Committee on Economic Affairs, 23 November 1992.
40 See Committee Records, Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 
December 1992, p.82.
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Philippines.41 The Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP) also submitted a 
position paper as a contribution to the discussion.42
Legislative leaders including House Speaker, Jose de Venecia, Jr. (Lakas-NUCD, 
Fourth District, Pangasinan) and House Majority Leader, Ronaldo B. Zamora (Lakas- 
NUCD, Lone District, San Juan/Mandaluyong) were keen to enact the bill. To facilitate 
the passage of the bill, the Speaker, Jose de Venecia, formed a Task Force composed of 
the sponsors, authors, Majority leaders, and members from the Minority. The 
Congressional Planning and Budget Office (CPBO), the research body of the House of 
Representative, and the staff of a number of Committees played important roles by 
providing technical support. This was in sharp contrast to the very slow legislative 
process under the previous Congress. After the intensive work by the committees and 
the task force, the Committee Report (Report No. 00068) was submitted for a Second 
Reading on 3 February 1993.
During the floor discussion, questions from the opposition caused some delay. 
According to Congressional rules, all members of the House are entitled to ask an 
unlimited number of questions about a bill in floor discussion. There were some 
resilient opponents, including Rep. Joker Arroyo. Rep. Arroyo was opposed to the final 
bill and expressed his hostility against the Central Bank in a speech explaining his vote. 
"The Central Bank is the most dishonest and irresponsible government entity we ever 
had. It has contributed immensely to the country's financial ruin. How else could Mr. 
Marcos and his cronies have hoarded their dollars abroad without the Central Bank's
41 Major contributors included as follows: Prof. Victor S. Limlingan "The Central Monetary 
Authority: A Clear Mandate, Not a Clean Slate" (Testimony before the House Committee on Banks 
and Currencies on the Proposed Central Monetary Authority) 7th December 1992; Dr. Mario B. 
Lamberte, Vice-President, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, "Comments on House Bill 
No. 296: An Act Amending RA No.265"; Dr. Maria Socorro Gochoco-Bautisla, Associate Professor, 
School of Economics, University of the Philippines "Comments on House Bill No. 296 An Act 
Amending R.A. No. 265 to Establish A Central Monetary Authority"; and Dr. Benjamin E. Diokno, 
Professor, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, "Comments on CMA Bill and 
Restructuring of the CB losses".
42 See Bankers Association of the Philippines, "Position Paper of the Bankers Association of the 
Philippines on the House Bill Entitled An Act Amending RA 256, As Amended to Establish a Central 
Monetary Authority".
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assistance over the years?"43 Despite some opposition, support for the bill was 
consolidated. The pro-Ramos coalition, led by Lakas-NUCD, controlled a majority in 
the House. Since there was no strong opposition outside the House, the members of the 
majority had no strong reasons to oppose the bill. The Bankers Association of the 
Philippines expressed their support for the enhancement of the regulatory power of the 
Central Bank and the restructuring the Central Bank's losses, since these reforms would 
improve macro-economic conditions and lead to lower reserve requirements, which 
would be favourable for the banking sector. Philippine industry was also sympathetic, 
since the reform was expected to lower interest rates, which would be beneficial for 
industry. The House approved a third reading of the bill with 149 votes in favour, 15 
votes against and 1 abstention on 31 May 1993.44
Drafting Senate Bill No. 1235
The legislative process in the Senate was slower than in the House. When the 
Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, chaired by newly-elected 
Senator Raul Roco, was held in late 1992, four bills were proposed to establish an 
independent central monetary authority (CMA).45 In fact, when the Central Bank 
governor was first invited to explain the Central Bank's proposal for the Committee 
Meeting on 3 December 1992, governor Cuisia suggested the possibility of separating 
the matter of the financial restructuring from the establishment of an independent 
monetary authority, since the former seemed to be more difficult for the House and the 
Senate to agree on. The Central Bank was desperate to obtain the second tranche of the 
Financial Sector Adjustment Loan (the World Bank's $450 million concessional loan) 
which the country would receive if Congress passed the bill to establish an independent 
monetary authority.46 The financial restructuring of the Central Bank did not include the
conditionality for the second tranche.
43 Record of House of Representatives, 31 May 1993, p. 16.
44 See Record of House of Representative, 31 May 1993, p.21.
45 The four bills were : (1) S.B. No. 844 authored by Sen. N. Gonzales; (2) S.B. No.23 authored by 
Sen. A. Romulo, the former chairman of the Committee for the last Congress; (3) S.B. No. 945 
authored by Sen. T. Guingona; (4) S.B. No. 867 authored by Sen. J. Osmefia.
46 Committee Records: Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 3 
December 1992, p.94.
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Between December 1992 and Februaiy 1993, the intensive work done by the Senate 
Committee to formulate the bill was remarkable. According to Senator Roco, there were 
numerous meetings and most of them were informal. By the end of February, the 
Senate Bill, which aimed to establish an independent monetary authority and to 
restructure the losses of the Central Bank, was largely consolidated except with regard 
to the management of the losses after clearance of the balance sheet of the Central 
Bank. Dr. Benjamin E. Diokno commented on the Senate Bill as of February 1993 that 
"I find the consolidated bill prepared by the Senate Committee on Banks, Financial 
Institutions and Currencies a remarkable improvement over the various related bills that 
I have seen before", although he recognised some problems, he added "I believe it 
comes close to what is an ideal CMA bill".47
After massive work by the Committee, the bill was scrutinised by senators during the 
second reading. The bill was extensively discussed between 19 May and 7 June 1993. 
Leading critics of the bill included Sen. Arturo M. Tolentino, Sen. Ernesto M. Maceda 
and Sen. Wigberto E. Tanada. The main reason for their opposition was similar to that 
underlying the opposition to the bill in the House, i.e. the urgent enactment was forced 
on Congress by international financial institutions; the causes of the losses, the 
beneficiaries, and the identities of those responsible for the actions of the Central Bank 
were not properly explained; and the provisions to prevent recurrence were not 
persuasive.
Sen. Maceda, a vocal critic of the Ramos government, argued that "this bill is another in 
a long series of Executive Department actions and/or recommendations that is, in effect, 
an acceptance of the interference of a foreign body into our internal affairs. And so, the 
$US 450 million has been dangled to us since last December yet, or what I call *450 
pieces of silver' which we seem to need out of a state of mere panic. Thus, we have been
47 See Benjamin E. Diokno, Professor of Economics, School of Economics, University of the 
Philippines, "Comments on the Bill Creating the Central Monetary Authority (Senate Version — as of 
23 Februaiy 1993)".
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rushed into approving this measure."48
Sen. Tanada articulated the problem of the lack of clarity in the Central Bank's 
explanations of issues relating to the financial restructuring. Before he would agree to 
vote for the creation of a new Central Bank, he demanded the resolution of the 
following issues: (1) "How did the Central Bank incur losses and liabilities amounting 
to P307.5 billion as of November 1992? How did these losses and liabilities increase 
by P 9.1 billion as of December 1992?" (2) "What steps should be undertaken to 
prevent the continuous increase in Central Bank losses and liabilities?" (3) "What 
specific provisions should be provided in the Charter of the New Central Bank to 
minimise possible losses and liabilities it may suffer, considering past experiences and 
projected future considerations?" (4) "Who shall absorb the CB losses and liabilities, 
and how shall they be paid?" and (5) "How shall the liabilities equivalent to the 'ampaw' 
assets represented by the three accounts now be paid and who should pay for them?"49
During the second reading, Tolentino consistently opposed the provision for the 
transfer of the Central Bank's assets and liabilities. He proposed that the bill should be 
geared to establishing an independent monetaiy authority and the provision relating to 
the financial restructuring of the Central Bank should be deleted. After Tolentino's 
amendment was rejected by Committee chairman Roco, he demanded a vote on his 
proposed amendment. As a result, the vote was lost but another six senators agreed with 
Tolentino.50 In spite of this resilient opposition, particularly to financial restructuring, 
the pro-Ramos allies consolidated support for the bill. The President certified the 
necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill on 2 June. Due to this certification, 
immediately after the vote for the second reading on 5 June, the bill was approved for a 
third reading on 7 June 1993.
48 See the Senate Records: Bill on Second Reading, "S. No 1235 — The New Central Bank Act", 7 
June 1993.
49 See the Senate Records: Bill on Second Reading, ”S. No 1235 — The New Central Bank Act", 7 
June 1993.
50 See the Senate Records: Bill on Second Reading, ’’S. No 1235 — The New Central Bank Act", 5 
June 1993.
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The Bicameral Conference Committee
After both the House bill and the Senate bill were consolidated, there were important 
tasks still left for the Bicameral Conference Committee.51 There were 16 provisions in 
the House bill which differed from those in the Senate Bill.52 However, after many 
formal and informal meetings and various public hearings with same experts including 
the Central Bank officials, there emerged a basic consensus among legislative leaders in 
the House and Senate. As House Chair of the panel, Rep. Ronaldo Zamora claimed that 
House members and Senate members worked together like a working group, rather 
than a negotiation panel, to form a unified bill.
Within three days, after further intensive discussion and hard work, the final bill was 
passed by the Committee. Overall, a reasonable compromise was achieved. With 
respect to the establishment of an independent monetary authority, the House version of 
the provision on the members of the Monetary Board was adopted. On the other hand 
the Committee adopted the the Senate version of the provision relating to the 
restructuring of the losses of the Central Bank. Although both bills shared a basic 
framework for the financial restructuring of the Central Bank, the House version, 
similar to the Central Bank proposal, recommended the issuance of 25-year bonds by 
the National Government. The Senate insisted that a special Committee should be 
formed to examine the financial restructuring further. This committee would determine 
what assets and liabilities should be transferred to the BSP. Then, the Monetary Board 
would recommend that Congress waive the Central Bank's liabilities and losses.
Although the final bill differed from the Central Bank’s proposal, the bill largely 
fulfilled the Central Bank’s recommendations. Finally, the independent monetary 
authority which the Central Bank had advocated since the beginning of the Aquino
51 Conferees on the Part of the Senate: Raul S. Roco, Bias F. Opel, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., 
Wigberto E. Tanada (dissent), Arturo M. Tolentino, Herherson T. Alvarez, Jose D. Lina, Jr. and 
Agapito A. Aquino. Conferees on the Part of the House of Representatives: Ronaldo B. Zamora, Jose 
Carlos V. Lacson, Felicito C. Payumo, Exequiel B. Javier, Rolando R. Andaya, Feliciano R. 
Belmonte, Salvador H. Escudero III, Ricardo C. Silverio, Jaime C. Lopez, Antonio M. Diaz, Edcel C. 
Lagman (dissent), Margarito B. Teves and Joker P. Arroyo (dissent).
52 See Table 5-2 "Differences Between House Bill No. 7037 and Senate Bill No. 1235".
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government was established. The New Central Bank Act included key 
recommendations by the Central Bank to enhance its regulatory powers and to end its 
role as provider of development financing. In the final moments, the Central Bank was 
given another bonus. Central Bank officials from salary grade 20 (Assistant Division 
Chief) upwards were exempted from salary standardisation law. Although this was 
originally a provision in the Senate bill and the exemption applied to officials from 
salary grade 22 (Division Chief level), Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, House Chair of the panel 
proposed more generous provisions for Central Bank officials in the Conference 
Committee.53 The motivation behind the generous offer by Rep. Zamora was unclear 
but this suggests the success of the Central Bank's advocacy for the vital necessity of 
attracting talented young personnel in the Bank to legislative leaders both in the House 
and in the Senate. It also showed how a leading politician could be very influential in 
the final provision of a law.
The establishment of the New Central Bank was a critical step in developing a stable 
economy and banking sector. The structural reforms achieved two essential objectives 
through the creation of an independent monetary authority and financial restructuring. 
The financial restructuring led to an improved macro economic policy. The Central 
Bank became more independent vis-a-vis the government and enhanced its regulatory 
powers vis-a-vis commercial banks. The Monetary Board has a majority of full-time 
private representatives, rather than part-time Cabinet members. The prime objective of 
the Central Bank is defined as that of achieving monetary stability and the fiscal 
functions of the Central Bank have been phased out. The Central Bank's role as 
provider of development finance has largely ended. These key measures are expected to 
secure the independence of the Central Bank from political intervention. It must be 
noted that after their retirement Central Bank officials, particularly deputy governors, 
become candidates for membership of the Monetary Board, a privilege previously 
enjoyed only by Central Bank governors.
The reform included various improved provisions to enhance the regulatory power of 
the Central Bank. First of all, the Monetary Board gained more governing power in
53 See, Committee Records, Bicameral Conference Discussion on 9 June 1993, p.39.
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terms of the Central Bank's operations. The status of Central Bank officials also 
improved. The Central Bank's officials from salary grade 20 (Assistant Division Chief) 
were now exempt from salary standardisation law. In terms of salary, there were no 
longer significant differences between Central Bank officials and commercial bankers 
except for senior officials. Second, the Central Bank's banking supervision powers 
were enlarged. It was now empowered to supervise and conduct examinations not only 
of banking institutions and quasi-banks but also of their subsidiaries and affiliates. The 
new law also stipulated higher penalties for violation of laws and regulations. Third, the 
Central Bank’s capacity to handle troubled banks was improved. A new provision put a 
ceiling on emergency loans to troubled banks. The rules on receivership and liquidation 
were clarified and the role of the PDIC was enlarged. Fourth, the new law provided 
Central Bank officials with legal protection against suits and legal proceedings. Central 
Bank officials were not fully exempted from legal action by this legislation, but Central 
Bank officials including banking examiners were no longer financially liable as a result 
of suits arising from normal performance of duties. This was an important step in 
protecting Central Bank officials and in strengthening the Central Bank's regulatory 
powers, since the vulnerability of Central Bank officials to legal action significantly 
weakened the regulatory powers of the Central Bank vis-a-vis regulated banks. Fifth, a 
preventative measure against irresponsible DOSRI loans was enacted. Receivers of 
DOSRI loans waived their right to protect the secrecy of their deposits in all banks, as 
provided by Philippine law.
Changing Political Institutions and The Central Bank Reform under 
The Ramos Government
Due to the enactment of the New Central Bank Act, which had not been passed by the 
Aquino government, the Ramos government became the first administration to 
implement key structural reform in the banking sector through the legislative process. 
In pursuing its legislative agenda, the Ramos government performed well in comparison 
with the previous governments. Within one year, many critical reforms were 
implemented through the legislative process. As mentioned above, the World Bank and 
the IMF provided the government with a generous financial incentive to reform the
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Central Bank. Business representatives including bankers were also supportive of the 
Central Bank reform, since it would improve the business environment by reducing 
interest rates. However, we must be careful not to overemphasise the importance of 
such support which already existed in the years of Aquino government, which 
nevertheless failed to implement the Central Bank reform. The successful 
implementation of reform by the Ramos government can only be understood in the 
context of emerging cooperative relationships between the President and the legislative 
leaders and these relationships were contingent on the new constellation of political 
institutions established by the 1987 Constitution.
When Ramos came to power, the Philippine economy was faced with serious 
uncertainties and difficulties, although it had recovered from the ruins of the mid- 
1980s. In 1990, a series of severe exogenous shocks contributed to depressing 
economic growth. A drought in early 1990 disrupted agricultural production and an 
earthquake in July 1990 caused serious damage to the infrastructure. Furthermore, the 
Gulf war dislocated about 50,000 Filipino overseas workers from Kuwait and Iraq and 
increased oil import bills. In 1991, economic growth was practically at a standstill 
(GNP growth was 0.5 per cent) and a high inflation rate was recorded (18.7 per cent). 
There was a real danger that the economy would be left far behind that of neighbouring 
countries. Political instability was still a crucial issue for the economy. The last coup 
attempt in December 1989, which damaged the financial centre of the country, was seen 
as an important factor impeding foreign financial flows and decelerating economic 
growth, although there were no coup attempts in 1990 and 1991. Facing these 
difficulties and uncertainties, the Ramos government launched "Philippines 2000" as a 
strategic framework to promote the economy to that of a Newly Industrialised Country 
(NIC) status by the year 2000. "Philippines 2000" was a critical framework for political 
and economic reforms, although it was not new as an economic strategy.
After Ramos won the 1992 election by a narrow margin, he appointed the Cabinet 
members of his new administration. Jose L. Cuisia, Jr., the governor of the Central 
Bank and the Chairman of the Monetary Board retained his post. Those holding key 
economic portfolios, who were also Monetary Board members were replaced. Ramon
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del Rosario, Jr was appointed Secretaiy of Finance. Before joining the Cabinet, Mr. del 
Rosario was Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Asian Bank 
Corporation. He had directorships in various companies including finance, construction 
and agricultural industries, and had once also been Executive Vice-President of San 
Miguel Corp. Rizalino Navarro, the former head of Sycip, Gorres and Velayo (SGV), 
became the Secretary of Trade and Industry. The NEDA was headed by Cielito F. 
Habito, a Harvard trained economist (PhD holder) who was teaching at UP Los Banos. 
Salvador M. Enriquez, Jr., who had been working for GSIS under the Aquino 
government, was appointed Budget Secretary.
It must be noted that, although the members of the Monetary Board had changed, due 
to the formation of the new Cabinet, the basic monetary and regulatory policy of the 
Central Bank had not altered. In terms of economic policy, there was strong continuity 
between the Ramos and the Aquino administrations. Since Ramos was endorsed by 
former President Aquino, he could easily continue the economic policy of the Aquino 
government. The President's trust in the Central Bank's policy had not changed. With 
regard to regulatory reform, the liberalisation initiated by the Aquino government was 
further promoted by the Ramos government. The Central Bank continued to liberalise 
the foreign exchange policy as planned, although the Central Bank was concerned 
about the potential loss of support from the new Presidency due to the replacement of 
the government after the elections (see Zialcita,1994:228). The President's support for 
the foreign debt policy of the Central Bank was also unchanged. The major policy to 
improve the financial system had not changed. The Central Bank promoted this goal in 
conventional ways: deregulation and greater market competition and increases in the 
size of financial institutions.
The strong constitutional power of the President and the old tactics used by the 
Presidents to push their legislative agendas must be seen as underlying the successful 
reform. After the restoration of regular legislative elections, the President's old tactics 
were more effective than in the Aquino period. Ramos was elected by 23.7 per cent of 
the vote, the smallest vote ever won by a Philippine President. Faced with a severe 
economic downturn, improving the economy was crucial if he was to consolidate
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support for his government. An ambitious legislative agenda was formulated under the 
"Philippines 2000". It was obvious that the weak position of the Ramos's Lakas party 
in Congress was the first obstacle to the agenda. The Ramos's Lakas party was a mere 
electoral vehicle, whose members had won only 35 out of 200 seats in the House and 2 
out of 24 seats in the Senate. In fact, at the beginning of the Ramos Presidency, the 
President was not very successful at establishing an amicable relationship with the 
Legislature. Conflicts between Ramos's allies and the opposition emerged over the 
appointment of a Cabinet member. The appointment of Finance Secretary Ramon del 
Rosario was rejected by the Commission of Appointments.54
Ramos employed the traditional tactics of Philippine Presidents to strengthen his 
control over the Legislature. He encouraged legislators from opposition parties to join 
his party by using the promise of patronage. Ramos backed Jose de Venecia for House 
Speakership, the most powerful position in the House; the promises of influential posts, 
including positions as Committee chairmen, were effectively used to encourage 
opposition members to join his allies. As Gutierrez (1994:8) points out, Ronaldo B. 
Zamora's case was a prominent example of how the tactics worked. Zamora was the 
former assistant majority floor leader under the Eighth Congress and was a key advisor 
to Mitra's presidential campaign in 1992. However, despite Mitra's defeat, Zamora 
became majority floor leader of a predominantly pro-Ramos House. He gained the post 
by organising a group of representatives to support Jose de Venecia's election for the 
speakership.
To mobilise further congressional support, Ramos increased the CDF (pork barrel 
funds) from US$420,(XX) to US$520,000 per House member and made its application 
so flexible that it could be used for practically any type of project, including 
infrastructure, scholarships, medicines, vehicle acquisition or training.55 Thanks to these 
tactics, the pro-govemment party Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats 
(NUCD) "rainbow coalition" had 170 members by April 1993, while the initial 86 
members of Lakas ng Democratikong Pilipino's (LDP), the single biggest bloc after the
54 See, for example, Malaya, 2 June 1993, "CA Finance Committee Rejects Del Rosario".
55 See Miranda (1996:35), cited in Eaton (1998:207).
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May 1992 elections, was reduced to 24 representatives in 1994.56
In the Senate, where the opposition LDP party held 16 of the 24 seats, Ramos 
successfully backed the replacement in December 1992 of Senate President Neptali 
Gonzalez by Edgardo Angara, who was more cooperative with regard to the ambitious 
legislative agenda (see Eaton, 1998:208). Angara shared the view that there was an 
urgent need for economic reform if the country was not to be left far behind the other 
ASEAN countries. In his speeches, Angara often stressed the importance of reform in 
the struggle to regain the economic glory of the 1960s.57
With no strong social forces outside the state to support opposition in Congress, 
opposition forces which were sceptical about the Central Bank policy, antagonistic 
towards the IMF and the World Bank and hostile to the Ramos government received 
little encouragement.
The business community was largely supportive of the establishment of the New 
Central Bank. The Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP) largely supported the 
New Central Bank bill. The BAP stressed the importance of the independent monetary 
authority in its position paper: "it is our view that a more independent monetary 
authority is absolutely necessary to achieve broad economic objectives such as price 
stability, an efficient financial intermediation process as reflected in interest rates, and a 
strong financial system that supports sustained economic development".58 The BAP 
also supported the financial restructuring of the Central Bank, since it was essential for 
monetary stability. The reduction of reserve requirements resulting from the financial 
restructuring would be beneficial for their businesses. Yet, the BAP should not be seen 
as a strong interest group which pushed the reform, since the banking sector had been
56 By mid-August 1992, the parties had realigned with 87 members for Lakas-NUCD, 45 for Eduardo 
Cojuangco's Nationalist People's Coalition, and 35 left in the rump LDP. By December 1992, only 
30 LDP representatives remained and by July 1993, this decreased to 25. See Business International, 
Country Report, April 5, 1993, cited in Eaton (1998:207). See also Gutierrez (1994:8).
57 See, for example, "Opening Statement of Senate President Edgardo J. Angara before the 
Participants of the Economic Summit held at ang Maynila, Manila Hotel on 20 August 1993".
58 See Bankers Association of the Philippines, "BAP Views of the Establishment of A Central 
Monetary Authority (CMA), Submitted for the Senate Committee on 13th January 1993.
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profitable despite the high reserve requirements. Although reduction of the reserve 
requirements would be beneficial for banking businesses, it was not a serious matter for 
them, since banks could easily transfer the high intermediate costs to their lending rates. 
The Central Bank would strengthen its regulatory power over banks through the 
creation of the New Central Bank. The Central Bank would become more powerful vis- 
a-vis regulated banks. However, the BAP, which was dominated by big banks was in 
favour of the creation of the New Central Bank which would phase out the Central 
Bank's role as a provider of development finance and secure the stability of the financial 
system. The business community expected to benefit from the establishment of the 
New Central Bank as it brought macroeconomic stability, lower interest rates and 
increases in the creditworthiness of the country.
The Freedom From Debt Coalition (FDC) was a critical voice of the reform. The FDC 
was a leading policy-based advocacy group formed to gather together critics of the 
foreign debt policy of the Aquino government. The FDC was headed by Leonor M. 
Briones, Professor of the College of Public Administration, University of the 
Philippines. The FDC was often invited to send a representative to the Senate 
Committee as a resource person on issues relating to the Central Bank reform. The 
FDC criticised the Central Bank for the lack of transparency in its operations and for 
the mismanagement of monetary policy.59 For example, they urged the abolition of all 
three special accounts in which the Central Bank's losses had been recorded, while the 
Central Bank insisted that the Revaluation of International Reserve Accounts (a self 
adjustment account) should be kept. They strongly advocated transparency in the 
process of dealing with the Central Bank's losses.60 Some legislators, including Senator 
Raul Roco, were sympathetic to their position which emphasised the need for 
transparency in the Central Bank's operations.61 However, it must be noted that the FDC
59 See the Freedom from Debt Coalition, "On the CMA Bill and the Transfer of CB Liabilities", 
Submitted for the Senate Committee discussion on 13th January 1993.
60 See Briones, Leonor M. (1993) "Public Interest and the Financial Restructuring of the Central 
Bank", conference paper presented at the conference on "the Establishment of the Central Monetary 
Authority and Financial Restructuring" organised by the Philippine Economic Society and the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, on 5 March 1993 at Makati, Metro Manila.
61 See Committee Records: Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 22 
March 1992, pp.67.
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essentially shared the view that the creation of an independent monetary authority and 
the financial restructuring of the Central Bank were urgent tasks for the economy.
Another group which influenced economic policy-making consisted of economists in 
the leading universities and research institutes, including the University of the 
Philippines, Asian Institute of Management, Ateneo de Manila University, Centre for 
Research and Communications and Philippine Institute for Development Studies. 
These organisations had been actively involved in the legislative process as advisors. 
They were also critical of the secrecy and mismanagement at the Central Bank. For 
example, Professor Benjamin E. Diokno noted that although the losses of the Central 
Bank were caused by the National Government’s intervention in monetary affairs, the 
mistakes of Central Bank officials in the conduct of monetary and foreign exchange 
policy were undeniable.62 However, although there were different opinions on the 
detailed provisions, there was broad agreement on the urgent need for the creation of 
the New Central Bank to stabilise macro-economic conditions.
Due to the new legislation, there were some potential losers, including small business
owners, who relied on large funds from a single bank. Some legislators had direct
interests in the banking sector and/or engaged in small businesses. According to
Gutierrez's study (1994:14), 19 of the 50 members of the Committee on Banks were
once, or were still, involved in banking business. Some of them were former directors
or executives of commercial banks. They included Reps. Rolando Andaya, Lualhati
Antonio, Renato Dragon, Felicito Payumo, Ricardo Silverio, Rodolfo Tingzon and Jose
Villarosa. Some provisions of the New Central Bank bill, which were designed to
strengthen the Bank's regulatory powers, potentially restricted the business activities of
these legislators. The bill imposed higher penalties and stricter rules on DOSRI loans,
which might directly influence their business activities. As noted above, under the new
rules, if the legislators concerned were to borrow a large amount of money from banks
with which they were connected, they would waive the right of secrecy regarding their
deposits in all banks. In this case, without a court decision, the Central Bank would
62 See Benjamin E. Diokno, Professor of Economics, School of Economics, University of the 
Philippines, "Comments on the Bill Creating the Central Monetary Authority (Senate Version — as of 
23 February 1993)", Submitted for the Senate Committee discussion on 13th January 1993.
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have access to individual account information in any banks and hence would be able to 
launch an investigation. Despite the potential loss of rights, opposition to this provision 
did not materialise. Domestic businesses, including small ones, broadly supported the 
legislation since they expected it to lead to a reduction in interest rates. In the early 
1990s, they had suffered seriously from a sharp rise in interest rates.
Old tactics and a broad support for the reform from businesses, including banks, 
helped to promote the Central Bank reform. Nevertheless, these should not be stressed 
too much as a cause of the reform. In the Philippine Congress, under a weak party 
system, the dominance of the pro-Ramos coalition did not entirely guarantee a smooth 
legislative process, particularly with regard to the individualistic voting behaviour in the 
Senate. In fact, with respect to banking reform, the "old tactics" had never worked in the 
old Congress under the 1935 Constitution. Under the Aquino government, the majority 
of the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives were elected as 
Aquino's supporters. However, the Legislature, in particular the Senate, strongly 
opposed the President's key legislative measures, including foreign debt policy and the 
US bases issue. The Aquino government failed to implement the Central Bank reform, 
despite strong support from the IMF, the World Bank, donor countries and local 
businesses including banks. The successful implementation of the Central Bank reform 
can be fully understood in the context of the new constellation of political institutions 
created by the 1987 Constitution.
Although the Ramos government inherited its economic strategy from the Aquino 
government, the transition from Aquino to Ramos was a critical trigger in changing 
policy-making institutions and organisations. The Ramos government articulated the 
problem of the close link between political instability and economic failure. Political 
instability was the main obstacle to attracting foreign investment and thus to promoting 
economic growth; and economic growth and poverty alleviation were crucial to solving 
the internal security problems. The government stressed the importance of political 
stability and national unity for economic development. In the Philippine context, along 
with internal armed conflicts, the conflict between the Executive and the Legislature was 
seen as a key obstacle to national unity and political stability. The government stressed
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that "For the past decades, relationships between the Executive and Legislative have 
been characterised as adversarial in nature. It is not uncommon to hear of stalemates or 
gridlock occurring, due to inability of the two branches of government to resolve policy 
differences" (LEDAC,1993:1).
In the first Presidential State of the Nation Address (SONA), Ramos expressed his 
deep concern about this problem and pointed out that "a shift to a more consensual type 
of decision-making" was a vital necessity (LEDAC,1993:1). In order to build politically 
stable conditions as the basis of economic growth, the establishment of "a harmonious 
and productive working relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches of 
government" was one of the first tasks for the Ramos government, along with the peace 
settlement of internal armed conflicts (PMS,1997:2).63 The "harmonious" relationship 
was boosted by the creation of the Legislative-Executive Development Advisory 
Council or LEDAC (Republic Act No. 7640 dated 9 December 1992), which facilitated 
the passage of priority legislation (PMS,1997:17). The LEDAC is composed of the 
President (chairman), Vice President, four Senators (Senate President, Senate President 
Pro-Tempore, Senate Majority Floor Leader, Senate Minority Leader), four 
Congressmen (Speaker and other three Congressmen including one member of a 
minority party), seven Cabinet members, and three other members (Local Government 
Unit Representative, Private Sector Representative and Youth Representative). Under 
the Ramos government, the LEDAC meeting was held once a week for many years. The 
role of Presidential Legislative Liaison Office (PLLO) was also enhanced.
As Professor Alex Magno, a Filipino political scientist of the UP, points out, a really 
distinctive feature of this government was "the extent to which the executive branch and 
legislative branch consult and consolidate their opinion" (see Caoili, et al.,1994:29-30). 
There are formal and informal consultation processes, not only between the House of 
Representatives and Malacanang but also between the Senate and Malacanang (ibid.). 
Senators were often invited to Malacanang for informal and formal meetings to discuss 
policy issues. This was in sharp contrast to President Aquino, who was hesitant to 
involve herself directly in the legislative process.
63 In this PMS report, other major tasks seen as necessary to the restoration of political stability 
include: opening people's participation in governance and; police and military reform.
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Apart from LEDAC, the Ramos government facilitated the construction of a common 
legislative agenda in various ways. It invited the legislative leaders to form an economic 
development plan. Senators (Edgardo J. Angara, Gloria MacapagaLArroyo, and Alberto
G. Romulo) and Congressmen (Felicito C. Payumo, Rolando R. Andaya and Salvador
H. Escudero III) participated in the Steering Committee, chaired by Cielito F. Habito, 
Secretary of Socio-Economic Planning, whose brief was to prepare the Medium-Term 
Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) for 1993-1998.
In addition, in order to consolidate a common legislative agenda, the People's Summit 
Leading to "A Social Pact for an Empowered Economic Development (SPEED)" was 
held in Summer, 1993. In July, the Senate passed Resolution No.544 urging the 
President to immediately convene an Economic and Social Summit. The ultimate 
objective of the Summit was to forge a national consensus towards moving the 
economy forward and propelling the country towards a Newly Industrialised Country 
(NIC) status by the year 2000 (LEDAC,1993:1). The Summit showed the extent of the 
cooperative relationship between the Executive and the Legislature.
It must be noted that the new institutional frameworks created by the 1987 Constitution 
encouraged legislative leaders to cooperate with the Executive in the promotion of 
socio-economic reforms. After the long Marcos dictatorship, the 1987 Constitution, 
which limited the presidency to a single 6-year term, opened the door for legislative 
leaders to stand as serious candidates for the Presidential seat. Importantly, the 
incumbent President was no longer a strong rival to legislative leaders who sought the 
next Presidential seat, since the Presidential term was limited to one term only under the 
1987 Constitution. It should be noted that the result of the 1992 Presidential election 
provided a foundation which encouraged legislative leaders to cooperate with the 
President to reform the economy.64 Legislative leaders, including the House Speaker, 
Jose de Venecia, the New Senate President, Edgardo Angara, and the Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Banks, Raul Roco, harboured presidential ambitions.
 1     .
64 For a careful analysis of the 1992 election in the context of political change and continuity, see 
Putzel (1995).
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For the legislative leaders, the 1992 election highlighted important lessons about 
Presidential elections under the newly-restored democracy. Ramos, who was endorsed 
by Aquino, won with 23 per cent of the votes, the smallest victory in all the country's 
Presidential elections. Miriam Defensor-Santiago surprisingly gained 20 per cent of the 
vote. She was a famous anti-corruption campaigner, but she lacked solid organisational 
support. The well-funded candidates, Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., (the National People's 
Coalition: NPC) a close associate of President Marcos and one of the country's richest 
businessmen and Ramon V. Mitra (the Laban Democratikong Pilipino: LDP), the 
candidate of the party which dominated Congress and had an extensive campaign 
machine, did not attract more votes than the "weak" candidate, Miriam Defensor- 
Santiago. Later Senator Roco stated that his political campaign for the 1998 
Presidential election was inspired by the campaign of Miriam Defensor-Santiago for 
the 1992 election.
For legislative leaders who harboured ambitions for the next Presidential seat, support 
from the President and enjoying popular appeal as a reformer were crucial assets. For 
example, in the House, Speaker de Venecia, who had been severely criticised by the 
media for his involvement in suspect business dealings, was keen to clear his "bad" 
image for the purposes of promoting his career. In particular, his Landoil Resources 
Group, one of the most successful construction firms in the country, which conducted 
lucrative construction projects in the Middle East during the Marcos era, was 
investigated by the Presidential Committee for behest loans, although de Venecia denied 
any criminality of the deal.65 After maintaining a cooperative relationship with the 
President, de Venecia was endorsed by President Ramos as the administration's 
candidate for the 1998 Presidential elections.
Senate President Angara, who became the President backed by Ramos, was a supporter 
of the reform agenda. Newly-elected senator Raul Roco, the Chairman of the 
Committee on Banks, was also keen to reform the economy and cooperated with the 
President. As the Chairman of the Committee, he enthusiastically undertook a massive 
amount of work to finalise the passage of the bill in a short time. It should be noted that
65 See, for example, PDI, 23 October 1992, ''P31B lent to cronies with little collateral".
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the electoral term of senator Roco was limited to three years, due to the result of the 
1992 election in accordance with the transitional provisions of the 1987 Constitution. 
He had to stand for the 1995 elections and was reelected as a senator. Later, both 
senators became candidates in the 1998 presidential election and both boasted to voters 
of their pivotal role in economic reform under the Ramos government. Angara claimed 
that most key economic reforms were enacted under his Senate presidency.66 Roco was 
veiy proud of his role as the father of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. He claimed that 
one third of the Law was actually written by himself.67
The ambitious strategy for industrialisation, Philippines 2000, was not new as an 
economic plan but the strategy was nevertheless innovative, since it addressed 
institutional and organisational problems, namely the uncooperative relationship 
between the Executive and the Legislature, as an obstacle to economic reform. With the 
new constellation of political institutions created by the 1987 Constitution, the initiatives 
taken by the Ramos government to form a common legislative agenda were very 
effective in facilitating economic and political reform. Within one year, many critical 
reforms were implemented through the legislative process, including the repeal of the 
Anti-Subversion Act (Presidential Decree No. 1700), which paved the way for a 
comprehensive peace process with rebel groups (Republic Act No. 7636 dated 22 
September 1992); the creation of a Department of Energy to address power shortages 
(Republic Act No. 7638 dated 9 December 1992); and setting a date for the elections in 
the ARMM (Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Republic Act No. 7647 dated 
5 March 1993).68 The Central Bank reform which had not been implemented by the 
Aquino government was one of these critical reforms.
66 Speech by Edgardo Angara at Ateneo de Manila University, "The Demands of Leadership: 
Leadership Series II", 17 May 1997.
67 Speech by Raul Roco at Ateneo de Manila University, "The Demands of Leadership: Leadership 
Series II", 28 June 1997.
68 For the lists of legislation, see PMS (1997:17-18).
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Conclusion
After the end of the Cold War, the Philippine government could no longer expect 
"special" support from the US government, in terms of lending from the IMF and the 
World Bank. Faced with economic downturn, the Ramos government was committed to 
the Central Bank reform in order to increase the creditworthiness of the country in the 
international financial system. Skilful use of the old tactics to consolidate the support of 
the President's allies in the Legislature was also important for the successful passage of 
the key legislation.
Nevertheless, the new constellation of political institutions created by the 1987 
Constitution facilitated cooperation between the President and legislative leaders and 
was the most critical for the implementation of the Central Bank reform. Amicable 
relations were built by various means, including initiatives taken by the newly-elected 
President such as the formation of the LEDAC. New political framework instituted by 
the 1987 Constitution provided legislative leaders with an additional incentive to 
cooperate with the President's reform agenda, since his support was important for those 
who aspired to the next Presidential seat. The 1992 election, the first Presidential 
election under the new Constitution, also provided an important lesson for the 
legislative leaders indicating that populist appeal as a reformer was a significant tool 
that could be used to attract many votes in the Presidential election.69
The lack of strong opposition from the business community also helped to implement 
the Central Bank reform. However, the entry of new foreign banks, which is examined 
in the next chapter, can be seen as more controversial banking reform, since a reformist 
force had to face strong resistance from the powerful interest group constituted by big 
domestic commercial banks.
69 For the importance of "populist images", see Putzel (1995:43).
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Appendix 5-1:
The Functions and Accumulations of MAA, ESAA and RIR accounts
This account absorbed the costs involved in the issuance of and interest payments on 
Central Bank securities, interest payments on National Government deposits and costs 
for minting and printing currency. These expenses pushed the MAA's outstanding 
balance from P6.9 billion in 1982 to P48.5 billion in 1991 (P59.8 billion as of 
November 1992). This sharp increase was largely due to huge interest payments on 
high-yielding Central Bank bills, namely Jobo bills and Joey bills and interest 
payments on National Government deposits. In addition, no revenue was generated to 
cover the cost of printing money.
This account absorbed, mostly, interest payments on foreign borrowings and foreign 
currency deposits and other external obligations. Over the years, the Central Bank had 
to borrow foreign exchange to cover the deficit between the dollars which the country 
gained from exports and grants and the dollars which the country spent on imports. 
From 1981 to 1991, the annual interest payments on foreign borrowings and other 
foreign obligations were PI 1 billion per year, on average. Following the 1983 financial 
crisis the ESAA's outstanding balance rapidly increased. It was further aggravated by 
the peso's depreciation over the years. The peso's value declined by an average of 14.8 
per cent per year from 1983 to 1991. This meant that the Central Bank had to amortise 
its assumed foreign liabilities with more pesos per dollars. As a result, the Bank's debt 
servicing requirements increased sharply. From P3.1 billion at the end of 1982, the 
outstanding level of ESAA had risen to P87.8 billion by the end of 1991 (P86.3 billion 
as of November 1992).
This special account was debited or credited as a result of the revaluation of the bank's 
net assets or liabilities in gold or foreign currencies. The law defined this account as a 
self adjustment account which the Central Bank did not amortise. During the economic 
crisis, swap and forward cover arrangements rapidly increased. As the peso depreciated, 
losses were accumulated. In addition, the differentials resulting from the change in the 
exchange rate were placed in blocked peso accounts because, if these differentials were 
actually paid, the money supply would have expanded tremendously. The Central Bank 
paid interest at the prevailing rate for the blocked peso accounts. Interest payments on 
these blocked swap liabilities amounted to PI 1.2 billion between 1986 and 1991. The 
RIR level soared from PI.8 billion in 1982 to P88.4 billion by 1985 and to P166.3 
billion in 1991 (P163.5 billion as of November 1992).
Sources: The Central Bank, Script For A Computer Presentation on Video Tape 
(Audio Video): "Toward An Independent Central Monetary Authority" (the Central 
Bank, Video Script), pp.4-7 and House Committee on Economic Affairs, 
"Understanding and Addressing the Huge CB Deficit", Annex: CB Suspense 
Accounts.
Table 5-1. CB Loss / Special Accounts 
CB Losses P334.6 billion
1. Forward Exchange Cover
a) Oil Companies
b) National Food Authority
c) National Steel Corp.
2. Interest Payments on 
Foreign Loans
3. Concessional Loans 
and Market Operation
4. Opportunity Losses 
(CB's Holding Low Yielding 
NG Securities)
P51.6 billion
P41.9 billion 
P7.6 billion 
P2.1 billion
P77 billion
P101 billion
P105 billion
Special Accounts P302.5 billion
1. Monetary Adjustment Account P48.5 billion
a) Issuance and servicing of P35.3 billion 
CB instruments
b) Interest on National Government P19.9 billion 
deposits
c) Cost of minting and P4.3 billion 
printing currency
2. Exchange Stabilisation Adjustment P87.8 billion 
Account, of which:
Cost of servicing foreign loans P91.3 billion
3. Revaluation of International Reserve P166.3 billion
Sources: Congressional Planning and Budget Office (CPBO),
"Central Bank Losses and the Proposed Central Monetary Authority", 
submitted to the House Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries, 
on 11 March 1993
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Table 5-2. Differences Between House Bill No. 7037 and Senate Bill No. 1235
1. Capital
House: P10 billion. (Sec.2)
Senate: P50 billion. (Sec.l)
R.A. 7653: P50 billion (initially P10 billion). (Sec.2)
2. Composition of the Monetary Board
House: All members from private sector shall be full time. (Sec. 6)
Senate: 3 full time, 2 part time.
R.A. 7653: All members from private sector shall be full time. (Sec. 6c)
3. Remuneration of MB members 
House: To be approved by Congress. (Sec. 12)
Senate: Limits of P150,000 or P120,000 a month. Fixed by President. (Sec. 12)
R.A. 7653: Fixed by President. (Sec. 13)
4. Compensation of Personnel
House: Subject to the Salary Standardisation Law. (Sec. 14c)
Senate: Exemption from Salary Standardisation Law (above salary grade 21).
(Sec. 14c)
R.A. 7653: Exemption from Salary Standardisation Law (above salary grade 19). 
(Sec. 15c)
5. Powers of the Governor 
House: No quasi-judical powers.
Senate: Governor has quasi-judical powers. (Sec. 16e)
R.A. 7653: Governor has quasi-judical powers. (Sec. 17)
6. Departments
House: No statutory departments.
Senate: Dept of Economic Research is statutory dept. (Sec. 21)
R.A. 7653: No statutory departments.
7. Secrecy of Bank Deposits for potential DOSRI loans 
House: Waiver applies to deposits in all banks. (Sec. 30)
Senate: Waiver of secrecy applies to deposits only in lending bank. (Sec. 25)
R.A. 7653: Waiver applies to deposits in all banks. (Sec. 26)
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8. Definition of Insolvency
House: Insolvency does not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands 
induced by financial panic in the banking community. (Sec. 38)
Senate: Does not provide for such a qualification. (Sec. 29)
R.A. 7653: Insolvency does not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary 
demands induced by financial panic in the banking community. (Sec. 30a)
9. Penal Provisions
House: Lower penalties. (Sec. 107,108)
Senate: Higher penalties. (Sec. 32,33)
R.A. 7653: Higher penalties. (Sec. 34,35,36)
10. Distribution of Profits
House: 75% of net profits placed in a special deposit account to be applied to the 
redemption upon maturity of Government securities held by the BSP. (Sec. 100) 
Senate: 50% of net profits reverts to National Treasury. (Sec. 42)
R.A. 7653: 50% of net profits reverts to National Treasury. (Sec. 44)
11. Issue Power
House: BSP has no such authority.
Senate: BSP has authority to arrest or conduct searches to maintain integrity of the 
currency. (Sec. 48)
R.A.7653: BSP has authority to arrest or conduct searches to maintain integrity of the 
currency. (Sec. 50)
12. Special Credit Operations
House: BSP may engage in special credit operations to promote lending operations of 
banks engaged in long-term financing. (Sec. 65)
Senate: No such provision.
R.A. 7653: No such provision.
13. Foreign Asset Position of the BSP
House: BSP has to maintain at all times a net positive foreign asset position. (Sec. 88) 
Senate: No such provision.
R.A. 7653: BSP has to maintain at all times a net positive foreign asset position.
(Sec. 71)
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14. Coordination of Credit Policies
House: Government-owned corporations which perform banking or credit functions 
shall coordinate their general credit policies with those of the MB. (Sec. 112)
Senate: No such provision.
R.A. 7653: Government-owned corporations which perform banking or credit 
functions shall coordinate their general credit policies with those of the MB. (Sec. 109)
15. Structure
House: CB abolished. All assets & liabilities transferred to BSP. (Sec. 131)
Senate: CB shall continue to exist for the purpose of disposition and liquidation of 
assets and liabilities it may retain. (Sec.l25d)
R.A. 7653: CB shall continue to exist for the purpose of disposition and liquidation of 
assets and liabilities it may retain. (Sec. 131 and 132)
16. Financial Restructuring
House: A 25-year bond shall be issued by the NG in favour of BSP. The terms shall 
be determined by a Committee. (Sec. 131)
Senate: A committee shall determine what assets & liabilities shall be transferred to 
BSP. The MB shall recommend to Congress solutions to retire CB liabilities and 
losses. (Sec. 125)
R.A. 7653:A committee shall determine what assets & liabilities shall be transferred to 
BSP. (Sec. 132)
Sources: Internal Memorandum for Bicameral Conference Discussion on 8, 9 and 10 
June 1993, "Differences Between H. No. 7037 & S. No. 1235";
Committee Records, Bicameral Conference Discussion on 8 ,9  and 10 June 1993; and 
Republic Act 7653, New Central Bank Act
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Chapter 6.
Banking Sector Reform under the Ramos Government (Part II):
The Entry of New Foreign Banks
Introduction
The Philippine banking sector had been closed to new foreign entrants since the 
General Banking Act became effective in 1949. Since then only four foreign banks had 
operated in the country. The legislation to allow entry of new foreign banks was 
significant in signalling a change in the industry. A journalist, Stella Tirol-Cadiz, wrote 
that "[Ojpening up banking to foreign competitors would have been unthinkable a 
decade ago. Liberalisation would have been resisted by powerful bank owners and 
officers".1 Facilitating competition by liberalising the entry of new foreign banks had 
often been discussed but it was seen as an impossible measure due to strong opposition 
from the powerful oligarchy (see Hutchcroft,1993a:576). Under the Ramos 
government, the Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP), which had been seen as 
a very powerful business organisation, desperately attempted to protect its business 
interests by pushing its own proposal. Nevertheless, their efforts were not entirely 
successful. They were able to influence the legislation but they could not prevent 
liberalisation. Although the legislation included some restrictive provisions, it was seen 
as a landmark legislation which had a large impact on the banking sector policy. This 
legislation became an important catalyst which opened up the banking sector. In 
particular, the BAP expressed its dissatisfaction with the legislation, because the 
number of entrants through majority-owned subsidiaries was not specified, although 
the law limited the number of branches which foreign banks could establish. Along 
with other liberalisation measures, the structural reform facilitated change in the 
banking sector. The big commercial banks had to face the fiercer competition 
encouraged by liberalisation.
Under the Ramos government, the liberal reformers had consolidated support to 
implement the structural reform, although the reform was less radical than the
' MALAYA, 29 November 1993, "Landmark law opens up banking".
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government initially intended. There were various factors which encouraged reform 
under the Ramos government. The IMF, the World Bank and the US government had 
always been supportive of liberal reform. In particular, they were keen to stimulate 
financial liberalisation in the mid-1990s. Although the structural reform was not 
encouraged by conditionality lending, the policy preferences of the World Bank and the 
US government consistently gave the Philippine government strong incentives to open 
up the banking sector. In the latter half of the 1990s, multilateral trade and economic 
agreements including GATT, WTO, AFTA and APEC also encouraged liberalisation as 
a world trend. The liberal reform of other ASEAN countries, including Singapore, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, helped to attract foreign investment, and were often 
referred to by pro-reformers as "successful" cases. The policy experience of these 
countries was therefore influential in facilitating liberalisation.
Nevertheless, foreign influence and pressure from the IMF, the World Bank and the 
US government cannot be seen as the only decisive factor behind the structural reform. 
Strong initiatives to liberalise the banking sector originated from the Executive branch. 
Under the Ramos government, liberal reform was formulated tactically, supported 
broadly and implemented forcefully. As we saw in the previous chapter, a new 
constellation of political institutions emerging as a consequence of the 1987 
Constitution strengthened the interests and capacities of the President in advancing 
reforms in the banking sector. Liberal reform was backed by a political campaign which 
aimed to show the President's willingness to dismantle the power of the oligarchy. An 
"Anti-Oligarchy" campaign was broadly supported by the general public. The liberal 
reform of the Ramos government also gained broad support from business, the media 
and the general public by addressing immediate economic problems like power 
shortages and telephone services.
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Liberal Coalition: "Anti-Oligarchy" Campaign
After global interest rates increased in the late 1970s, the importance of foreign 
investment was recognised as a vital necessity for the economic development of the 
Philippines. In the early 1980s, liberalisation was planned by the technocrats, but it was 
stalled by the serious economic turmoil during the late Marcos era (see Montes and 
Ravalo,1995:153-154). Under the Aquino government, an economic development 
strategy which stressed export promotion and foreign investment was adopted. To 
attract foreign funds and expand export products, various liberalisation measures were 
initiated. The Foreign Investment Act of 1991 was a key piece of legislation designed to 
attract foreign investment by liberalising the economy. Other liberalisation measures, 
including trade liberalisation (tariff reforms) and foreign exchange liberalisation, also 
began to be implemented. The liberalisation initiated by the Aquino government was 
further facilitated by the Ramos government, which implemented liberal reform in 
various areas including trade, energy and telecommunications. The entry of new foreign 
banks became one of the key measures in the liberalisation of the economy.
The strength of the government's commitment to liberal reform was closely connected 
to its political agenda. Amando Doronila observed that, for all the discussion of 
protectionism and liberalisation, the more important context of liberal reform in the 
banking sector was "the administration's campaign to break the cartels and monopolies 
/ oligopolies that have been the base of economic and political power of the Filipino 
oligarchy".2
In the government, close allies of the President were at the centre of the political 
campaign. Among them, Jose T. Almonte, Director General of the National Security 
Council, the Presidential Security Adviser was a key strategist. The retired general with 
a background in intelligence was a supporter of the Reform the Armed Forces 
Movement (RAM) during the Marcos era, which played a critical role in the "EDSA 
revolution". He headed the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau in the 
Finance Ministry under the Aquino government, where he began to track down
2 PDI, 25 April 1994, "FVR has opportunity to crack bank cartel".
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economic crime and self-serving business practices. As Presidential Security Advisor, 
he was a core member of the Ramos government and played a leading role in drafting 
the President's early speeches and providing input for the strategic framework of 
"Philippines 2000".
As a security expert, Almonte identified the country's main concern: the importance of 
poverty alleviation, particularly in rural areas, as a means to solve internal security 
problems.3 Almonte was obsessed with the oligarchy and was convinced that the root of 
the country's problems lay in the dominance of "the predatory rent-seeking elite" in key 
industries (Coronel,1998:135-136). In seeking to crack down on monopolies (or 
cartels) and the dominance of the oligarchy, Almonte's approach was to use market 
forces and strong Presidential initiatives.4 The Ramos government was undoubtably 
supported by some members of the "oligarchy". Most notably, former President 
Aquino, who endorsed Ramos, belonged to one of the most powerful families in the 
country. However, since President Ramos and Almonte who had a prominent career as 
a military commander were not seen as members of the "oligarchy", the promotion of 
the "Anti-Oligarchy" campaign was effective in generating broad support for the 
government from the general public.
A close ally of Jose Almonte was Antonio Carpio. He was a corporate lawyer who was 
a member of the Ramos campaign team and became presidential legal advisor in 1992. 
As a corporate lawyer, he realised that there were strong proponents of liberal reform in 
business. Many business elites were frustrated with the lack of infrastructure, the 
economic recession and the slow progress of reform. Coronel explains his commitment 
to the reform: "Like many who had a brush with student activism in the 1970s, he 
found Almonte's anti-oligarchy position enticing" (Coronel,1998:136).
There were also proponents of liberal reform in various government agencies and 
among staff in Congress. Romulo Neri, the Director of Congressional Planning and 
Budget Office (CPBO) was a strong proponent of liberal reform. The research body of
the House of Representatives was established by Speaker Ramon V. Mitra after the
3 Interview, Jose Almonte, Presidential Security Advisor, 2 June 1998.
4 For his view on development strategy, for example, see Almonte (1996).
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Legislature was restored under the Aquino government. The former professor of the 
Asian Institute of Management was appointed by Speaker Mitra as director of the 
office, but he also became a credible economic advisor to his successor, Speaker Jose 
de Venecia. Director Neri was described by the Speaker as a very talented economic 
advisor.5 The relationship between the Speaker and the CPBO was so close that some 
saw the CPBO as the Speaker's office in the House.
Under the Ramos government, strong networks of liberal reformers were developed. 
The liberal reformers in various agencies cooperated with each other to push reforms 
and to curb opposition. Neri explained that there were members of the reform coalition 
in each of the key economic agencies, including the National Economic Development 
Authority (NEDA), Department of Finance, and Department of Trade and Industry.6 
They shared critical information, particularly on the opposition's movements through 
daily contacts and worked together to curb movements against liberal reform.
Ramos's initiatives to facilitate cooperation between the Executive and the Legislature 
encouraged the formation of informal and formal networks for the liberal coalition. 
Furthermore, the Ramos government was keen to mobilise support from the general 
public including various NGOs. As noted earlier, one such effort was the People’s 
Summit on Social Pact for Empowered Economic Development (SPEED) which was 
organised by close collaboration between the Legislature and the Executive.7 One of the 
pre-Summit meetings was held at Malacanang and had an attendance list of more than 
thirty pages.
Once the Executive and Legislative leaders had agreed on the importance of the reform, 
there was little chance for opposition forces to stop the reform entirely. Even the 
owners of the big domestic banks, who were supposed to be the most influential and
5 Speech by Jose de Venecia Jr. at Ateneo de Manila University, "The Demands of Leadership: 
Leadership Series II", 28 June 1997.
6 Interview, Romulo Neri, Director General, Congressional Planning and Budget Office, 23 June 
1997.
7 For the SPEED meeting, see, "Final Report: People's Summit on Social Pact for Empowered 
Economic Development", prepared by LEDAC Secretariat, October 1993.
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politically powerful segment of the oligarchy, were not able to stop the reform, 
although they were successful in inserting some restrictive provisions into the 
legislation. In the following sections, the legislative process underlying the structural 
reform, the entry of new foreign banks, is examined as a means of exploring the politics 
of economic reform.
The Legislature, the House of Representatives in particular, is often seen as a 
stumbling-block to the reform of the existing system since it has always been 
dominated by the traditional "oligarchy", who are beneficiaries of the existing system. 
In fact, the House has opposed and modified critical economic reforms, most notably 
land reform8 and tax reform.9 However, the successful legislation that allowed the entry 
of new foreign banks showed the complexity of the dynamics of Philippine legislative 
politics. Surprisingly, the House formulated a very liberal bill which aimed to facilitate 
the entry of new foreign banks, while the Senate bill was a more restrictive guideline 
including provisions which were consistent with the BAP's position.
House Bill No. 8226: Drafting the Liberal Bill
Under the Ramos government, the legislative leaders in the House took initiatives to 
liberalise the banking sector without delay. This was consistent with the Executive's 
agenda to liberalise the economy. However, this liberalisation measure was not entirely 
new to the House. In the Ninth Congress, the House Committee already had a draft bill 
which aimed to amend the General Banking Act (R.A.337) for the entry of new foreign 
banks, since the bill had been approved for the third reading in the Eighth Congress. 
The new bill, which was similar to the previous one, was again filed and discussed in a 
Joint Committee comprising the Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions 
(Chaired by Jose Carlos V. Lacson) and the Committee on Economic Affairs (Chaired 
by Felicito C. Payumo). The main author of the bill was Margarito B. Teves, a member 
of the opposition party (LDP).
8 For detailed analyses of key agrarian reform legislation under the Aquino government, see Putzel 
(1992, Chapter 8) and Magadia (1999, Chapter 3).
9 For detailed analysis of tax reform focusing on VAT legislations under the Ramos government, see 
Eaton (1998, Chapter 5).
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Between October 1992 and March 1993, the joint Committee discussed and finalised 
the bill. The Committee formulated the bill in consultation with the Central Bank, whose 
officials were often invited to the Committee discussions as technical advisors. They 
also had many hearings with representatives from resident foreign banks, offshore 
banking units (potential applicants for new entry), BAP and economists from P1DS and 
the Centre for Research and Communication. Position papers were submitted by 
various organisations and economists including: Resident Foreign Commercial Banks 
(Bank of America, Citibank, N.A., Hong Kong Shanghai Bank and Standard Chartered 
Bank); Offshore Bankers Association of the Philippines; Dr. Mario B. Lamberte, Vice- 
President, Philippine Institute for Development Studies; and Rural Bankers Association 
of the Philippines.10
The House bill was very "liberal" in the sense that it did not include restrictive 
provisions for the entry of new foreign banks. The Monetary Board of the Central 
Bank was given the authority to determine the details with respect to the pace, 
composition and extent of the liberalisation. Essentially, the bill could be seen as a set 
of broad guidelines to facilitate the entry of new foreign banks. First of all, the bill 
approved three modes of entry as follows: (1) the establishment of branches, (2) the 
acquisition of wholly or majority- owned subsidiaries and (3) investments of up to 70 
per cent of the voting stock of an existing bank. Second, the bill stipulated neither the 
specific numbers of new foreign banks allowed to establish branches nor the numbers 
of branches that each foreign bank might open. Third, the bill did not limit in any way 
the entry of a foreign bank. With the Monetary Board's approval, a foreign bank could 
establish branches, acquire wholly-owned subsidiaries and own 70 per cent of the 
voting stock of an existing bank.
10 See Statement by Resident Foreign Commercial Banks (Bank of America, Citibank, N.A., Hong 
Kong Shanghai Bank and Standard Chartered Bank); Offshore Bankers Association of the Philippines, 
"Comments on the proposed House Bill No.263" by J. Desmond Ormsby, 16 October 1992; Dr. 
Mario B. Lamberte, Vice-President, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, "Comments on 
House Bill No.263: An Act Liberalising the Entry and Operations of Foreign Banks in the 
Philippines" 19 October 1992; and Rural Bankers Association of the Philippines, "RBAP Position on 
House Bill No.263".
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The bill included some preferential criteria for selecting a new foreign bank, but they 
were not very strict. They included the following: (1) it must be a foreign banking 
institution; (2) preference would be given to publicly-held banking corporations with 
global reputations for financial innovation and stability; (3) geographic representation, 
specifically in terms of the trade and investment relationship between the Philippines 
and the country of incorporation of the foreign bank; (4) reciprocity arrangement; and 
(5) technology transfer.
The initial bill (H.B. 263), which was very similar to the previous bill, did not even 
include a provision on capital requirements. In the previous bill, the authority to decide 
on capital requirements was given to the Monetary Board. Although a guideline on 
capital requirements was added to the bill through Committee discussion, the basic 
features of the bill did not change. The capital requirement was proposed by Rep. 
Ponce Enrile, a member of the joint Committee, who was one of the most powerful 
politicians in the post-war politics of the Philippines. In the Committee meeting, he 
argued that Congress should assume responsibility for establishing the policy and for 
the requirements for the entry of a new foreign bank into the country, rather than leave 
it to the Central Bank.11 However, his proposed capital requirements, which were 
adopted by the Committee, were far less restrictive in comparison with those specified 
by the Senate bill.12
Initially, the Central Bank expressed its concern about the mode of entry. In the first 
joint meeting, Mr. Feliciano Miranda (Deputy Governor, the Central Bank) 
recommended that the entry of foreign banks should be only through the establishment 
of branches in the Philippines.13 The Deputy Governor pointed out that since the 
existing law limited the holding of a Bank's share for a Filipino corporation (up to 
30%) and for individuals (up to 20%) and banned the establishment of a majority or
11 See Minutes of the Joint Meeting: Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions and Committee 
on Economic Affairs, 19 October 1992.
12 See Minutes of the Joint Meeting: Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions and Committee 
on Economic Affairs, 9 February 1993.
13 Committee Records: A Joint Committee; Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions and 
Committee on Economic Affairs, 19 October 1992, p.23.
214
wholly owned subsidiary by Filipino commercial banks, the entry of foreign banks 
through the acquisition of wholly or majority owned subsidiaries or through 
investments of up to 70 per cent of voting stock of an existing bank potentially gave 
foreign banks advantages vis-a-vis Filipino commercial banks. However, the 
amendment was not adopted by the Committee. Rep. Teves, the author of the bill, 
insisted that the bill would not advantage foreign banks due to the "even playing field" 
principle: whatever rule applied to foreign banks would also apply to domestic banks.14 
He suggested changes to the existing law which restricted the ownership of banks.
The principle of the bill, which aimed to amend the General Banking Act for the entry 
of new foreign banks, was supported by representatives from various banking 
organisations, including: Resident Foreign Commercial Banks; the Offshore Bankers 
Association of the Philippines; and the Rural Bankers Association of the Philippines. 
The entry of new foreign banks was a very sensitive matter for big commercial banks 
whose businesses were directly affected by the new entrants. The Bankers Association 
of the Philippines (BAP) which was dominated by such big commercial banks stressed 
the importance of the principle of an "even playing field" between domestic and foreign 
banks. However, it was not able to secure the insertion of more restrictive provisions 
into the House bill by lobbying. The Central Bank did not have a strong reason to push 
restrictive provisions since the flexible bill, which gave the Monetary Board broad 
authority to determine the details of the liberalisation measures, worked in its favour.
The House of Representatives has often been seen as an obstacle to reform of the 
economy due to the dominance of the "traditional elites" (or oligarchy) which have 
benefitted from the existing system. In fact, with regard to land reform, the House 
prevented the passage of a "liberal" bill under the Aquino government.15 The House was 
not keen to increase revenues through tax reform.16 However, with regard to the entry of 
new foreign banks the liberal bill was broadly supported in the House by legislators 
across party lines. Sixty-five legislators were listed as the co-authors of the bill, which
14 Committee Records: A Joint Committee; Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions and 
Committee on Economic Affairs, 19 October 1992, p.24.
15 See Putzel (1992, Chapter 8) and Magadia (1999, Chapter 3).
16 For the case of VAT reforms under the Ramos government, see, Eaton (1998, Chapter 5).
215
was approved and sent to the Senate on 31 March 1993. The adoption of the liberal bill 
reflected the general acceptance of liberal reform in the House, the high expectations of 
liberal reform in the business community and the limited influence of the big banks 
with regard to this legislation in the House.
Since the Aquino government's adoption of an economic development strategy which 
emphasised foreign investments and export promotion, support for liberal reforms had 
gradually been growing among legislators and the business community. In particular, 
under the Ramos government, LDP (Liberalisation, Deregulation and Privatisation) was 
supported by many legislators after this approach proved effective in solving long-term 
problems in the country's infrastructure, such as energy shortages and underdeveloped 
telecommunications. The liberalisation of the banking sector by opening it up to the 
new entry of foreign banks was seen as a critical measure supplementing the Foreign 
Investment Act, passed under the Aquino government. In his Sponsorship Speech, Rep. 
Payumo emphasised that this bill was "vital in complementing the reform in trade, 
investments and foreign exchange which are necessary to stimulate economic growth 
and development".17
To attract foreign investment was seen as a vital necessity for improving the economy, 
and many expected to benefit from foreign investment. The business community 
expected that the entry of new foreign banks would generate competition among big 
commercial banks, and that this would lead to a decrease in interest rates. In addition, it 
was believed that the expansion of the new foreign banks would bring more new 
financial products, which would benefit many businesses.
The passage of the liberal bill in the House also suggested that the influence on the 
legislative process of the large families which had dominated the banking sector was 
not as decisive as previously assumed. Among the traditional elites, there were 
diversified business interests and policy preferences. All key supporters of the bill were 
from prominent political families who had a solid economic base and political support
17 Sponsors of the bill stressed these merits. See, Sponsorship Speech of Rep. Lacson, Rep. Payumo 
and Rep. Teves, Records of the House, 30 March 1993 and 31 March 1993.
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in their local constituencies.18 The main author, Margarito V. Teves, is a member of a 
wealthy family from Negros Oriental, a sugar production area and a former chief 
economist of the Ayala Corporation. Sponsors of the bill included Jose Carlos V. 
Lacson (Negros Occidental), Felicito C. Payumo (Bataan) and Amado S. Bagatsing 
(Manila) who are all from wealthy families involved in politics. It is assumed that they 
have close relationships with the big banks which dominate the banking sector through 
their various business activities. Nevertheless, they were not supportive of the large 
families who had interests in big banks. For example, in his sponsorship speech, 
Amado S. Bagatsing, who is from a wealthy family which has been very influential in 
politics in Manila, urged the necessity of opening up the highly protected banking 
sector which had been dominated by the large families.19 Many legislators, particularly 
the Speaker, the majority leader and the members of the joint Committee, could have 
proposed the addition of restrictive provisions to the bill if they had wished. However, 
there was little attempt to favour the big commercial banks in the House.
Senate Bill No. 1606: Insertion of Restrictive Provisions
After the House finalised the bill, the Executive and legislative leaders placed a high 
priority on it. The Senate leaders expressed their commitment to opening up the 
banking sector at the People's Summit on Social Pact For Empowered Economic 
Development (SPEED) in August and September 1993, The Senate Committee on 
Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, chaired by Sen. Raul S. Roco, started to 
study the bill from October 1993, although bills had been prepared since early 1993. In 
the Senate, three different bills were filed as follows: S.B. 839 (by Sen. Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo), S.B. 1474 (by Sen. Neptali A. Gonzales, Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, 
Sen. Bias F. Ople and Sen. Raul S. Roco) and S.B. 1563 (by Sen. Leticia Shahani).
Initially, the three bills were not very different from the House bill in terms of the key 
provisions, including the mode of entiy and the capital requirement, although some
18 For their family backgrounds and business interests, see Gutierrez (1994).
19 See, the Sponsorship Speech by Rep. Bagatsing, Records of the House, 31 March 1993.
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restrictive provisions were included.20 Through numerous formal and informal 
discussions in the Committee, the caucus of Senators and floor meetings, the Senate bill 
was formulated. The Senate created a separate bill to regulate the entry of new foreign 
banks, while the House bill was an amendment to the existing law, namely the General 
Banking Act. The Senate bill, unlike the House bill, included many restrictive 
provisions for the entry of new foreign banks. First of all, the Senate bill restricted 
entry to only one of the following modes: (1) the establishment of branches; or (2) 
acquisition of up to 60% of the voting stock of an existing bank; or (3) investments of 
up to 60% in one new banking subsidiary. Second, the bill specified the number of 
foreign banks which were allowed to establish branches and the number of branches 
that could be opened by each bank. Third, the bill required higher capital requirements 
for new foreign banks. Fourth, the bill included more specific guidelines for the 
selection of new foreign banks. The restrictive provisions added to the Senate bill were 
a reflection of nationalist (protectionist) sentiments, scepticism about the Central Bank's 
regulation, opposition to the Ramos government and its economic policy, cautious 
attitudes to radical liberal policy and the influence of the BAP's desperate advocacy.
The Committee held many hearings with representatives from various business 
organisations and economists. Central Bank officials, including governor Singson, were 
also involved in the Committee discussions as advisors. Since the House bill had been 
finalised, it was also referred to the Senate for discussion along with the position papers 
on the bill. Through the committee hearings, representatives from various business 
organisations expressed their expectations of the liberalisation measures and support 
for the liberal bill. Only the Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP) was vocally 
opposed to the liberal bill and demanded more restrictive provisions to the Senate bill in 
order to create a stricter guideline based on the "level playing field" principle .
20 For the bills, see "Comparative Analysis Between R.A. 337, H.B. B226, S.B. 839, S.B. 1474 and 
S.B. 1563", 10 January 1993, prepared for the Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and 
Currencies.
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Strong support for the entry of new foreign banks came from the resident foreign 
banks.21 In particular, Citibank, which had been the largest foreign bank in the country, 
expressed its interest in expanding its business into retail banking businesses. It was 
the only foreign bank which planned to request the establishment of more than six 
branches after the bill was enacted. They clarified support for the liberal bill as follows: 
"We support a liberal version of the banking bill, even though our banks 
will be the most directly impacted competitively by new entrants into the 
market. We do so out of a conviction that economic liberalisation brings 
economic dynamism and growth. The new legal framework for foreign 
banking in the Philippines that will emerge from Congress as well as the 
regulatory process to be adopted by the banking authorities to implement 
the liberalisation can be realised. Understandably, some sectors, particularly 
domestic banking interests, have been advocating a restrictive framework 
which will undermine the liberalisation program and minimise the benefits 
to the users of financial services."
Offshore banks, which were operating a very limited business in the country, strongly 
supported the entry of new foreign banks22 as they were potential applicants. Offshore 
banking units (OBUs) had been operating in the country since 1976. However, they 
were only allowed to accept deposits from non-Philippine residents and provide loans 
in foreign currencies. They were neither permitted to conduct business in pesos nor to 
borrow money from local banks. Some of them, including a Japanese bank (Bank of 
Tokyo), showed strong interest in opening a branch and expanding their business.23
Resident foreign businesses also expressed their support for the entry of new foreign 
banks. The foreign Chambers of Commerce were invited to the Senate hearing and the 
Chambers, including American, Canadian and Australian-New Zealand Chamber of
21 See The Position of the Resident Foreign Banks on the Liberalisation of Foreign Banking in the 
Philippines, 20 October 1993.
22 See Offshore Bankers Association of the Philippines, "Comments on the proposed House Bill 
No.263" by J. Desmond Ormsby, 16 October 1992.
23 See Susumu Nakaichi's (General Manager, Bank of Tokyo) comments in Committee Records: 
Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 12 January 1994, p. 19.
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Commerce of the Philippines, published a statement of their position in favour of the 
liberal approach in a local business daily.24
In the Philippine business community, many were strong supporters of the liberal bill. 
Although solid ties between the commercial banks and big business through inter­
locking directorates were strong, this did not determine their positions on the bill. The 
anticipated benefits seemed to be much more important than the old business ties. The 
Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industiy (PCCI), the most influential business 
chamber in the country, expressed its support for banking liberalisation. Federico C. 
Pascual who became the President of Allied Bank, stated that PCCI's constituency 
consisted of the users of funds and that the more competition there was in the market 
the better. They expected that the new foreign banks would stimulate the banking 
business and bring new financial products and better services for the Philippine 
business sector.25
PhilExport, which represented the interests of small exporters, was also in favour of the 
entry of new foreign banks. PhilExport had close ties with the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) which it used to facilitate private investment 
and trade opportunities in the Philippines. Mr. Gerry R. Anigan, Policy Group 
Coordinator of PhilExport, expressed strong support for the bill's goal of liberalising 
the entry of foreign banks. Although some predicted that the entry of new foreign 
banks would have an impact on the wholesale markets of big business in the country, 
PhilExport argued that the small businesses would be potential beneficiaries of the 
entry of new foreign banks. They stated that;
"We agree with the Governor that the principal objectives here are 
investment promotion and technology transfer. We also wish to emphasise 
that another objective which will be useful to exporters is the opening up of 
information networks for their linkages with international markets."...
24 See Committee Records: Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 12 
January 1994; and Business Star, Letters, 14 December 1993.
25 See Committee Records: Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 9 
November 1993, p.45 and Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI), Chamber Views: 
Perspectives on the Liberalisation of Entry of Foreign Banks and Their Scope of Operations.
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"We also see that the increased competition arising from the entiy of 
foreign banks should help improve access of smaller businessmen, smaller 
exporters to credits, as well as improve the availability of credit at 
internationally competitive rates, and increase the options or the financial 
instruments available on the market."26
Even the National Economic Protectionism Association (NEPA), headed by Rene 
Ofreneo, did not offer any objection to the entry of foreign banks. In its view, as long 
as the majority of banks were controlled by Filipinos, liberalisation measures which 
would foster economic growth would be beneficial to Filipinos as a whole.27
After the House had passed the bill and the issue had begun to attract media attention, 
the Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP) became desperate to clarify its 
position. The BAP was keen to insert restrictive provisions into the Senate bill. The 
BAP, particularly its President, Rafael B. Buenaventura, the President of PCIBank and 
a former Citibank manager (later Central Bank governor), enthusiastically advocated 
proposals for the entry of new foreign banks to various media, the Senate Committee 
and individual Senators. The BAP represented the interests of the big commercial 
banks, which had dominated the banking sector and would be faced with fierce 
competition from new and existing foreign banks. These banks were desperate to 
protect their businesses from powerful competitors, particularly Citibank.
Changing conditions fuelled a sense of threat among the big domestic banks. First, the 
liberalisation of the banking sector had already started through deregulation of the 
establishment of new branches and new domestic banks. The competition among banks 
was becoming fiercer. In 1993, the new Central Bank governor, Gabriel Singson, had 
already allowed the establishment of two new domestic banks. Second, big commercial 
banks were afraid of the aggressive stance of the resident foreign banks. In particular, 
Citibank was keen to expand its business into retail banking for wealthy individuals
26 Committee Records: Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 6 January 
1994, p.49.
27 See Committee Records: Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 6 
January 1994, p.45.
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where the domestic commercial banks had an advantage, Third, the Central Bank, which 
had been a protector of the domestic banks, was not entirely in favour of the domestic 
banks' position. The Central Bank also expected that the entry of new foreign banks 
would facilitate foreign investment. Furthermore, Governor Singson seemed to be 
supportive of Citibank's position since he appreciated Citibank's contribution to foreign 
exchange generation during the economic and foreign currency crisis of 1982-1983.28 
Fourth, the House had authorised the liberal bill and the bill had gained broad support 
from domestic and foreign businesses. There was little support for the BAP's position 
from Philippine businesses which had close relationships through inter-locking 
directorates. The domestic commercial banks were often criticised for their wide profit 
margins and the large spread between lending and borrowing rates.
The BAP claimed that it recognised the merits of foreign equity and investment and 
welcomed the entry of new foreign banks subject to the principles of the level playing 
field and reciprocity, and to the institution of policies which would guarantee effective 
control by Filipinos of the country's financial and banking system.29 The BAP severely 
criticised the liberal bill passed by the House. First, the BAP claimed that it was 
inaccurate to state that the Philippine banking sector was "more restricted and 
protective" vis-a-vis its ASEAN neighbours, since there were far fewer foreign banks in 
the Philippines than in the other countries, but the total assets of the foreign banks were 
not smaller than those in the other countries. Second, it was not accurate to state that the 
entry of foreign banks would enable "savings mobilisation" and "achieve greater 
efficiency through increased competition". Since the majority of foreign banks were 
interested only in wholesale business, the impact of the new entrants would limit the 
services offered to big corporations. Third, the BAP even expressed scepticism with 
regard to the contribution which new foreign banks might increase foreign investment
because there had been two British banks whose investment contribution to the
28 Committee Records: Bicameral Conference Committee; Senate Committee on Banks, Financial 
Institutions & Currencies and House Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries, 21 April 
1994, p47.
29 For the BAP's position, see "The Position of the Bankers Association of the Philippines on the 
Liberalisation of the Entry of Foreign Banks" submitted to the Senate Committee on 10 September 
1993 and reprinted in PhilExport (1994); and Malaya, 29 November 1993, "All we Want is a level 
playing field" by Rafael B. Buenaventura.
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economy had not been large.
Guided by the principle of the level playing field and effective Filipino control, the BAP 
proposed very restrictive provisions on the mode of entry, the size of capital 
requirement and the type of capital,30 The BAP recommended the entry of new foreign 
banks by the establishment of branches only and wanted to limit the number of 
branches to three. In spite of the limited number of branches, the capital requirement of 
the new foreign banks would be equal to the level of the domestic commercial banks. 
The proposal also enforced strict ceilings on the transfer of capital from head offices 
(Net Due to Head Office accounts).
The BAP insisted that the large spread between lending and borrowing rates was 
caused by the high costs of intermediation. To defend its position, the BAP presented a 
research paper written by Jaime Laya, the former Central Bank governor. In the paper, 
Laya pointed out the three causes of high costs as follows: (1) high reserve 
requirements, 25% at that time; (2) Agri-Agra regulation which required that 10% of 
loanable funds be used for lending to agriculture and agrarian reform programme 
beneficiaries or used to purchase certain allowable government securities; and (3) 5% 
of Gross Receipt Tax (GRT).31
A fierce conflict came to light over this issue between the BAP and Citibank. The 
foreign bank claimed that the BAP's proposal was very restrictive. Citibank argued in 
its position paper that "in contrast to the BAP position, most of the countries that have 
liberalised ahead of the Philippines have taken a proactive 'market mode' posture in 
order to attract foreign banks into markets". There was a deep cleavage between their 
views. The BAP expressed concern over "misleading" information presented by the 
foreign bankers on the issue.32 In a news conference, Buenaventura accused the foreign 
bankers of raising "false expectations that the liberalisation for foreign banks will 
achieve benefits to the Filipino public in general". The BAP also argued that its own
30 See Table 6-1 "Proposals of the BAP".
31 See Jaime C. Laya, Chairman, Laya Manabat Salgado & Co. "A Note on the Spread Between 
Borrowing and Lending Rates", in PhilExport (1994:14-16).
32 See Malaya, 29 October 1993, "Rift widens between bankers".
223
proposals for the entry of new foreign banks were not restrictive by ASEAN standards.
Although the BAP could not push its position entirely on the Senate bill, its position, 
which stressed the importance of restrictive provisions on the entry of new foreign 
banks, appealed to the members of the Senate. Vocal support for the restrictive 
provisions came from some senators who emphasised the principle of Filipino control 
of the economy. Sen. Arturo M. Tolentino consistently opposed the bill and demanded 
restrictive provisions. He even argued that the bill violated the Constitution and 
expressed concerns about the "extinction of local banks" as a result of the entry of new 
foreign banks.33 Sen. Wigberto Tanada, Minority Floor Leader, who had a reputation 
for his Pro-Filipino attitude, was also opposed to the entry of new foreign banks. He 
argued that the banking sector should be controlled by Filipinos and that the 
liberalisation measure would be unconstitutional. In addition, he thought that the 
Philippine banking sector could sufficiently and adequately respond to the growing 
needs of business, industry and agriculture.34 Sen. Emesto M. Maceda, a vocal critic of 
the Ramos administration and their economic policy was also strongly opposed to the 
bill. Sen. Nikki M.L. Coseteng, a former T.V. show hostess, also joined the opposition 
allies. These senators were much more sceptical about the entry of new foreign banks 
than the BAP, which agreed on the importance of foreign investment and capital for the 
Philippine economy.
Other senators also demanded that restrictive provisions should be included in the bill 
although they were not opposed to the entry of new foreign banks. The authors of the 
three bills, the core members of the caucus meeting, agreed that the Senate bill should 
provide more specific guidelines for the entry of new foreign banks. With respect to the 
mode of entry, Sen. Neptali A. Gonzales was in favour of the BAP's position. During a 
caucus meeting, he proposed an amendment which restricted mode of entry in line with
33 See Sen. Arturo M. Tolentino's Press Release, 21 March 1994; Record of the Senate, 17 May 
1994, Vol.V,No.80, pp.420-439, "Cof. Com. Rep. on S.1606/H.8226", Explanation of Vote of Sen. 
Tolentino, p.427.
34 See, Record of the Senate, 17 May 1994, Vol.V,No.80, pp.420-439, "Cof.Com. Rep.on 
S.1606/H.8226", Explanation of Vote of Sen. Tanada, p.433.
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the BAP's request.3S Regarding the issue of the number of new foreign banks and the 
number of branches, the Committee decided on a limit of six banks (and two additional 
banks) and six branches. Higher capital requirements were also adopted. Various 
guidelines for the selection of the new foreign banks were specified by the bill. 
According to Sen. Roco, the stricter guidelines reflected scepticism among senators 
about the BSP's regulations.36
The Bicameral Conference Committee
When the Bicameral Conference Committee on the bill convened, there were large 
differences between the House and the Senate bills. While the Senate bill created a new 
law to regulate the entry of new foreign banks, the House bill aimed to amend the 
existing law, the General Banking Act, for the entry of new foreign banks. The key 
provisions differed in the following ways: (1) modes of entry, (2) number of foreign 
banks and number of branches opened by each bank, (3) guidelines for approval, (4) 
capitalisation, (5) capital ratios, and (6) equal treatment.37 During the meetings of the 
Bicameral Committee, these differences occasionally intensified the sense of rivalry 
between the House and the Senate.
In April and May 1994, a series of formal and informal meetings, including the 
meetings of the four bicameral committees, was held to resolve the differences between 
the two bills. Central Bank officials, including governor Singson, often attended the 
meetings as technical advisors. The root of the differences between the House and the 
Senate bills stemmed from their basic stances: the House tended to stress the 
importance of flexibility in banking regulations while the Senate required stricter rules 
and guidelines for the entry of new foreign banks. There were fierce arguments
35 See Committee Records: Bicameral Conference Committee; Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions & Currencies and House Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries, 21 
April 1994, p.22.
36 See Committee Records: Bicameral Conference Committee; Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions & Currencies and House Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries, 21 
April 1994, pp. 15-16.
37 See Table 6-2 "The Comparison of S.B. 1606, H.B.8226, BSP (Executive) Position and R.A.
7721.
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between Rep. Teves, the main author of the House bill, and Sen. Roco, the Committee 
Chair of the Senate panel, over such issues as the mode of entry and the specific 
limitations on the number of banks and branches.
In general, the Bicameral Conference Committee tended to arrive at an intermediate 
compromise position between the House bill and the Senate bill. For example, the 
amount of permanently assigned capital agreed on was P210 million, a figure between 
that in the Senate bill (P300 million) and that in the House bill (P125 million). 
However, regarding the entry of new foreign banks, the Senate bill was more influential 
than the House bill in terms of the final outcome. The Senate panel was able to insert 
restrictive provisions regulating the mode of entry and the specific numbers of new 
foreign banks and branches. The Senate panel utilised their advantage. First of all, 
although the Central Bank demanded the deletion of some of the restrictive provisions 
of the Senate bill with the endorsement of the Executive, governor Singson did not 
openly express support for the House bill in the Bicameral Conference Committee. His 
role as technical advisor in the Committee could largely explain the "neutral" position 
of Singson as well as that of other Central Bank officials on the Committee. However, it 
must be noted that Senator Roco had a close relationship with the BSP since he played 
a critical role in establishing the New Central Bank, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 
(BSP) as the chairman of the Senate Committee on Banks. Second, the existence of 
resilient opposition in the Senate put unseen pressures on the House panel. There was 
vocal opposition to the entry of new foreign banks in the Senate. Because, unlike the 
House, the pro-Ramos coalition did not dominate the Senate (although Senate President 
Angara was supportive of Ramos's economic agenda), the support of the Senate for the 
liberalisation was not solid. Sen. Roco insisted that it was very difficult to reach a 
compromise on the provisions to be added to the Senate bill since some senators 
demanded more restrictive provisions.38
38 See, for example, Committee Records: Bicameral Conference Committee; Senate Committee on 
Banks, Financial Institutions & Currencies and House Committee on Banks and Financial 
Intermediaries, 21 April 1994, pp.25-26.
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The Committee adopted the Senate bill as a draft for discussion in the first meeting. 
The Senate bill, which was to create the new law, enjoyed some advantages in the 
Committee discussion. Since it included only provisions to regulate the new foreign 
banks, the issues could be much more easily clarified. The Senate panel was successful 
in gaining the support of the Central Bank on the form of the bill. Rep. Lacson, the 
Chair of the House panel, accepted the form of the Senate bill as the final outcome 
when governor Singson recommended it. Later, in the Committee, the chair of the 
House panel complained that "it would have been a big disadvantage on our part to start 
discussing this particular issue of the entry of foreign banks by using the Senate 
version as a draft".39 The final bill included restrictive provisions which were not 
included in the House bill.
The most controversial issue was the mode of entry and statutoiy provisions on the 
number of new foreign banks and the number of branches opened by each bank. The 
House panel insisted that these regulations should be flexible enough to allow for 
adjustments to changing conditions, and that the authority to decide the numbers should 
be left to the Monetary Board. However, the Senate panel strenuously resisted pressure 
to change its position on this issue. To justify the Senate's position, Sen. Roco often 
referred to the Australian experience as an example of a failure resulting from an 
attempt to open up the banking sector without sufficiently restrictive guidelines.40 After 
long debates, the House accepted that these numbers should be specified by law, while 
the Senate agreed that the maximum number of new foreign banks should be increased 
from eight to ten. The number of branches opened by each bank was limited to six. The 
three modes of entry were accepted, but each bank had to choose one of the three 
modes of entry. In addition, the final bill included the general policy of equal treatment, 
and specified a ceiling of ownership of foreign banks up to 30 per cent of the entire 
banking sector which was even more restrictive than the 40 per cent ceiling stipulated 
by the Senate bill._________
39 See Committee Records: Bicameral Conference Committee; Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions & Currencies and House Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries, 4 
May 1994, p.71.
40 See for example, Committee Records: Bicameral Conference Committee; Senate Committee on 
Banks, Financial Institutions & Currencies and House Committee on Banks and Financial 
Intermediaries, 21 April 1994, pp.33-34.
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The Senate panel was able to persuade the House panel to accept the imposition of 
restrictive guidelines for the selection of the new entrants with some modification while 
the regulations on the Net Due to Head Office accounts (inwards remittances from the 
headquarters of foreign banks) was not restrictively specified by the law in accordance 
with the House position.41
Conclusion
The legislation regulating new foreign banks (R.A.7721) included some restrictive 
provisions which were not found in the liberal bill adopted by the House. Nevertheless, 
the entry of new foreign banks was a critical event for the banking sector which had 
been closed to new foreign entrants since 1949. The restrictive provisions on the mode 
of entry and the numbers of new foreign banks and branches were not so tight as to 
discourage the entry of foreign banks. Governor Singson commented that the number 
of foreign banks (eight) permitted by the Senate bill was not too restrictive. He 
suggested the Committee that it might be increased to ten.42 The number of branches, 
which was limited to six, was also not an obstacle to new foreign entrants, since no 
potential applicants, except Citibank, were interested in opening more than four 
branches.43 Although the law limited the number of foreign banks entering by 
establishing branches, the number of entrants through majority-owned subsidiaries was 
not specified, as the BAP had expressed concern about this mode of entry.44 In fact, the 
entiy of new foreign banks triggered competition in the sector. In the late 1990s, some
big banks were merged in order to survive the new business environment which had
41 See Committee Records: Bicameral Conference Committee; Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions & Currencies and House Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries, 11 
May 1994, pp. 10-11.
42 See Committee Records: Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 6 
January 1994, p.38.
43 See Committee Records: Bicameral Conference Committee; Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions & Currencies and House Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries, 21 
April 1994, p.47.
44 See, for example, Speech by Rafael B. Buenaventura at Financial Executives Institute of the 
Philippines (FINEX) 6th General Membership Meeting, "The Entry of Foreign Banks in the Country- 
Boon or Bane?".
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been created by the various liberalisation measures.
The Ramos government further facilitated the economic liberalisation, initiated by the 
Aquino government. To encourage foreign investment and expand exports, the 
government implemented various liberalisation measures, including tariff reforms (trade 
liberalisation), telecommunications reform, foreign exchange liberalisation and the entry 
of new foreign banks. International influences played a critical role in liberalising the 
economy. Nevertheless, the entry of new foreign banks was not simply a passive 
reaction to pressures from outside the country. The case of the banking sector showed 
that the strong initiatives for liberalisation stemmed from the President, the centre of 
Philippine government.
Faced with an economic downturn in the early 1990s, the Ramos government was keen 
to reform the economy. Successful economic management was the key to mobilising 
support for the new President, who was elected with the smallest share of votes in 
Philippine history. Furthermore, the strong initiative to liberalise the banking sector 
emerged from the government on the back of a political ("anti-oligarchy") campaign 
which aimed to show the government's willingness to challenge the oligarchy's 
dominance of key industries. The constitutional strength of the Presidency and the 
President's tactical approach to the formation of a Pro-Ramos coalition in the Congress 
were important to the success of his legislative agenda. Most importantly, as was seen 
in the previous chapter, a new constellation of political institutions emerged as a 
consequence of the establishment of the 1987 Constitution which strengthened the 
interests and capacities of the President in advancing banking reform and weakened 
resistance among legislators. The six-year limit on the Presidency and the various 
initiatives taken by the new President facilitated the building of cooperative 
relationships between the President and legislative leaders, leading to structural reform.
The President's strong initiatives to reform the economy generated broad support. The 
entry of new foreign banks reflected rapid changes in the policy preferences of 
legislators, Philippine businesses, the media and the general public. Although there 
were pockets of resilient opposition to economic liberalisation, especially in the Senate,
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liberalisation was no longer an economic strategy which easily generated hostile 
reactions throughout Philippine society. Liberalisation was previously a word which 
hinted at foreign dominance, massive layoffs and high prices due to the loss of 
subsidies. For example, under the Aquino government, the government's plan to 
liberalise the oil industry generated massive opposition, led to strikes of transportation 
workers and even spread rumours of another military coup. Dr. Paderanga, the former 
Director General of the NEDA, pointed out that there was a significant shift in policy 
preferences among legislators, businesses, the media and the general public.45 As an 
economic strategy, liberalisation was accepted by many more people under the Ramos 
government than under the Aquino government.
In the domestic business community, there were many supporters of the liberalisation 
measures, which would create new business opportunities and foreign investment. 
Competition, facilitated by liberalisation measures, was expected to reduce prices and 
improve services. Businesses anticipated that the reform of the banking sector would 
reduce the costs of borrowing. In spite of the close ties between the banking sector and 
various industries, there was little support from other businesses for the BAP's 
position. Backed by businesses and the general public once a consensus had emerged 
among policy elites on the importance of the banking reform, the owners and 
managements of big banks who were supposedly the most powerful "oligarchy", were 
unable to stop the reform.
45 interview, Dr. Cayetano Paderanga, Jr. 10 June 1997.
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Table 6-1. Proposals of the BAP
1. Mode of Entry of Foreign Banks
BAP proposes that foreign banks enter the Philippines as branches only:
(a) Branching will require less capital.
(b) Foreign banks themselves indicate they prefer to establish branches due to facility 
of operations.
(c) Monetary authorities may find it difficult to ensure effective control by nationals 
should foreign banks be allowed to gain control of Philippine banking corporations.
(d) There will be no need to amend the maximum legal ownership of foreigners in 
Philippine banks.
2. Size of Capital for Foreign Banks
Based on the principle of the level playing field, the capital requirements of banks are:
(i) P750 Million for a commercial bank license.
(ii) P1.5 Billion for a universal bank license.
Requiring that the size of capital be equal to that required for Philippine banks will 
assure:
(a) Equal and fair treatment for all classes of banks;
(b) The permanent presence and long term commitment of foreign banks; and
(c) Larger capital will make a foreign bank branch more competitive and more willing to 
COMMIT resources within the Philippine financial system.
3. Type of Capital
(a) Permanently assigned capital
(i) The maximum permitted ratios of Net Due to Head Office to permanently assigned 
capital are the following:
(1) 2 to 1 for a single branch:
(2) 1 to 1 for a maximum of 3 branches:
(3) For an expanded Commercial Bank, the required capital of P1.5 Billion would be 
through Permanently Assigned Capital of P750 Million and Net Due to Head Office of 
P750 Million.
(b) The maximum number of branches for a foreign bank fixed at three.
(c) The Monetary Board issues guidelines on the application and the use of the Net
Due to Head Office, providing particularly that the amount is converted into local
currency, invested and maintained in such local assets as the Monetary Board may 
direct.
Sources: "The Position of the Bankers Association of the Philippines on the 
Liberalisation of the Entry of Foreign Banks" submitted to the Senate Committee on 10 
September 1993 and reprinted in PhilExport (1994).
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Table 6-2. The Comparison of S.B.1606, H.B. 8226, BSP (Executive) Position 
and R.A. 7721
Modes of Entry 
S.B. 1606 (Sec. 2)
With prior MB approval, a foreign bank may avail itself of ONLY one of the following 
modes of entry:
(1) establish a branch;
or (2) acquire np to 60% of voting stock in one existing bank; 
or (3) invest up to 60% in one new banking subsidiary.
H.B. 8226
Subject to MB approval, foreign banks may:
(1) establish branches (Sec. 7,9),
(2) establish wholly or majority-owned subsidiaries (Sec. 9),
(3) invest up to 70% of voting stock of an existing bank (Sec. 5,9).
BSP (Executive)
With prior MB approval, a foreign bank may avail itself of the following modes of 
entry:
(1) establish a branch;
(2) acquire up to 60% of voting stock one existing bank;
(3) invest up to 60% of one new banking subsidiary.
R.A.7721 (Sec. 2)
With prior MB approval, a foreign bank may avail of ONLY one of the following 
modes of entry:
(1) by acquiring, purchasing or owning up to 60% of the voting stock of an existing 
bank;
or (2) by investing in up to 60% of the voting stock of a new banking subsidiary
incorporated under the laws of the Philippines;
or (3) by establishing branches with full banking authority.
Limits on Privilege, Number of New Foreign Banks and Number of Branches
of a Bank
S.B.1606
Maximum of 6 or 8 foreign banks through entry by establishing branches (Sec. 6) and 
maximum of 6 branches of each bank (Sec. 2), (this limitation does not apply to the 
other modes of entry); and the privileges granted to foreign bank entrants shall expire 
five years from the effectivity of the Act 
H.B. 8226
No limitation (subject to MB approval)
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BSP (Executive)
The privileges granted to foreign bank entrants shall be re-examined by the Monetary
Board after five years from the effectivity of the Act
R.A.7721
Maximum of 10 foreign banks (Sec. 6) and maximum of 6 branches (Sec. 4).
The privileges granted to foreign bank entering by establishing branches shall expire 
five years from the effectivity of the Act (Sec. 6)
Guidelines for Approval 
S.B.1606 (Sec. 3)
Enforcing restrictive guidelines including, among others, reciprocity rights and 
inclusion among the top 100 foreign banks in the world or the top 3 banks in the 
country of origin 
H.B. 8226
No restrictive guidelines 
BSP (Executive)
Deletion of restrictive guidelines, particularly the requirement to be among the top 100
foreign banks in the world or the top 3 banks in their country of origin
R.A.7721
Enforcing restrictive guidelines including, among others, reciprocity rights, regional 
representation and among the top 150 foreign banks in the world or the top 5 banks in 
the country of origin
Capitalisation 
S.B.1606 (Sec.4)
P300 million for 3 branches, P50 million for every additional branch 
H.B. 8226
P125 million for 3 branches, P150 million for 4 branches, P175 million for 5 branches, 
P200 million for 6 branches, for 7 or more branches an amount equal to minimum 
capital requirement for domestic banks is required.
BSP (Executive)
Permanently assigned capital P200 million 
R.A.7721 (Sec. 12)
For locally incorporated subsidiaries - equal to that required by MB of domestic banks, 
For branches - a permanently assigned capital of at least P210 million for 3 branches 
and an P35 million for every additional branch
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Capital Ratios 
S.B. 1606
For purposes of computing capital ratios of foreign bank branches, the Net Due To 
Head Office (NDTHO) account that is inwardly remitted and converted into pesos shall 
be added to assigned capital in the ratio prescribed by law or the MB.
H.B. 8226
The Net Due To Head Office together with the assigned capital at a maximum ratio of 
5:1 will be used for calculating capital ratio.
R.A. 7721 (Sec. 4)
15% of NDTHO to be inwardly remitted and converted to Philippine currency, but 
exemption is provided for the amount invested in productive enterprises
Equal Treatment
S.B. 1606
Foreign banks enjoy the same privileges and be subject to the same limitations imposed 
upon a Philippine bank of the same categoiy. These limits include the Single 
Borrowers Limit and Capital To Risk Asset Ratio under the General Banking Act and 
other related laws of the Philippines.
H.B. 8226 
No provision 
R.A. 7721
Foreign banks enjoy the same privileges and be subject to the same limitations imposed 
upon a Philippine bank of the same category. These limits include the Single 
Borrowers Limit and Capital To Risk Asset Ratio under the General Banking Act and 
other related laws of the Philippines.
Sources:
Summary Comparison of the Bills on Foreign Bank Entry Liberalisation, Prepared by 
the House Committee Staff, 19 April 1994; Differing Provisions Between Senate Bill 
No. 1606 and House Bill No. 8226,25 April 1994, Prepared for Bicameral Conference 
Committee; and R.A. 7721.
BSP (Executive) Positions are from:
Letter from Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Executive Secretary, to Sen. Raul S. Roco, "the 
aide memoir from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas" 19 April 1994.
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Chapter 7.
Conclusion
"Weak banks are a worldwide phenomenon. They pose a continuing 
challenge for bank supervisors in all countries, irrespective of the political 
structure, financial system and level of economic and technical 
development. All bank supervisors have to be prepared to minimise their 
incidence and deal with them if they occur".1
In the beginning of the new century, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) has faced 
numerous challenges as a banking regulator. Under a more liberalised and globalised 
business environment, maintaining financial stability has become more difficult than 
before. There are also still large amounts of non-performing assets (NPA) in the 
banking sector. Banking frauds which lead to the insolvency of banks are repeatedly 
revealed. However, despite remaining weakness, the Philippine banking sector has 
experienced various developments and changes guided by policy reforms. The 
Philippines, which had been seen as "the Sick Man of Asia", was able to maintain 
relative stability in the economy and the banking sector despite the rapid depreciation of 
the currency in 1997. Faced with the "Asian economic crisis", unlike other ASEAN 
countries such as Malaysia, and in particular Thailand and Indonesia, the Philippines 
was able to avoid spending huge sums of public money to restructure the banking 
sector in the late 1990s. Although short term capital inflows to the economy increased 
in the mid-1990s, the relatively small amount of "hot money" was an important factor 
which allowed the Philippines to avoid the economic and banking crisis of the late 
1990s. Nevertheless, there was also a broad consensus among economists and business 
analysts on the significance of banking sector reform as a cause of the relatively 
successful maintenance of economic and banking stability in the Philippines2 along 
with relatively sound monetary, fiscal and foreign exchange policy.
1 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (2002:3). Also, cited partly in Business World, 13 
August 2002, Special Report: Second Quarter Banking Report.
1 See, for example, Canlas (2000), Gochoco-Bautista (1999), Urn (1998), Sicat (1999), and Noland
(2000).
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In this context, this thesis has examined the politics of Philippine banking reform in the 
process of economic recovery from the economic crisis of the early 1980s. With 
respect to economic policy-making in the Philippines, the existing literature views the 
demands made either by foreign actors such as the US, the IMF and the World Bank 
or social forces (i.e. the oligarchy) as critical explanatory factors. In the existing 
literature on the Philippines' political economy, and in particular on the banking sector, 
there is a tendency to focus on the "weak" state, the "strong" society (oligarchy) and the 
strong continuity of these factors throughout Philippine history. However, this view 
limits our ability to understand the successes or failures of banking reform, the 
developments and changes in the banking structure, and the overall restoration of 
banking stability in the process of economic recovery between 1986 and 1995 since 
these views reduce Philippine politics to a relatively immediate expression of foreign or 
socially rooted demands.
As an alternative, this thesis argues that to understand the failures and successes of 
banking reform in the Philippines, the decisions of policy elites and institutions should 
be located at the centre of the analysis. In brief, the successful enactment and 
implementation of banking reform during the process of economic recovery was 
contingent on a new constellation of political institutions which emerged with the 1987 
Constitution. This new constellation strengthened the interests and capacities of 
Presidents, the centre of the Philippine government, in advancing banking reform and 
weakening potential resistance among legislators and dominant social forces. This 
concluding chapter briefly recapitulates the arguments of this thesis on the politics of 
banking reform in the Philippines.
Banking Reforms and the Avoidance of the Banking Crisis of the 1990s
The Philippine banking sector has been seen as typical of a failed economy. Frauds, 
DOSRI loans, cartel-like behaviour and high financial intermediation costs have been 
viewed as obstacles to the developing economy. The defects of the banking sector were 
very clear during the economic crisis of the early 1980s. However, in the 1990s, a new 
puzzle emerged as the failed banking sector was rehabilitated and reformed to create a
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banking sector which was more effective and stable in comparison with that in other 
ASEAN countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia which, prior to the Asian 
foreign currency crisis, had been seen as the more successful economies.
In the process of recovery from the ruins of the economic and banking crisis of the 
early 1980s, banking sector reform was guided by two key principles: the facilitation of 
competition through liberalisation measures and the strengthening of the regulatory 
framework. Liberalisation does not guarantee an effective and stable banking sector. 
However, the ineffective structure of the Philippine banking sector, that had largely been 
occupied by state banks and was highly protected against new domestic and foreign 
entrants until 1986, was transformed by liberalisation. Along with Central Bank policies 
such as hikes of minimum capital requirements, liberal reforms facilitated the 
consolidation of the banking sector. The various structural and regulatory reforms 
implemented by the Aquino and, more fully, Ramos governments greatly contributed to 
the creation of a healthier banking sector, which was relatively resilient to the currency 
crisis of the late 1990s.
When the Aquino government took power through extraordinary means, the "EDSA 
revolution" in 1986, the banking sector was left in ruins. The huge foreign debt and 
non-performing assets of the banking sector, which was dominated by large state 
banks, clearly showed the failure of economic and banking reform under the Marcos 
government in the early 1980s. Soon after she took power, President Aquino initiated 
an important banking reform. She started to rehabilitate the state banks, namely the 
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), 
as a first step towards banking reform. The redirection of state activism in the banking 
sector and steady economic growth in the late 1980s revitalised the banking sector. In 
the early 1990s, the Central Bank initiated liberalisation in the banking sector to 
facilitate competition among banks while it maintained a cautious prudential regulation. 
The Central Bank also started to implement foreign exchange liberalisation. For many 
years, the commercial banking sector had been heavily protected by the restriction of 
new entries. Large and strong commercial banks had secured large profits. This highly 
protectionist policy started to change in the early 1990s. The Central Bank gradually
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deregulated bank entry and branching. The policy shift toward liberalising the banking 
sector was further facilitated by the Ramos government. The banking sector, which had 
been closed to new foreign entrants since the Central Bank was established in 1949, 
was finally opened through legislation. The entry of new foreign banks further 
facilitated competition among banks.
Along with the new Central Bank policy, the more competitive business environment 
encouraged the consolidation of the banking sector. The structure of the banking sector, 
which had been dominated by state banks, was rapidly altered after the economic and 
banking crisis of the early 1980s. After the currency crisis of the late 1990s, the 
changes in the structure of the banking sector became even clearer. Due to mergers 
among commercial banks, the big private commercial banks became larger than state 
banks. During the economic recession, the profitability of the banking sector decreased, 
although the banking business is still profitable for solvent banks. The relatively low 
profitability and fierce competition among banks is a recent feature of the banking 
sector, which for a long time had been largely protected and highly profitable. In the 
newly competitive environment, the representatives and owners of banks are now forced 
to be more concerned about solvent lending activities and effective management, 
although banking frauds will never be wholly eradicated.
The 1993 Central Bank reform can also be seen as an important factor contributing to 
the relative monetary and banking stability of the late 1990s, although banking reform 
is an endless process which aims to foster a healthier financial sector in changing 
economic conditions. The establishment of the new Central Bank, Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas (BSP) in 1993 was a significant reform which strengthened the regulatory 
power of the monetary authority. The huge losses of the old Central Bank, which 
pushed interest rates upward, were finally liquidated. Due to the Monetary Board 
reform and reduction of development finance, the new Central Bank became more able 
than before to isolate itself from political interests. Today, the Monetaiy Board is 
composed of seven members with a fixed term of six years each except for one 
representative of the government. The President also appoints the other six members of 
the Monetary Board including the Central Bank governor. However, once appointed,
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the six members' tenure is protected by law. Due to the differences in the tenures of 
Presidents and Monetary Board members, a newly elected President cannot replace 
Board members, including the Central Bank governor. The strict restrictions placed on 
BSP's lending to the National Government have also been beneficial in maintaining 
monetary stability. The Central Bank also keeps the foreign currency accounts in 
surplus. Central Bank officials are provided better legal protection against legal action. 
Their salaries have been increased by the exemption of higher rank officials from the 
salary standardisation law for public servants.
It is also noteworthy that, since the experience of the banking crisis of the early 1980s, 
the Central Bank has adopted a more assertive attitude towards regulating the banking 
sector. The minimum capital requirement for banks has been steadily increased to 
improve the stability of the banking sector. The minimum capital requirement for 
expanded commercial banks (universal banks) has been steadily increased from 500 
million pesos in 1986 to 4.5 billion pesos in 1999. To meet these increasing minimum 
capital requirements, diversification of ownership has been encouraged. Every 
commercial bank must also maintain a high capital adequacy ratio, defined by the 
Central Bank as the ratio of net worth (capital account) to risk assets. In 1992-1997, the 
capital adequacy ratio stayed within the range of 16.9 per cent to 20.2 per cent (Intal 
and Llant,1998:18, Table 5). This is twice as high as the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) requirement of 8 per cent.
In terms of monetary policy, the performance of the BSP still needs to be observed 
carefully. However, there are some positive signs which suggest that the BSP is 
maintaining monetary stability relatively well. Since the BSP was established, key 
monetary indicators, including inflation rates, interest rates and the level of base money, 
have fallen (see Lamberte,2002:23-26). The establishment of the BSP, which removed 
the huge losses of the old Central Bank and strengthened the regulatory power of the 
monetary authority, helped to foster better monetary conditions and a healthier banking 
sector before the currency crisis occurred. In addition, after the currency crisis the 
Central Bank took the necessary action to maintain monetary and banking stability, 
although the deceleration of the economy hurt the banking sector and the insolvency of
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weak banks was unavoidable. After the currency turmoil, in order to strengthen the 
stability of the banking sector, the BSP implemented regulatory reforms. The BSP 
raised bank capital requirements, loan-loss provisions and liquidity cover for foreign 
exchange loans, and implemented stricter limits on loans to the real-estate sector. It also 
redefined past-due loans and enhanced information disclosure and accountability.3 
Importantly, despite the Presidential elections in the midst of rapid foreign currency 
depreciation, the Central Bank was able to keep the banking sector relatively stable and 
the election of a new President did not adversely affect monetary and banking policy. 
The relatively autonomous policy-making power of the Central Bank, which was 
secured by establishing the New Central Bank, was a precondition of maintaining 
relative banking stability.
The Policy Elites-Institutions Centred Approach
In the past two decades, the Philippine banking sector has experienced radical changes. 
In the early 1980s, the worst economic crisis led to the worst banking crisis in the 
country. However, key banking reform was not implemented by the authoritarian 
Marcos regime in decline, despite the emergency. President Aquino, who took power 
by extraordinary means, the "EDSA revolution" of 1986, initiated reforms in the 
banking sector, although she did not successfully implement structural reform through 
the legislative process. The Ramos government implemented critical structural reforms 
in the banking sector. The Ramos government became the first administration which 
was able to implement structural reform in the banking sector through the legislative 
process, namely the establishment of the new Central Bank, Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas, and the entry of new foreign banks.
To understand the successes and failures of banking reform, this study has located
policy elites and institutions at the centre of the analysis. The fact that the decisions of
policy elites, including Presidents, legislators and state officials (Central Bank officials),
centred on their career interests is critical to the attempt to explain the outcomes of
banking reform. Demands from societal and international actors are influential in
banking reform, but these demands are mediated through domestic political institutions
3 See Canlas (2000:56-61), Paderanga (1998) and Gochoco-Bautista (1999:51-55).
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and influence the decisions of policy elites. Changing political institutions crucially 
influence the decisions of policy elites and the interactions among them as they pursue 
their own career interests.
With respect to the Philippine state, arguments which stress the role of the "weakness" 
of the state vis-a-vis social forces (oligarchy) have been the dominant view in studies 
which seek to explain the continuing failure of policy reform and the economy. The 
problems in the banking sector have been seen as typical of a failed economy. For 
example, in his influential study, Hutchcroft (1998) argues that the banking sector can 
be seen as a typical example of "ineffectual state regulation" and "rampant favouritism" 
which is understood in the context of a "patrimonial state" and a "predatory oligarchy". 
He stresses the strong continuity of these structural problems in the Philippine banking 
sector, state and society through its post-war history to the middle of the 1990s. 
However, this view limits our ability to examine the politics of banking reform in the 
process of economic recovery. Contrary to Hutchcroft's stress on the continuing 
fundamental characteristics of the banking sector, since the banking crisis in the early 
1980s there have been visible changes and developments in the banking sector in terms 
of its structure, the role of state banks, the level of competition, regulatoiy policy and 
overall stability, although economists agree that there are still many sources of financial 
inefficiency and instability. Banking sector recovery in the Philippines shows that even 
a "weak" state can be relatively successful in enhancing its regulatory authority in terms 
of monetary and banking management, and in implementing liberalisation measures, 
despite opposition from dominant social forces, namely domestic commercial bank 
owners in the 1990s.
From a comparative perspective, Hutchcroft (1998) classifies the Philippines as a case 
of "booty capitalism" which faces greater obstacles in terms of economic development 
than Indonesian and Thai capitalism ("bureaucratic capitalism"). However, arguments 
based on this broad typology critically limit our ability to understand the banking sector 
in the Philippines after the economic crisis of the early 1980s. In fact, the Philippines 
was able to avoid a banking crisis despite a rapid decline of the currency. During the 
currency crisis, the Philippine banking sector was more stable than its counterparts in
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Indonesia and Thailand in the late 1990s.
Hutchcroft's analysis (1998), assumes that dominant social forces (or oligarchy) 
constitute a united social actor and he thus overestimates the influence of the oligarchy 
on policy decisions. This view is problematic in an examination of banking reform, in 
particular in a consideration of liberalisation in the banking sector. If the banking sector 
had been dominated by a united oligarchy, there would have been no liberalisation 
since the entry of new foreign and domestic banks would potentially have facilitated 
greater competition. In fact, there have been consistent conflicts among Philippine elites 
in and out of the state over key economic policy and banking reform as Hutchcroft 
recognises. Support (or opposition) from various social actors have been influential in 
the successes and failures of banking reform. In the case of banking reforms such as 
the rehabilitation of state banks, liberalisation measures and the entry of new foreign 
banks, the existence of beneficiaries are important in discouraging opposition and 
implementing reforms (see de Dios,1998:74). As noted earlier, when legislation was 
enacted to derestrict the entry of new foreign banks, local banks opposed this critical 
liberalisation measure, while other local businesses were supportive. In spite of the 
close links between local business and big banks, local businesses were in favour of 
banking liberalisation, since they expected that it would lead to lower interest rates.
Hutchcroft (1998) also views the Central Bank as a typical case of ineffectual state 
regulation and emphasises the strong continuity of the Bank's weakness throughout its 
history. However, this view is also problematic. In fact, the regulatory powers of the 
Central Bank and its autonomy vis-a-vis the government and regulated banks have 
improved since the banking crisis of the early 1980s. Few economists see a strong 
continuity in the role of the Central Bank and its regulatory powers under the Marcos, 
Aquino and Ramos governments. Under the Marcos dictatorship, the Central Bank, 
which played a critical role in development finance, was unable to maintain its 
autonomy vis-a-vis the President and political affairs. Faced with an economic and 
banking crisis, the role of the Central Bank as monetary authority and banking 
regulator was severely undermined by the President's interference in Central Bank 
decisions. After Aquino took power, the Central Bank, which was backed by the
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President, started to implement regulatory reforms more smoothly. Unlike her 
predecessor, President Aquino did not intervene in the Central Bank's decisions 
regarding banking policy. Under the Ramos government, the regulatory powers of the 
Central Bank were strengthened by the enactment of the New Central Bank Act, a 
critical bank reform. The Central Bank secured more distance from the government as a 
result of the monetary board reform and the reduction of development finance. The 
Central Bank's huge deficits, which caused high inflational pressure were restructured. 
The Central Bank also enhanced its regulatory power by establishing the new Central 
Bank.
International financial structures, the policy preferences of the IMF, the World Bank, 
the US government and other donor countries have always been influential factors in 
Philippine economic and banking policy reform. The Aquino and in particular, Ramos 
governments have implemented liberalising reforms and have also reformed the central 
bank in order to improve its creditworthiness in international financial markets. Yet, the 
pressures from foreign actors cannot been seen as the single decisive factor in banking 
sector reform. From the early 1980s, liberal reform has been the main policy concern of 
the IMF, the World Bank and the US government. However, the Philippine experience 
shows that the adoption of liberal reform in the banking sector and other sectors has 
never been a simple process enforced by powerful foreign actors. Despite the strong 
trend towards financial liberalisation in the 1990s, the structure, regulatory framework 
and overall stability of the banking sector varied across countries.
The change of US security interests in the 1990s, has often been viewed as a major 
cause of liberalisation in the economy (see Hutchcroft,1998). Proponents of this view 
assume that after the end of the "Cold War" and the closure of US bases, the US 
government no longer saw any need to shield the Philippines from the demands of the 
IMF and the World Bank to open the economy. However, pressure from the IMF and 
the World Bank should not be seen as the decisive or sole factor in promoting reforms 
in the Philippine banking sector. Neither can one persuasively argue that US support of 
the new Aquino government due to security interests was a decisive factor in mitigating 
the pressure from the IMF and World Bank to reform the economy.
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Especially after the Philippines declared a moratorium on foreign debt payments in 
1983, the policy preferences of foreign creditors, including the US government, the 
IMF, the World Bank and other donor countries were influential in the making of 
economic policy. However, faced with an economic crisis, the Marcos government 
repeatedly delayed the implementation of the economic stabilisation measures 
recommended by the IMF due to considerations of domestic politics, namely the 1984 
legislative election. In addition, a critical banking reform, namely the rehabilitation of 
the state banks, was not implemented, despite support from the IMF and the World 
Bank. During the Aquino period, a critical banking reform, the Central Bank reform, 
was not implemented, due to the deadlock between the President and the newly restored 
Legislature, although the World Bank provided strong financial incentives through 
conditionality lending. It should also be noted that although the Ramos government did 
not receive strong financial support through conditionality lending, the reform measure 
to open the banking sector to new foreign entrants was successfully implemented, 
despite strong opposition from big domestic commercial banks.
The relationship between US security concerns, its preferences in terms of economic 
policy and the policy stances of the IMF and the World Bank is also less than clear. 
Despite US support of the Marcos government, the IMF and the World Bank put 
strong pressure on Marcos to reform the economy including public spending, and to 
implement the coconut and sugar industry reforms. The shortage of foreign exchange 
due to the strict stance of the IMF and the World Bank decelerated the economy and 
fuelled opposition to the US backed President. In spite of its security concerns, the US 
also forcefully recommended an unpopular foreign debt policy to the Aquino 
government which fuelled opposition to the government. Foreign debt policy was the 
most controversial economic issue in the early years of the Aquino government.
A "policy elites and institutions-centred approach" essentially places policy elites, 
including Presidents, legislators and state officials at the centre of economic reform 
policy-making. The fact that the interests of policy elites centre on their career interests 
is crucial to their policy choices. The core of any President's career interests is the
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desire to stay in power. If they can serve for consecutive terms, reelection becomes a 
high priority. If Presidents face a real threat of being overthrown, their first wish is to 
be able to complete their term. If they cannot serve consecutive terms, they will aim to 
maximise their political influence within their political parties or among their allies. 
Legislators are most concerned about reelection. The vote in the next election is always 
crucial for their career. State officials want first to secure their posts in office and then 
to win promotion.
It is important to note that the interests of policy elites are not identical with those of the 
oligarchy and international actors, including the US government, the IMF, the World 
Bank and other donor countries. Politicians, including the President and legislators, 
might chose to protect the interests of wealthy social forces (oligarchy or cronies) for 
electoral purposes. Yet, as the failure of the Marcos dictatorship showed, this is often 
not an optimal strategy for politicians. The high risks involved in such a strategy 
became clearer after democratic electoral contests were restored. For state officials, 
misconduct which maximises their material benefits in the short term can also 
potentially terminate their career. Serving foreign interests (or rumours about such 
activities) is surely damaging for policy elites and may end their careers. Thus, policy 
elites in the Philippine state authority can be seen as potentially autonomous from 
societal and foreign actors. They make policy decisions which serve neither the 
interests of dominant societal forces (oligarchy) nor those of powerful foreign actors 
when they serve their own interests.
Political institutions are influential in determining the decisions of policy elites and the 
interactions among them, which centre on their career interests. Political institutions can 
be defined as either formal (e.g. statute laws and regulations) or informal. The 
Constitution, which defines the power of the President, Legislature and State is at the 
centre of formal political institutions. It also determines the electoral rules for 
Presidents and legislators which are essential for their career interests. A particular 
form of formal political institution does not lead directly to the success or failure of 
banking reform. Informal institutions, which include customs, social norms and self- 
imposed codes of conduct, are also influential in shaping the policy decisions of policy
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elites. Nevertheless, as Philippine experiences show, changing formal political 
institutions have had a significant impact on the decisions of policy elites, policy 
coordination among them and the level of the Central Bank's autonomy, all of which are 
influential in determining the success or failure of banking reform.
The policy elite and institutions-centred approach, which locates the decisions of policy 
elites and the interactions among them in the context of changing political institutions at 
the centre of the analysis can offer a systematic and coherent explanation for the 
failures and successes of banking reform in the Philippines. This thesis has argued 
that the successful enactment and implementation of banking reform in the process of 
economic recovery between 1986 and 1995 was contingent on a new constellation of 
political institutions which emerged with the establishment of the 1987 Constitution. 
This new constellation strengthened the interests and capacities of Philippine Presidents 
in advancing banking reforms and weakened potential resistance among legislators and 
social actors. The decisions of policy elites, the interaction among them in the context 
of changing Philippine political institutions and their influence on banking reform 
outcomes are briefly recapitulated below.
After independence, the Philippines adopted a democratic form of government under 
the 1935 Constitution, which was a Presidential system with a bicameral legislature 
until 1972. The regulatory framework of the banking sector was established by the 
Central Bank Act and General Banking Act in 1949. After a steady economic recovery 
supported by funds from the United States during the 1950s, economic growth 
decelerated at the beginning of the 1960s. Demands for economic reform to restore 
economic growth grew in the 1960s. In the late 1960s, faced with banking instability, 
the Central Bank first began to advocate structural reform in the banking sector to 
strengthen the regulatory framework under the first Marcos government (1965-1969). 
In the early 1970s, the massive behest loans of growing state banks were revealed, and 
the necessity of banking reform became evident under the second Marcos government 
(1969-1972). After President Marcos was reelected, he faced rising criticism and 
became more keenly supportive of the banking reform recommended by the Central 
Bank in response to public demands. Yet, the Marcos government failed to implement
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structural reform in the banking sector. Between 1949 and 1972, under the 1935 
Constitution, there was no key structural reform in the banking sector through the 
legislative process. This period of the economy and the financial system was also 
characterised by frequent monetary instability caused by massive election-related 
spending.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the President's interests and capacities in promoting 
banking reform were not strong enough to overcome opposition from legislators. 
Under the 1935 Constitution, the frequent legislative elections, in particular Presidential 
elections, every four years, which allowed reelection of the incumbent President, 
inevitably encouraged election-related spending and discouraged the Central Bank from 
tightening monetary policy. More importantly, the fierce rivalry between the President 
and legislative leaders, in particular the senators, which was often fuelled by tactical 
considerations for the next Presidential election, was a serious obstacle to reform of the 
banking sector through the legislative process. Legislative leaders who were seeking the 
next Presidency faced a serious dilemma: legislative actions that promoted economic 
and banking reform benefitted the incumbent President, who was their main rival.
Since the political party system, which disciplined the behaviour of legislators and 
provided the rules for electing leaders, was underdeveloped in the Philippines, there 
were few formal or informal institutions and organisations which helped to build a 
consensus between the President and the Legislature on important economic policy 
measures. It should also be noted that the Central Bank authority did not enjoy strong 
powers as a monetary authority. On the first Monetary Board before the 1972 reform, 
the decision-making body of the Central Bank was chaired by the Minister of Finance 
and the Central Bank governor was one of seven members on a par with 
representatives from two state banks, namely the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and 
the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
In 1972, President Marcos declared martial law and closed the Legislature. This 
transformation of political institutions strengthened the interests and capacities of the 
President in promoting reforms in the banking sector. The concentration of power
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overcame the problem of policy coordination in the early years of the dictatorship. 
Important structural reforms to enhance the regulatory power of the Central Bank were 
implemented by Presidential decrees soon after the declaration of martial law. The 
importance of banking reform was stressed by the government as an achievement of 
the martial law regime. However, the concentration of power provided fertile ground for 
Presidential cronyism under the dictatorship. The banking sector had experienced 
unprecedented levels of presidential cronyism and favouritism under the Marcos 
dictatorship. State banks expanded, as did behest loans. Marcos crony banks also 
expanded rapidly in the 1970s. Expansion of Presidential cronyism eroded the stability 
of the banking sector. As development finance by the Central Bank, which largely 
benefitted the dictator and his cronies was expanded, the role of the Central Bank as a 
monetary authority and banking regulator was severely undermined.
In the 1970s, the Philippine economy maintained a relatively high economic growth rate 
but this was largely fuelled by foreign and domestic borrowing. With changing 
international economic conditions, the Philippines had to face its most serious 
economic and banking crisis in the early 1980s. Faced with this crisis, the Presidential 
dictatorship in decline showed its inability to reform the economy and banking sector.
By the early 1980s, the problems of policy coordination between the President, Cabinet 
members and Central Bank officials and other close allies of the President were 
revealed as the dictatorship began to lose its grip on power. In 1978, the creation of the 
Ministry of the Human Settlement by the first lady, Imelda Marcos, triggered the loss 
of the government's control over government spending. In the early 1980s, under strict 
budget constraints, conflicts between Monetary Board members who were in favour of 
macro economic stabilisation measures and Imelda Marcos and close Marcos cronies, 
who opposed austerity measures, intensified. The restoration of legislative and local 
elections added to the complexity of governing the country, although the elections were 
not fair and the President dominated law-making. The implementation of economic 
stabilisation measures was repeatedly delayed due to the 1984 elections. Critical 
economic reforms, including reforms of the coconut, sugar and banking sector, were 
not implemented under the Marcos government, despite strong pressure from the IMF
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and the World Bank. The sugar and coconut industries were dominated by powerful 
Marcos cronies, namely Roberto Benedicto and Eduardo Cojuangco respectively. Both 
of these men, who also owned big banks, occupied important positions in the ruling 
Marcos party, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).
In the economic and banking crisis, the weakness of the Central Bank as a monetary 
authority and banking regulator was clearly revealed. The Central Bank, which played a 
critical role in development finance, allocation of foreign exchange and rescue of ailing 
companies, including banks, was vulnerable to the President's interventions. The 
majority of the Monetary Board members were representatives from the government 
(Cabinet members). Election related spending reemerged as a serious threat to 
monetary stability. Central Bank initiatives, which aimed to strengthen the banking 
sector and to restore public confidence by implementing tough measures against 
insolvent banks, were curbed by the direct intervention of the President. The insolvent 
state banks, which were at the centre of the Philippine banking sector, exemplified the 
failure of economic and banking reform under the Marcos dictatorship. Faced with 
growing opposition, President Marcos was most concerned about consolidating 
political support from his close allies, who opposed dismantling the coconut and sugar 
industries and banking reform due to their business interests. Marcos was more 
interested in the immediate goal of reelection in the snap Presidential election of 1986 
than in implementing economic and banking reform to improve the economy in the 
long term. Under the dictatorship, there was no restoration of public confidence in the 
banking sector.
In 1986, when the newly elected President Aquino took power, the Philippines faced 
serious economic problems, including huge foreign debts. There was no short-term 
solution to the deep problems of the Philippine economy, such as low economic growth 
rates, large inequity of wealth and an ineffectual state apparatus. Nevertheless, the 
transition from Marcos to Aquino triggered a change in banking policy and policy­
making. The banking sector started to recover as a consequence of policy reform under 
the Aquino government.
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In terms of banking reform, the Aquino government had mixed results. Immediately 
after Aquino took power, the interests and capacities of the President in promoting 
reforms in the banking sector were strengthened by generating broad support from 
mass and foreign lenders, and by maintaining the President's domination of law-making 
power until the Legislature was restored. During this period, an important banking 
reform, the rehabilitation of state banks, was implemented. The rehabilitation of state 
banks, which were left insolvent with huge non-performing assets by the previous 
government, was the first step towards the restoration of the banking sector. It should 
also be noted that under the Aquino government, the Central Bank restored amicable 
relations with the President. Unlike President Marcos, President Aquino did not 
intervene in the decisions of the Central Bank regarding banking policy. With support 
from the President, the Central Bank implemented regulatory reforms in the banking 
sector more successfully than under the Marcos government in the early 1980s.
However, the fierce conflicts between the President and legislative leaders, in particular 
the senators, prevented the successful implementation of further structural reform 
through the legislative process. There were no effective formal or informal institutions 
and organisations which facilitated cooperation between the President and Legislature 
in enacting important economic measures under the newly restored legislative system. 
Due to a transitional provision of the 1987 Constitution, there were no legislative 
elections held between 1987 and 1992. Thus legislators did not need to cooperate with 
the President in order to be able ask for her support in an approaching election. 
President Aquino was not keen to create a formal body to facilitate policy coordination 
between the President and legislative leaders. She committed herself to a veiy strict 
stance of not intervening in the legislative process since such intervention might have 
hurt her popularity, which had been generated by opposing the dictatorship and 
respecting the "democratic" system. The importance of Central Bank reform was 
broadly recognised and the reform was endorsed by the World Bank. However, the 
Aquino government was not able to implement Central Bank reform.
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The Aquino government had embarked on an economic strategy based on liberalisation 
and the enhancement of regulatory powers in order to expand exports and attract 
foreign investment in the early 1990s. The Ramos government further promoted this 
economic strategy. In terms of banking reform, the Ramos government became the first 
administration to implement key structural reforms in the banking sector through the 
legislative process. The establishment of the New Central Bank and the entry of new 
foreign banks can be seen as critical structural reforms in the banking sector.
Although the Ramos government inherited its economic strategy from the Aquino 
government, the transition from the Aquino to Ramos government was accompanied by 
important changes in political institutions, which influenced the decisions and interests 
of policy elites and the interactions among them. Under the new constellation of 
political institutions created as a result of the 1987 Constitution, the interests and 
capacities of the President in advancing banking reforms were enhanced.
The New political institutions created under the 1987 Constitution provided legislative 
leaders with strong incentives to cooperate with the President in reforming the economy 
and banking sector. The 1987 Constitution replaced the basic framework of the 
previous 1935 Constitution, including the Presidential system and the bicameral 
Legislature. Importantly, the Presidential term was now limited to only one term of six 
years. Under the 1987 Constitution, for legislative leaders who harboured ambitions for 
the next Presidential seat, the incumbent President was no longer a rival in the next 
elections. In addition, the results of the 1992 Presidential election, the first held under 
the new Constitution, suggest that popular support for "reform" and the endorsement of 
the incumbent President were very important for electoral success. Thus, for legislative 
leaders concerned about their prospects as candidates in the next Presidential election, 
there were strong incentives to cooperate with the President on his reform agenda, 
particularly, before the President decided which candidate to supporrt. The 
establishment of a cooperative relationship between the President and legislative leaders 
was a significant precondition for successful implementation of structural reforms in 
the banking sector.
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Amicable relations between the President and legislative leaders were also encouraged 
by the Ramos leadership, as can be seen in measures such as the formation of the 
Legislative and Executive Development Advisory Council (LEDAC), which played a 
critical role in building a consensus on priority bills. Under the Ramos government, the 
LEDAC met once a week for many years and became the most effective body in the 
country's history in coordinating communications between the Executive and the 
Legislature on policy issues. The Ramos government also encouraged legislators to 
participate in forming an economic development plan. Furthermore, in 1993, a People's 
Summit on Social Pact for Empowered Economic Development (SPEED) was 
organised through cooperation between the President and legislative leaders to mobilise 
public support for the government's economic and social agenda. Cooperative efforts 
between the President and legislative leaders on priority bills reached a high point under 
the Ramos government.
In the Philippines, the lack of a responsible party system was seen as a serious obstacle 
to economic reform due to poor coordination between the President and legislative 
leaders. However, under the 1987 Constitution, the President was able to take the 
initiative in building cooperative relations with Legislature and the Ramos government 
was thus able to pursue its legislative agenda more successfully than previous 
Presidents.
Concluding Comments
In the last two decades, there has been little improvement in terms of international 
financial stability. Developing economies are severely constrained by the unstable 
international financial system. The Philippines has faced numerous challenges to its 
attempts to develop its economy and banking sector in this unstable international 
financial system. Political instability, corruption, cronyism and ineffectual state 
regulation are still serious matters which undermine economic development. The 
domination of economic wealth by a small number of elites (or new and old oligarchy) 
continues. Nevertheless, the economy and the banking sector have experienced notable 
changes. After the end of the Marcos dictatorship, the Philippine banking sector
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recovered under the Aquino and Ramos governments from the ruins of the banking 
crisis of the early 1980s. The Philippines, which was the most vulnerable economy 
among Southeast Asian countries to the international economic shocks of the early 
1980s, was relatively successful in avoiding the worst-case scenario of the economic 
and banking crisis caused by the rapid decline of the currency in the late 1990s. The 
successful enactment and implementation of banking reform in the Philippines, which 
contributed to the recovery and development of the banking sector, was contingent on a 
new constellation of political institutions emerging as a consequence of the 1987 
Constitution. This new constellation strengthened the interests and capacities of 
Presidents in promoting banking reform and weakened resistance among legislators 
and the dominant social forces (or oligarchy).
After the currency crisis, the Philippine economy and banking sector showed mixed 
signs of disappointment and hope. Although the Philippine banking sector did not face 
a real threat of collapse in the financial system, the persistent weaknesses of the 
banking sector were revealed. Banking frauds, which led to the insolvency of banks, 
continued to emerge. The viability of the state banks' lending activities was still in 
doubt. President Estrada's misconduct revealed that even one of the top commercial 
banks was not entirely trustworthy in terms of its banking business. The recent collapse 
of the Urban Bank highlighted the difficulty of banking supervision in a liberalised 
environment which allows commercial banks to invest in their investment banking 
arms.4
However, it is also possible to see the positive effects of banking reform after the 
economic crisis of the early 1980s. The BSP has continued to regulate the banking 
sector without serious intervention from successive presidents. The BSP has also tried 
to become more accountable for its own actions. Since the BSP was established, it has 
maintained a good reputation among businesses as a monetary authority. Although the 
Estrada administration was not keen to use the LEDAC to facilitate cooperation
4 For the case of the Urban Bank, see Business World, 16 August 2000, "Second Quarter Banking 
Report: Some hard lessons from the Urban Bank collapse (What Happened and Can it Happen 
Again?)11.
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between the President and legislative leaders on high priority bills,5 the function of the 
LEDAC remained unchanged and the Legislature was able to amend the General 
Banking Act of 2000 under the Estrada government. The regulatory power of the BSP, 
the Central Bank, was enhanced and foreign participation was also encouraged by the 
legislation. Despite the serious political turmoil fuelled by financial scandals, the 
banking sector maintained relative stability.
This thesis has demonstrated that the positive effects of the emerging political 
institutions, which strengthened the interests and capacities of the Presidents in 
advancing banking reforms, were most clearly visible under the Ramos government. 
Yet, dark shadows were growing over the relative optimism of the mid 1990s. Above all, 
the unexpected fall of President Estrada showed the weakness of formal political 
institutions which enforce regular change in the Presidency. Due to this irregularity, his 
successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who was promoted from the office of Vice 
President, was allowed to stand for the next election as an incumbent President. Faced 
with approaching Presidential elections, incumbent Presidents rarely reduce government 
spending to strengthen economic fundamentals. At the beginning of the 21st century, 
the Philippines is still in the early stages of developing the formal and informal political 
institutions necessary to facilitate reform initiatives through the legislative process and 
to encourage the Central Bank to further develop the banking sector according to its 
mandate.
5 For the LEDAC under the Estrada, see, for example, Business World, 4 November 1998 
"Estrada to reconvene economic planning body", Business World, 1 July 1999,
"Estrada administration tinsel gov't, Roco claims", and Business World, 20 October 1999 
"More coordination urged in lawmaking process".
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